Professional scepticism : another audit expectation gap? by O'Donnell, KG
  
 
 
Professional Scepticism: 
Another audit expectation gap? 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Kerri O’Donnell 
BCom, CFE 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, Commerce 
 
 
 
Tasmanian School of Business & Economics 
University of Tasmania 
2016 
  
 
 
 
 i 
  ii 
Statement of Originality 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by 
the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and 
duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no 
material previously published or written by another person except where due 
acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any 
material that infringes copyright. 
27/11/15 
………………………………………. ………………………….. 
Kerri O’Donnell Date 
Statement of Ethical Conduct 
The research associated with this thesis abides by the international and Australian 
codes on human and animal experimentation, the guidelines by the Australian 
Government's Office of the Gene Technology Regulator and the rulings of the 
Safety, Ethics and Institutional Biosafety Committees of the University. 
27/11/15 
……………………………………….   ………………………….. 
Kerri O’Donnell Date 
Statement of Authority 
 This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication 
in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.  
27/11/15 
……………………………………….   ………………………….. 
Kerri O’Donnell Date 
iii 
iv 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would not have happened but for the support and encouragement of a 
number of very important people.   
I firstly take this opportunity to formally acknowledge and appreciate the very 
important role of the formal supervision team: Associate Professor Trevor 
Wilmshurst, Dr William Maguire, and Dr Sonia Shimeld; and to express particular 
gratitude to Dr Paul Shantapriyan for his exceptional mentorship.  I also thank the 
examiners, and review committee members, for their considered and insightful 
feedback. 
Very special thanks must also go to Professor Roger Willett; and graphic artist, 
Shannon Lee (www.ShannonLee.com.au).  
I am also grateful to my professional and academic colleagues and other kind 
individuals, at University of Tasmania and across the world, for their interest, 
constructive attention, pearls of wisdom and feedback along the way – for listening, 
and asking the curly questions.  These include, but are certainly not limited to:  Dr 
Gail Ridley, Mr John Streeter, Mr Barry Hicks, the late Associate Professor Sue 
Hrasky, Mr Peter Collett, Mr John Pugh, Associate Professor Martin Grimmer, 
Associate Professor Mark Dibben, Dr Seu Keow Cheng, Professor Mardi Dungey, 
Professor David Adams (all of University of Tasmania), the organisers and mentors 
of the 2011 CSEAR Doctoral Colloquium (Hobart), Mr John Oliver (Solutions to 
Business P/L), Dr Judy Oliver (Swinburne University), Professor Ken Trotman 
(UNSW), Professor Rabinarayan Subudhi (KIIT University, India), Mr Heitor Moura 
Filho (Associação Biblioteca de Cultura, Brazil), Dr Antje Cockrill (University of 
Wales Trinity Saint David, Carmarthen), Dr Ulf-Dietrich Reips (Universität 
Konstanz, Germany), Mr Steve Taylor (Auckland University of Technology), Mr 
Daryl Connelly (Cradle Coast Innovation Inc), Mr Richard Chapman and Ms Gina 
Gunn (CPA Australia), Ms Caron Wilds, Mr Neil Christopher, Dr Anna Kamaralli 
(University of Notre Dame, University of Newcastle)… and the many others I 
encountered from around the world, who participated in my data gathering, promoted 
my survey to their wider networks, and expressed interest in, and encouragement of, 
my research.  Numerous people took the time to sign up to a mailing list to learn the 
study outcomes, to connect with me via social and professional networks, and took 
the time to email that they wish me well.  I am also grateful to officemate-
extraordinaire, Mrs Debbie Wills, for her very important sense of work-life 
perspective.  Thank you all. 
I also wish to express enormous appreciation for my mother, Noelene Wilson.  Like 
your Dad, you always try to make everyone happy: You have something that no 
education can teach, yet the world needs more and more of it. 
For Shannon and Madeline Lee, who I value more than anything. 
v 
Extended Abstract  
Auditor independence became a focus of regulatory and accounting research due to a 
number of large corporate collapses involving fraud in the early 2000s.  The focus of 
research was the reduction of auditor bias, and attention to improving the auditors’ 
objective position as a means to enhance the identification of fraud and mitigate the 
risks of issuing an inappropriate audit opinion or being implicated in fraud cases.   
Audit team members are required, under the International Auditing Standards, to 
exercise professional scepticism throughout the audit process.  In Australia, this 
requirement is mandatory under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003, and auditors 
have been held accountable in the courts for failure to exercise an appropriate degree 
of professional scepticism following audit failure. 
Two aspects under International Auditing Standard ASA200 (AUASB, 2013b) are 
associated with professional scepticism: A questioning attitude, and critical 
assessment of evidence.  Interestingly, a professional level of that attitude is not 
defined within the Standard, so it is not clear how auditors can judge whether they 
are exercising an appropriate standard of scepticism.   
This research explored whether a ‘professional’ standard, or level, of scepticism 
could be identified, and developed the notion of level to distinguish a range of 
‘professional scepticism’ from ranges of lay scepticism and less objective attitudes. 
The levels are then used to explore whether external auditors exercise the appropriate 
professional scepticism, as mandated by the International Auditing Standards.  This 
extends prior research, which has attempted to measure auditor scepticism focused 
on the attitude factor only, and resulted in relative measures of scepticism that 
compared auditors with other auditors rather than comparing with a ‘professional’ 
level or benchmark.  
In this research, a conceptual model of professional scepticism is developed, 
illustrating the interrelationships between the attitude and critical assessment aspects. 
The literature informing the model supports the view that the attitude factor reflects 
an inherent trait, while critical assessment is a learned skill, developed over time, and 
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influenced by training and/or experience.  Together, these factors represent a default 
level of scepticism, being a default mindframe in the absence of prompts to increase 
vigilance, and distinct from a state that may be achievable by such an increase in 
vigilance.  
Three established questionnaires were combined to address the trait and skill aspects 
of the model:  Wrightsman’s (1991) Interpersonal Trust Scale, Budner’s (1962) 
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale, and The Curiosity and Exploration Inventory-II 
(Kashdan et al, 2009). These generic inventories were chosen to facilitate 
participation by non-auditors, enabling exploration of a broad range of sceptical and 
non-sceptical attitudes and skills, increasing the range of observations across the 
model continuum for the purpose of establishing scepticism levels.   
The resulting questionnaire was administered online to potential participants via 
social media.  This method of recruitment enabled participation by subjects across 
the world, appropriate to the modern international educational, commercial and 
investment scenarios.  Clusters of relevant participant groups were encouraged by 
advertising the survey to the memberships of qualified fraud examiner and auditor 
groups’ online discussion boards, and the social media construct was utilised to 
snowball recruitment to a reasonably diverse cross-section of adult internet users 
without accounting, auditing or fraud training.  The non-specialist participants could 
be expected to have a direct or indirect interest in the truth and fairness of financial 
statements, as business decision makers, employees, investors and/or consumers.  
Participation was voluntary, anonymous and without reward. 
Of 298 completed surveys, 7 participants were excluded, resulting in 291 usable 
responses.  After preliminary analysis, the survey instrument was analysed and 
reduced to a 17-question instrument with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.910 and two 
confirmed factors.   
Each participant’s data was scored in two ways: Firstly, a Bias Score indicated a 
degree of personal bias as well as the direction of bias, toward either trust or distrust, 
where a score of zero represents the lowest level of subjective or dispositional bias 
and the maximum bias score is +/-26.  This score was derived solely from the items 
in Wrightsman’s (1991) Interpersonal Trust Scale.   Secondly, each participant’s data 
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was received a Scepticism Score, derived from all items in the composite scale, 
converted to a percentage, where 100% represents the highest level of professional 
scepticism.  The objective of the dual-scoring process is to offer clarity in instances 
that an auditor’s Scepticism Score is lower than the professional level benchmark: 
The directional Bias Score may be useful for deciding upon relevant skill 
development activities for those whose scores suggest a high level of trust in others 
(at the positive sign end) which could result in increased audit risk or, conversely, a 
high level of distrust (at the negative sign end) which could result in audit 
inefficiencies. 
Two standard deviations of the mean of scores of qualified fraud examiners (n=41), 
whose work is centred on use of admissible, relevant and reliable evidence for 
prosecution of fraud cases, were utilised to establish a boundary to the ‘professional’ 
range of scepticism, by virtue of the role of evidence in their work.  This top level of 
scepticism was expected to capture 95% of those participants whose work entailed 
objective evidence-based judgments.  Two further ranges were established:  A 
middle range, between the professional benchmark and the mid-score of 50%, 
expected to capture those participants whose judgements are more likely informed by 
evidence than subjectivity; and the lower range, below 50%, expected to capture 
those participants whose judgements are more likely informed by subjectivity than 
evidence.  
An unexpected Sophisticated Layperson (SL) group emerged from the exploration: 
Qualified accountants without external audit experience or fraud training (n=52), 
employed in corporate roles.  This group’s mean Bias score was substantially less 
trusting than all other participant groups’, and the range of scores within the group 
was quite narrow.  In contrast, the scores of the Non-sophisticated Layperson (NSL) 
group (n=153) spread very much further along the scepticism continuum in both trust 
and distrust directions, as anticipated. 
Testing revealed that 51% of external auditors (n=45) in the study returned default 
scepticism scores within the ‘professional’ range, with the average mean score 
attributing to the auditors slightly less trusting attitudes than fraud examiners. 
Auditors scored .0947747 points, 95% CI [.140962, .048587], above the professional 
benchmark, set at two standard deviations of the mean of Qualified Fraud 
viii 
Examiners’ scores.  This difference is statistically significant, t(44) = 4.135, p < .001, 
and statistically moderate at d = 0.6165.  Further, Auditor participants were, on 
average, less biased than all other participants, and the mean Auditor score diverges 
only 3% (1/26) from the optimal objectivity point. 
Overall, the results of this research suggest that a small majority of external auditor 
participants in the study do exhibit a professional level of default scepticism.  Other 
observations arising from the data suggest that future research may be warranted to 
explore whether accounting training is more effective than fraud training for the 
purpose of mitigating trust bias and increasing the efficacy of evidence-based 
judgments, and to understand whether the high scores achieved by trained 
Accountants working in corporate roles are attributable to taking a preparer 
perspective, rather than a user perspective, when evaluating information. 
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Chapter 1: Research Context 
1.1  Introduction 
Lack of professional scepticism is a cause to which audit failure has been directly 
attributed (ACRA, 2013; ASIC, 2010; CPAB, 2013; PCAOB, 2012a, 2013; Glover 
& Prawitt, 2014), particularly when such failures involve material misstatements due 
to fraud (Trompeter et al, 2013).  According to Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson 
(2001), lack of professional scepticism is one of the most common audit deficiencies, 
along with lack of due care and failure to collate sufficient evidence of sufficient 
quality.  Bonner (1999) has suggested that little or no professional scepticism is 
utilised to inform judgements, increasing the probability that audit judgments will be 
based on incomplete or inaccurate information.  Indeed, in 80% of the SEC 
enforcement action cases studied by Beasley et al (2001), auditors “failed to gather 
sufficient evidence”, while in 40% of cases, they over-relied on management 
explanations and did not “challenge explanations that were inconsistent or refuted by 
other evidence the auditor had already gathered”.   
The IAASB (Gunn & Jules, 2012, p1) reinforce that: 
“[t]he need for professional skepticism in an audit cannot be 
overemphasized… In the aftermath of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, 
recent audit inspection reports in various jurisdictions have noted areas … 
where regulators and oversight bodies believe that auditors should have 
more clearly demonstrated professional skepticism.” 
The IAASB has also more recently issued an Invitation to Comment (IAASB, 2016) 
on its current work, titled ‘Enhancing Audit Quality in the Public Interest: A focus on 
professional scepticism, quality control and group audits’.  O’Malley (2016) noted 
that the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) is concerned 
that the audit profession has still not done enough to improve audit quality, with 
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 deficiencies being found in 43 per cent of audit inspections.  Professional scepticism 
is essential to audit quality, underpinning the premise of independent assurance, 
however the industry recognises that more work is necessary in this area in particular 
(Chartered Accountants, Australia & New Zealand, 2014).  Indeed, in the Australian 
Securities & Investments Commission’s Audit Inspection Program Report for 2014-
15, ‘audit evidence and professional scepticism’ featured as the first of the key 
findings communicated (ASIC, 2015), noting that the level of professional 
scepticism must continue to improve. 
 
Professional scepticism is an important part of professional judgment, which all 
members of audit teams (AUASB, 2013b, para. 13(d)) are required to exhibit 
throughout the audit engagement (AUASB, 2013b).  The Auditing Standards 
(AUASB, 2013b, para. 13.4(l)) define professional scepticism as: 
...an attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert to conditions 
which may indicate possible misstatement due to error or fraud, and a 
critical assessment of evidence.   
 
 
Professional scepticism can be considered of particular significance in cases of fraud 
because fraud involves deception and disguise (Grenier, 2014), making it far more 
difficult to identify than error.   
 
Professional scepticism is mandated by the International Auditing Standards, and in 
Australia, the “Auditing Standards are legislative instruments under the Legislative 
Instruments Act 2003” (AUASB, 2013b, p.4; Wong, 2008, p.46).  This means that 
the Standards are legally enforceable.  The Standards apply to all members of audit 
engagement teams (AUASB, 2013b, para. 13(d)). 
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 Prior to the legislative change, auditors could be liable to others for losses suffered as 
a result of auditor negligence: Clients could sue for breach of contract pursuant to the 
agreement embodied in audit engagement letters; and other parties could sue for 
damages under the tort of negligence, provided that they could show a duty of care 
was owed by the auditor.  Court rulings about such claims, over more than a century, 
have informed the development of our modern perspectives about foreseeability, 
reasonable care and skill, and independence, as precursors to our understanding of 
professional scepticism.  If found guilty, auditors were liable to compensate 
claimants for relevant financial losses suffered as a result of their negligence.   
Common law rulings were so influential that their role is discussed in more detail for 
the purpose of defining professional scepticism in Section 2.2 of this thesis.   
 
Auditors could also be sanctioned by their professional bodies for breach of the 
Australian Professional and Ethical Standards Board Code of Ethics (APESB, 2013), 
which is also enforceable pursuant to Auditing Standard ASA102 Compliance with 
Ethical Requirements when Performing Audits, Reviews and Other Assurance 
Engagements (APESB, 2013, para 1.4).  The Code’s Professional Behaviour 
principle, which obliges all members of professional bodies to “comply with relevant 
laws and regulations and avoid any action or omission that the Member knows or 
should know may discredit the profession” (para 150.1).  The fundamental principles 
of the Code also include the requirement to maintain professional competence and 
comply with relevant Standards (APESB, 2013, para 100.5(c).  These sanctions can 
include reprimands, fines, suspension and/or expulsion from the professional body 
(CPAA, 2016).1 
 
1 Examples of recent decisions, and penalties applied by the CPA Australia Disciplinary Tribunal are published at 
https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/about-us/member-conduct-and-discipline/outcome-of-disciplinary-hearings, 
last accessed 26/7/16.  
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 In addition, the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (CALDB) 
acts as an independent tribunal that assesses complaints made against auditors under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (s 1292) (CALDB, 2016a).  Penalties that can be applied 
include suspension or cancellation of auditor registration (Corporations Act 2001, s 
1292(1).2   
 
Following the change to legal enforceability, the range of potential consequences is 
expanded.  In addition to the consequences above, auditors may now face 
prosecution for breach of statute, independently of any contract or tort action, 
because these actions are not mutually exclusive.  If held accountable under statute, 
auditors may now incur fine and/or jail penalties.  It has been argued, however, that 
making auditing standards legally enforceable may be counterproductive to global 
harmonisation (Allen, 2006), and that fines would not improve auditor performance 
(Brown, 2003). 
 
Even before legal enforceability, auditors have been held accountable in court for 
failure to exercise sufficient professional scepticism (Harding & Trotman, 2015).  
However, the determination of what constitutes sufficient professional scepticism has 
been a matter for courts.   Scepticism is an “attitude” (AUASB, 2013b, para. 13(l)), 
and a professional level, or benchmark, of that attitude is not defined by the 
Standards, so it is not clear how auditors are to evaluate whether they are exercising 
an appropriate level of scepticism prior to such an evaluation being made in a court 
of law.    
 
Combined, legal accountability and the linkage between fraud and audit failure 
suggest that professional scepticism is a key factor in the identification (or not) of 
2 Examples of recent decisions, and penalties applied by the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board are published at http://www.caldb.gov.au/decisions/caldb-decisions/, last accessed 26/7/16. 
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 fraud in financial statements.  Accordingly, prior research identifies that auditors 
who exhibit more professional scepticism are more likely to identify contradictions 
in evidence and generate alternate hypotheses for observations (Hurtt et al, 2013) and 
pay greater attention to unethical behaviour (Rose, 2007) and fraud cues (Popova, 
2013).   
 
Of concern for this research are the global statistics which indicate that external 
auditors are only responsible for less than 5% of financial statement fraud detections 
(ACFE, 2014b, p.19).  This study explores professional scepticism in an effort to 
understand more about why cases of material financial statement fraud elude the 
external audit process (Dyck et al. 2010 in Grenier, 2014). 
 
The remainder of this chapter introduces problems that fraud presents, in general, 
and to external audit in particular.  The research problem is then narrowed to identify 
the research gap and the specific research questions.  The objectives of this study are 
then defined, followed by description of the approach taken to conduct the research. 
 
1.2  Background 
This study of auditor scepticism was initially prompted by the problem of fraud, its 
various potential impacts on financial reporting, and the challenges that fraud 
presents to auditors when deceptively hidden in financial records. Academic 
literature has explored these challenges, and revealed that auditors who are very 
trusting are less sceptical than others, and therefore less likely to focus upon 
evidence that reveals fraud (Harding et al, 2016, p.5). 
 
The Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB, 2013a, para. 
11(a)), adopts the international auditing definition of fraud as:  
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 ...an intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those 
charged with governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of 
deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage. 
 
Fraud is a particular subset of the crime definition, known as white-collar crime, set 
apart from theft by virtue of its concealment within business in an increasingly 
industrialised world.  First coined in the 1940s by EH Sutherland (Latimer, 2000), 
the term white-collar crime was further contextualised in 1977 by criminologist H 
Edelhertz (in Latimer, 2000, p. 97) to encompass: 
1. Crimes by persons operating on an individual, ad hoc basis, for 
personal gain in a non-business context. 
2. Crimes in the course of their occupations by those operating inside 
business, government, or other establishments, or in a professional 
capacity, in breach of their duty of loyalty and fidelity to employer or 
client. 
3. Crimes incidental to and in furtherance of operations, but not the 
central purpose of such business operations. 
4. White-collar crime as a business, or as the central activity of the 
business.   
 
This research is concerned with aspects 2) and 3) due to the potential of these 
misstatements to impact upon the financial statements of a business.   
 
Fraud is commonly associated with large, isolated incidents, but this is not the case 
(AUASB, 2013a, para 35; Wells, 2003), with many perpetrations occuring in smaller 
entities (COSO, 1998; Naydorf, 2004).  This misconception is reinforced by media 
coverage of high profile corporate collapses (Glover et al, 2005; Fisher, 2007), which 
represent fraud as a special issue rather than an everyday possibility.   
 
Fraud has been recognised as “a global epidemic” (Butler, 1986, p.36), and a “huge 
problem in Australia” (Abernethy, 2005, p.30); and the problem is growing (KPMG, 
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 2013). Fraud is “a pervasive problem that knows no boundaries, regardless of the 
industry, the country, or the size of the company” (Peterson and Zikmund, 2004, 
p.30).  It is a problem that can occur in every environment, involve an exchange of 
benefit, and can result in substantial financial losses (Association of British Insurers, 
2015).  
 
Figure 1.1, below, illustrates the distribution and median losses of 1,483 cases 
investigated by Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) members across 
the world (ACFE, 2014b, p. 13). 
 
Whilst that data is far from exhaustive, Transparency International (2014), further 
reports that “not one” of the 175 countries studied for its 2014 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, was free of corruption, which is just one type of fraud that can 
ultimately impact upon financial statements (ACFE, 2014a).  Appendix 1 depicts 
further types of fraud; all of which can result in materially misstated financial 
reporting. 
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 Figure 1.1   Global Distribution and Median Losses of 2013 Fraud Investigations 
 
SOURCE:  ACFE, 2014b, p. 14 
 
The depth of the problem can be seen with an average of 5% of revenues lost to fraud 
each year (ACFE, 2014b). “Applying the percentage to the 2013 estimated Gross 
World Product of $73.87 trillion results in a projected potential total global fraud loss 
of nearly $3.7 trillion” for that year (ACFE, 2014b, p.8).  In Australia, the KPMG 
Fraud Survey (2013, p.6, 17) reported fraud losses of $373 million in 2012, with 
43% of victim organisations reporting average losses of more than $3 million.  
Whilst these KPMG figures represent less than 5% of Australian GDP, KPMG 
(2013) reports increases in incidence (ACFE, 2009b; Goldmann, 2009; Zipkin, 
2009); increases in collusion, which typically involves higher dollar value losses; and 
increase in higher dollar value frauds generally (Association of British Insurers, 
2015), when compared with prior Surveys conducted over the previous 15 years 
(KPMG, 2013, pp. 6-7).   
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 New and more sophisticated (Nigrini & Meuller, 2014; ACFE, 2009a; Abernethy, 
2005) methods of fraud perpetration are enabled by an increasingly technological and 
global commercial environment (Carmichael, 1975; O’Leary & Cotter, 2000; 
Abernethy, 2005).  Technology is growing at such a rapid pace that perpetrators are 
able to discover outstanding security loopholes (Hargreaves, 2013).  Zipkin (2009) 
reports that perpetrators are finding new ways to commit fraud, and “… corporate 
violations are increasingly difficult to discover, investigate, or prosecute successfully 
because of their growing complexity and intricacy” (ACFE, 2009a, p.4.403), to the 
extent that they can elude discovery by even a well conducted audit (Trotman, 2006).  
This is enabled by increasingly complex legitimate accounting transactions (Glover 
& Prawitt, 2014), fair value accounting methods (Trotman, 2006), high volume 
computerised information systems, and online commerce which mean that 
perpetrators no longer have to be physically present to make fraudulent transactions 
(Nigrini & Meuller, 2014).   
 
“As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of 
analytical tools available to an auditor” (Knechel et al, 2010).  However, whilst these 
tools assist auditors to sort and identify samples, and to highlight potential 
anomalies, they cannot replace the inherent audit need for scepticism in evaluating 
such anomalies. 
 
1.3  Motivation 
Audit clients are responsible for devising and implementing controls to prevent and 
detect fraud, and for monitoring and maintaining the effectiveness of those controls 
(AUASB, 2013a, para 4).  The external financial statement audit function formally 
provides a “reasonable” level of assurance (AUASB, 2013b, para. 5).  Although this 
a high level of assurance, it is not a guarantee that the financial statements are 
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 completely free of error and/or fraud (AUASB, 2013b, para 5), but rather an opinion 
that they are “prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable 
financial reporting framework” (AUASB, 2011, para. 7(c)).  Despite the onus on 
clients, audit failures have led to increased responsibility on auditors to detect fraud 
in client’s financial statements (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Trotman, 2006), and failure 
to do so invariably leads to criticism of audit firms and the audit profession in 
general (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Grenier, 2014; Westermann et al, 2014). 
 
The risk of issuing an inappropriate audit opinion also exposes auditors to litigation 
(Grenier et al, 2015) and potential liabilities arising as statutory charges for breach of 
duty imposed by the Corporations Act 2001, breach of contract with the audit client, 
and common law claims lodged by users of audited financial statements who have 
suffered losses as a result of material misstatement.  The penalties range (Peecher et 
al, 2013b) from disciplinary actions taken by professional bodies to jail sentences 
decided in courts of law, and auditors are “only implicitly and problematically 
protected” from litigation by an audit judgment rule (Peecher et al, 2013b, p.605) 
when judgments are made in good faith and on a reasonable basis (Brown et al, 
2014).  Peecher et al (2013b) argue that, in future, auditor scepticism will be 
enhanced if the penalty-based approach to regulation reinforcement were replaced by 
a consequence model that accommodated accountabilities for judgment processes as 
well as outcomes, and that included rewards for fraud identification.  
 
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that the majority of frauds remain undetected 
(REAGAN Accounting & Consulting Group, nd; ALMR, 2014).  Ninety seven 
percent of detected fraud schemes are brought to light by parties other than external 
auditors (ACFE, 2014a; ACFE, 2014b; KPMG, 2015; Grenier 2014), such as 
employees, vendors, customers and anonymous whistle blowers (ACFE, 2014b).  
However, such reports generally relate to employee fraudsters, and the risk of fraud 
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 perpetration by executives requires a different approach, because executives pose a 
“significant” risk (ACFE, 2007b, s.1-229).   
 
The most costly financial statement frauds are committed by executives (ACFE, 
2014b, p.41; KPMG, 2004), who are in the best position to override controls over 
financial reporting (ACFE, 2014b, p.53).  In such instances, the auditor is unlikely to 
identify control breaches because the perpetrator has already ensured that controls 
relevant to his/her particular fraud are absent or ineffective, and they perceive they 
will get away with it:  That is, they can (Nigrini & Mueller, 2014).  The Auditing 
Standards (AUASB, 2013a, paras. 5-7) advise that: 
…the risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is 
higher than the risk of not detecting one resulting from error… [and] the risk 
of the auditor not detecting a material misstatement resulting from 
management fraud is greater than for employee fraud. 
 
Executives with strong accounting expertise are favoured by boards, but fraudsters in 
these positions, with these skills, are well placed and equipped to “manipulate 
accounting records, present fraudulent financial information, or override control 
procedures designed to prevent similar frauds by other employees” (ACFE, 2007b, 
s.1-223; AUASB, 2013a; Wells, 2003), and which are effective in ordinary 
circumstances (ACFE, 2007b, s.1-229).  “Among all financial personnel, the CFO is 
in the best position to know how to cook the books and keep it from being 
uncovered” (ACFE, 2007b, s.1-341; Wells 2003; Erickson et al, 2000).  Whilst less 
frequent (ACFE, 2014b, p. 40), the dollar value of executive frauds is typically very 
much higher than employee-perpetrated frauds (ACFE, 2014b, p. 41; KPMG, 2004) 
and it takes longer to detect (ACFE, 2014b, p.41). 
 
Demand for fraud expertise is greater than ever (Logan, 2009; Zipkin, 2009; ACFE, 
2005a; Simpson, 2004), including need for auditors to develop sound fraud-detection 
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 audit techniques (Trompeter et al, 2013; Dorminey et al, 2012; ACFE, 2007a; 
Beasley et al, 2001). 
 
Fraud is very difficult to detect because it is concealed within the organisation’s 
ordinary accounts (AUASB, 2013b; AUASB, 2013a).  That is, the perpetrator 
intends to obtain an unfair advantage, and, if necessary, deliberately conceals his/her 
activities to reduce risk of detection.  This presents challenges which complicate the 
audit process, far beyond the challenges of identifying errors.  Fraud is distinguished 
from errors or mistakes in judgement by the fundamental characteristics of intention 
(ACFE, 2009a, s.1-303, s.2-201; AUASB, 2013a, para. 2) and deception (ACFE, 
2009a, s.1-303, s.2-201; AUASB, 2013a, para 6). 
 
Detection is complicated because fraud may also involve omissions of material 
amounts or disclosures (ACFE, 2009a, s.1-303; AUASB, 2013a para A28).  This 
means that discovering fraudulent misstatement may entail observations about 
information which is not there. 
 
A further problem is the evolving nature of fraud and the need for flexibility in 
regulatory approaches that encompass new perpetration methods as they arise.  The 
conundrum is that whilst the auditing regulation must therefore remain largely a 
matter of substance over form, the spirit of regulation is subject to interpretation, 
judgement and potential loopholes.   
 
1.4  The Research Problem 
Whilst external auditors do not play a large role in identification of fraud generally, 
they do play a relatively greater role in identifying frauds that extend over multiple 
reporting periods and involve high dollar values (ACFE, 2014b, p. 20).  Therefore, 
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 external auditors are in a position of particular importance concerning executive 
fraud, as well as an important role in seeking to address fraudulent financial 
misstatement in general (Harding & Trotman, 2015; AUASB, 2013a; PCAOB, 
2007). 
 
Auditors must consider fraud risks appearing as control weaknesses (AUASB, 
2013c), be alert to the possibility of fraud (AUASB, 2013a), and identify red flags of 
fraud (AUASB, 2013a), being characteristics, techniques and types of fraud 
applicable to the client environment.  This suggests that at least three explicit stages 
of evaluation are required to fulfil this responsibility to detect fraud:   
1) Assess risk by forming an understanding of the client entity (AUASB, 2013c); 
2) Assess the adequacy of internal controls to prevent and detect fraud (AUASB, 
2013c); and  
3) Assess whether red flags are present in financial statements. 
 
Auditors can demonstrate due care and diligence in the making of such assessments 
by providing evidence that the audit was conducted in accordance with the Auditing 
Standards, though it has long been recognised that auditors must apply the substance 
of regulatory guidance to the facts of their particular audit client case by utilising 
professional judgement and professional scepticism (Bonner, 1999; Nelson 2009; 
Hurtt et al. 2013).  It is arguably the processes involved in applying the Standards 
and other guidance that exposes auditors to professional discipline and litigation 
risks.   
 
As the auditing standards define the term ‘auditor’ to include all members of audit 
teams (AUASB, 2013b), this implies that expectations extend to all members of audit 
teams, from the engagement partner to the most junior undergraduate assistant 
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 accountant.  The International Auditing Standards require that all auditors exercise 
professional scepticism (AUASB, 2013b), indicating an expectation that all auditors 
are capable of scepticism.   
 
This expectation may be inappropriate, at least to an extent.  Given that the Standards 
do not clarify how to apply scepticism for the purpose of forming the necessary 
judgements, there may be vast inconsistencies between auditors in the ways they 
approach sceptical thinking, or sceptical interpretation of information. There is also 
no currently available means of measuring professional scepticism for the purpose of 
identifying whether all audit team members exhibit scepticism, or assessing whether 
that scepticism is appropriately professional.  Without means of measuring the status 
quo, we have no means of measuring performance against the expectations in the 
Auditing Standards to identify any need for improvement.  The purpose of this 
research is to address that measurement gap.   
 
1.5  Research Objectives  
The scope and direction of this research pivots on the assumption, embedded within 
the Auditing Standards, that all members of audit teams are capable of a professional 
level of scepticism. The issue of whether auditors do in fact exercise a professional 
level of scepticism, as mandated by the Auditing Standards, has not been resolved by 
prior, discipline-specific, research.   
 
This study seeks to develop understanding of ‘professional’ scepticism, and explores 
the notion of levels of scepticism for the purpose of distinguishing a range of 
‘professional’ scepticism.  A scale measure of scepticism is developed, and the 
results compared with the professional level boundary to explore whether auditors 
exercise ‘professional’ scepticism, as mandated by the Auditing Standards.  
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To achieve the objective of devising an appropriate scale, a conceptual model is 
developed to demonstrate interrelated concepts in the literature.  The model draws 
upon literature which aligns with the definition of professional scepticism in the 
Auditing Standards, with the view that “an attitude that includes a questioning mind” 
(AUASB, 2013b) constitutes an inherent trait, while “critical assessment” (AUASB, 
2013b) is a learned skill.   
 
1.5.1  Research Questions 
Given that auditors have been criticised for exercising insufficient scepticism during 
the audit process (Beasley et al, 2001), in attempting to contribute to understanding 
of the main problem, this research will explore the following specific questions: 
 
RQ 1:  Do auditors and other groups exhibit different levels of scepticism? 
and 
RQ 2:  Do auditors exhibit professional scepticism? 
 
 
1.5.2  Importance 
This research extends published academic discourse by introducing the skill aspect of 
professional scepticism into measurement.  Prior research has attempted to measure 
only the trait aspect, which is acknowledged as only part of professional scepticism 
(Hurtt, 2009).   
Further, prior measures have resulted in relative measures of scepticism, comparing 
auditors with other auditors, rather than establishing a discrete measure or 
benchmark of professional scepticism.  Relative measures are problematic for the 
purpose of distinguishing levels.  The combination of a dual-factor approach 
(encompassing both Trait and Skill) and discrete measurement (professional 
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 scepticism benchmark) is intended to enable assessment of auditors’ default 
scepticism; that is, the basic mindframe experienced in the absence of workplace-
specific risks or cues to initiate a heightened state of scepticism.    
Such a measure may be useful for the purpose of comparing performance with the 
requirements of the Auditing Standards, and may provide guidance as to the nature 
of professional developments to improve scepticism via a proactive approach.  That 
is, prior to audit failure and examination in the courts. 
The dual-factor approach is also an important step in progressing understanding of 
what scepticism is, and how it might manifest in the audit environment.  Prior 
research has established that professional scepticism entails more than the Trait 
foundation (Hurtt, 2009), so it is necessary for this contribution to encompass the 
existence of another construct.  For the purposes of this research, that construct is 
defined as Skill.  This term is inspired by reference to the task of ‘critical 
assessment’ in the Auditing Standard definition of professional scepticism.  Although 
many terms have been used by academic authors to describe this other factor3, it is 
generally accepted that it is distinct from, and offers support to, Trait scepticism, and 
is related to assessment of evidence (Grenier, 2014; Harding & Trotman, 2015).  
Previous studies which specifically refer to Skill include Anderson (2009) and 
Nelson & Tan (2005). 
 
For the purpose of guiding the nature of professional development activities, the 
research also offers an additional indicator.  This may simplify identification of types 
of training which are most appropriate for auditors with a sceptical position which 
would be considered below the ‘professional’ benchmark, by identifying whether the 
deficiency is related to audit risk or to audit inefficiency.  This may lead to improved 
3 For example, self-criticism (Grenier, 2014), state scepticism (Hurtt, 2009), or inward scepticism (Harding & 
Trotman, 2015; Grenier, 2014). 
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 training outcomes for auditors, lower audit risk for audit firms, and mitigation of 
liability.  
 
Findings may also be of significant interest to professional bodies, in terms of 
continuing professional development and evaluation of accredited education 
components, and to independent regulators relying on the assumption that all 
auditors are sceptical at the professional level.  It is important to identify a 
benchmark to differentiate the professional level of scepticism, if identification is 
possible, because the profession and the regulatory bodies may need to consider fresh 
remedial measures if there is found to be an expectation gap between the 
requirements explicit in the auditing standards and auditors’ capacity to comply. 
 
There already exists a well-known Audit Expectation Gap which refers to asymmetry 
between preparers and users of audit reports, whereby users’ perceptions of audit 
work far exceed the scope of audit engagements.  Koh and Woo (1998, p.147) blame 
this asymmetry for what they term as a “legal liability crisis facing the accounting 
profession”.  Indeed, this gap is linked to many courts’ determinations regarding 
reasonable care, foreseeability and proximity, forging the balance between the 
auditor’s role of watchdog, versus claimants’ perception of a bloodhound which 
ought to identify all error and fraud (Kingston Cotton Mill 1896).  However, 
continuing calls for accountability indicate that the balance and symmetry are not yet 
achieved, and De Martinis and Burrowes (1996) argue that more recent court actions 
against auditors have even widened the gap.  Koh and Woo (1998) agree, noting that 
the public requires someone to be held accountable for corporate failures, and judges 
continue to expect more from auditors. 
  
De Martinis and Burrowes (1996, p.17) use the terminology “performance gap” to 
describe the audit scope problem described above.  The regulatory expectation gap to 
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 which this research refers, is similar in that it potentially involves information 
inconsistency, but the players are different:  In this instance, the potential 
misalignment is between auditors and the regulatory authorities.  An extreme 
example of the effects of this gap is that if auditors are constrained by some variable 
such that some or all are inherently unable to perform at the required professional 
level of scepticism, then they are inherently prone to breach of the legally 
enforceable auditing standards.  We do not currently have an identified benchmark; 
nor a reiterative method of reliably measuring auditors’ scepticism to compare with 
it, and therein lies a substantial information gap given that auditors are obliged to 
maintain a standard they can not objectively or reliably identify.   
 
Research outcomes which inform a framework to improve understanding of auditors’ 
professional scepticism and its efficacy are fundamentally important for the purpose 
of understanding whether auditors are capable of fulfilling their legal obligations, 
and, if not, how that gap might be contracted.  This research is expected to 
reinvigorate academic discourse in the scepticism component of professional 
judgement. 
 
1.6  Scope of the research 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:  Chapter 2 contains a review of 
existing literature from the profession and contributing disciplines to explore 
professional scepticism in more detail.  Chapter 3 compiles a research model, from 
which hypotheses are extracted.  The research method is set out in Chapter 4, 
followed by reporting of results in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the results are discussed, 
and Chapter 7 presents conclusions, and also sets out limitations of this particular 
study along with implications for accounting education and future research. 
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 Chapter 2:  Professional Scepticism 
2.1  Introduction 
Professional scepticism underpins the entire audit process (AUASB, 2013b; PCAOB, 
2012a), yet is the least understood (Glover & Prawitt, 2014) component of 
professional judgement, despite a significant volume of research activity on the 
topics of auditor judgement and professional scepticism during the past two decades 
(Nelson and Tan, 2005; Humphrey, 2008).  A substantial part of that problem is that 
scepticism is very difficult to measure (Hurtt et al, 2013; Grenier, 2014), and to date 
myriad methods of measurement are still being explored. The conundrum is that a 
divergence of conceptualisations about what constitutes professional scepticism exist 
(Grenier, 2014; Nolder & Kadous, 2014), impeding understanding (Glover & 
Prawitt, 2014) and the progress of measurement tool development.    Therefore the 
regulatory, professional and academic attempts to improve professional scepticism 
would benefit from establishing a more universal consensus of underlying factors 
and variables (Nolder & Kadous, 2014).  
 
While professional scepticism is an essential part of forming audit judgments 
(AUASB, 2013a; Westermann et al, 2014; Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Quadackers et al, 
2014; Nolder & Kadous, 2014; Trotman, 2006), it is maintained that lack of 
professional scepticism is a common audit deficiency (PCAOB, 2012a; Nelson, 
2009; Westermann et al, 2014) associated with inadequate due care and a failure to 
collate sufficient evidence of sufficient quality (Beasley et al, 2001).  Indeed, it has 
been asserted that auditors generally fail to recognise material misstatement (Wells, 
2005; Hall, 1996); and use little or no professional scepticism to inform their 
judgments (Bonner, 1999; ASIC, 2010; Grenier, 2014).   
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 The major audit judgement error identified by the AUASB is Audit Risk; being the 
“...risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial 
report is materially misstated” (AUASB, 2013b, para. 5).  This means that a material 
misstatement exists in the financial statements and is not detected.  Audit risk also 
applies to modified audit opinions if the modification does not encompass the 
material misstatement.  The Auditing Standards acknowledge Audit Risk from only 
the false-negative perspective and not the false-positive.  This is ostensibly because 
the consequences of a false negative involve greater potential losses and liabilities 
when weighted against the false-positive consequences of wasted, and perhaps 
unbillable, time.   
 
The audit risk model (Changa et al, 2008) assumes a positive relationship between 
perceived audit risk and scepticism rigour; however it is not yet known whether an 
increase in perceived risk of material misstatement does, in practice, lead to an 
increase in scepticism, or simply an increase in substantive testing, which may give 
the appearance of increased scepticism (Beasley et al, 2001).  Prior studies4 have 
resulted in inconsistent findings as to the usefulness of the Audit Risk Model in 
practice, in terms of whether the multiplicative association between inherent risk and 
control risk is appropriate, and in terms of whether auditors utilise the theoretical 
relationship at all (Nelson and Tan, 2005). From an ex-post descriptive perspective, 
Nelson and Tan (2005) propose that the model could be of little value in situations 
where fraud exists, on the basis of a prior study (Houston et al, 1999; Nelson & Tan, 
2005) in which the model was found to describe audit planning decisions in the event 
of material errors, but not fraud (Nelson and Tan, 2005).  
 
4 For examples see Asare & Wright (2004), Payne and Ramsay (2005), Nelson & Tan (2005), Hoffman & 
Zimbleman (2009). 
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 Efficiency is an important factor in audit practice (Glover & Prawitt, 2014), as 
indicated by the standard practice of sampling (AUASB, 2009).  That is, of those 
sample components reviewed, whether the exceptions identified are tolerable given 
the tests of materiality and audit risk.  This means that the focus is on management 
by exception.  Important difficulties associated with that perspective are in 
identifying exceptions, and whether the identified exceptions are most likely due to 
error or fraud.  A significantly complicating factor, however, is that fraud does not 
necessarily present as exceptions. 
 
In this chapter, professional scepticism is defined and explored to increase 
understanding for the purpose of measurement.  The contributing factors, limitations, 
and means of achieving professional scepticism, are then explored, and a regulation-
specific conceptualisation of professional scepticism is offered.  Finally, a model of 
the contributing factors is presented. 
 
2.2  Professional Scepticism Defined  
Definition of professional scepticism has developed over more than a century, 
embedded in courtroom discussion of the concepts contributing to reasonable care 
and skill, judgment about which has distinguished whether auditors were, or were 
not, held liable when clients’ accounts were materially misstated.  This process did 
not produce early definitions about auditor judgment, or aspects of judgment such as 
scepticism per se.  Rather, such discussions were framed in terms such as ‘reasonable 
care’ and ‘reasonable skill’, as noted by the judges in landmark cases, such as 
London and General Bank Ltd (1895) and Kingston Cotton Mills Co (1896), which 
are still commonly referred to today, to introduce current auditing students to such 
concepts.   
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 However, the difficulty in gleaning generalizable guidance from these judgments is 
that the constitution of those terms “must depend upon the circumstances of each 
case” (Lord Justice Lopes in Kingston Cotton Mills Co.  Nonetheless, Lord Justice 
Lopes did introduce an objection to auditor use of assumption, which is central to 
auditor scepticism as we know it today.  Specifically, the Kingston Cotton Mills Co 
case made a key contribution by ruling that an auditor is not required to approach 
work “with suspicion, or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong” 
(Ch. 279).  That contribution is incomplete, however, because the judgment went on 
to partially sanction the opposite form of assumption by stating at paragraph that an 
auditor is “entitled to assume that [clients] are honest and rely upon their 
representations, provided he takes reasonable care".  Such an entitlement is 
problematic if financial statements are fraudulently misstated, and given that 
‘reasonable care and skill’ were matters for the courts to determine, ex-post, the 
judgments of many more auditors have been examined by the courts since the late 
1800s. 
 
In 1948, industry professional F. E. Trigg presented a report to the Australian 
Congress on Accounting, stating that “the general principles of professional auditing 
practice were not generally understood in Australia; and even where they were 
understood, they were not, as a rule, applied in practice” (Gibson & Arnold, 1981).  
Trigg further explained (Gibson & Arnold, 1981) that:  
The approach to professional auditing in the forties was, in a large measure, 
unintelligent. Books were checked and ticked in a stereotyped fashion—the 
“tick and turn-over method” it was called. This method of course achieved 
little. Very few audits were planned as to their scope and character—that is 
to say, based on the auditor’s knowledge of a company’s business, how the 
business was organized, the state of accounting and so on, and still less on 
the auditor’s evaluation of the company’s system of internal control. In short 
the entire approach to professional auditing had to be changed and uplifted. 
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 Two decades later, Justice Moffit’s findings in the landmark Pacific Acceptance 
(1970) case, formalised more generalisable, yet considerably more specific, 
standards of care and skill than we had previously seen in the courts, including the 
duties to check and see for themselves, rather than rely on client representations, to 
closely supervise and review the work of junior audit team members, and to take 
further action when misstatement is suspected.  This Australian development 
corroborated Lord Denning’s finding in the United Kingdom, wherein he stated at 
section 23 of Fomento (Sterling Area) Ltd. v Selsdon Fountain Pen Co. Ltd. (1958) 
that:  
To perform his task properly he must come to it with an enquiring mind - not 
suspicious of dishonesty - but suspecting that someone may have made a 
mistake somewhere and that a check must be made to ensure that there has 
been none. 
 
The Pacific Acceptance (1970) case was instrumental in prompting attention to 
improvement of Auditing Standards, recognising that adherence to inadequate and/or 
outdated standards constituted no defence for auditors (Gibson & Arnold, 1981), and 
Justice Moffit’s requirement to “check and see” was reinforced by Justice Owen in 
the HIH Royal Commission Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), who found 
that the auditors relied unduly on others (at 21.6.3); subsequently leading to a 
number of important recommendations regarding auditor independence (Blake 
Dawson Waldron, 2003), noting its potential incompatibility with professional 
scepticism.  Specifically, Justice Owen concluded (at 21.4.5) that “One consequence 
of an auditor exercising appropriate levels of professional scepticism and 
independence in the course of an audit is that tension may arise in the course of the 
relationship between auditor and client.”  The rulings in the above legal cases set the 
foundation for regulatory developments as well as professional and academic 
discourse that have helped us to refine our understanding of reasonable care and 
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 skill, and subsequently, the more specific aspect of auditor judgment which is now 
known as professional scepticism.   
 
Notwithstanding, professional and academic literature continues to offer varied 
descriptions of the essence of professional scepticism (Glover & Prawitt, 2014; 
Westermann et al, 2014), rather than a single universally accepted understanding 
(Nolder & Kadous, 2014; Quadackers et al, 2014).  This divergence increases the 
challenge of measuring and further understanding it (Rasso, 2015; Grenier, 2014; 
Hurtt et al, 2013; Nelson, 2009; Van Peursem, 2010).  For the purposes of this 
research, with a view to measurement firmly in mind, it is essential to establish 
specific factors that comprise professional scepticism.  To that end, this chapter is 
focused on defining the parameters of the regulated requirements and specifying 
factors which clearly describe the essence of professional scepticism as reported in 
auditing and related literature. 
 
Scepticism is often inconsistently defined and applied in various contexts from 
colloquial to professional usage (Van Peursem, 2010).  Colloquially, the term is often 
used to express a position of disbelief, or even cynicism, which suggests a bias 
toward doubt, mistrust or suspicion.  Nelson’s (20009) use of the term ‘presumptive 
doubt’ suggests a moderated variant of this stance, bearing in mind that a cynical (or 
very doubtful) attitude would lead to over-auditing and inefficiencies (Glover & 
Prawitt, 2014), though this appears to be the expectation of regulators conducting 
quality audits of the firms’ work (Nelson, 2009; Glover & Prawitt, 2014).  The 
term’s Greek origin, ‘skeptikos’, is more focused on being ‘‘inquiring or reflective’’ 
(Glover & Prawitt, 2014, p.P2), which is more aligned with an attitude of 
maintaining an objective, or neutral, position, free of assumption or bias, until such 
time as evidence identifies whether a particular management assertion is to be 
accepted or rejected.   
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A professional is expected to possess knowledge and skill beyond that expected of a 
reasonable lay-person (Cambridge University Press, 2015).  Accordingly, scepticism 
has a more explicit meaning in an audit sense, encompassing due diligence and a 
standard of care (Glover & Prawitt, 2014, p.P2).  Consistent with the American 
definition (PCAOB, 2012b), the International Auditing Standards define professional 
scepticism as (AUASB, 2013b, para. 13(l)): “...an attitude that includes a questioning 
mind, being alert to conditions which may indicate possible misstatement due to 
error or fraud, and a critical assessment of evidence”. 
 
There are a number of issues that derive from this definition and at times raise the 
question as to whether there are significant differences between the lay and the 
professional interpretations about what we mean by scepticism other than the jargon 
used.  Concerns such as ‘a questioning mind’ and ‘alertness’ appear to be common.  
However, the distinction would seem to be in the light of reference to ‘alertness’ and 
‘critical assessment’ that might be expected.  Of interest to this research is the 
potentially different attitude that a qualified professional, as compared to a layperson, 
might bring to the table.  That is, an attitude of merely opining, rather than asserting 
anything (Liddell and Scott, 1940 in Van Peursem, 2010) or presuming doubt (Van 
Peursem, 2010; Nelson, 2009).  Such a stance represents clear objectivity. 
 
Despite a substantial body of research and regulatory body publication regarding 
professional scepticism, ambiguity of terminology in the definition and variations in 
interpretation continue to vary (Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Nelson, 2009).  Therefore, 
the various aspects of the audit definition are explored in more detail in the following 
sections. 
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 2.3  Scepticism as a Trait  
Prior research, such as that published by Hurtt (2010) and Nelson (2009) identifies 
the attitude of professional scepticism as a trait.  Trait theory holds a view that 
behavioural traits are predispositions of biological origin, and they are therefore 
considered innate (McLeod, 2014; Mooradian et al, 2006).  This means that trait 
scepticism is a tendency to behave in a certain way, and that the behaviour will 
manifest in a reasonably consistent way (McLeod, 2014).  In the context of 
professional scepticism, this view is supported by Carpenter & Reimers (2013), who 
assert that scepticism is not readily susceptible to internal or external influence.  As 
such, it could be expected to remain reasonably stable over time (McLeod, 2014; 
Peytcheva, 2014; Rose et al, 2010; Carpenter & Reimers, 2013; Hurtt, 2009).  
McLeod (2014) explains that “theories are sometimes referred to as psychometric 
theories, because of their emphasis on measuring personality by using psychometric 
tests.”  Indeed, numerous studies have utilised trait methods to measure auditors’ 
scepticism relative to other auditors.   
 
Hurtt (2010) developed a scale to measure professional scepticism in terms of a 
“relatively stable” trait (Hurtt, 2009, p. 150), which has been applied to numerous 
research projects5.  The survey instrument addresses six characteristics of scepticism: 
“A questioning mind, suspension of judgment, [need to] search for knowledge, 
interpersonal understanding, self-esteem and autonomy” (Hurtt, 2010 p.151), and 
reflects a regulatory perspective of scepticism (Westermann et al, 2014).    
 
5 For examples, see Rasso, 2015; Harding & Trotman, 2015; Peytcheva, 2014; Carpenter & Reimers, 2013. 
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 Another trait measurement tool previously used to measure auditor scepticism 6 is 
the Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991).  Like scepticism, trust has been identified in the 
academic literature as a trait, or propensity, which differs between individuals, but 
remains relatively stable in individuals over time (Rotter, 1980; Chughtai & Buckley, 
2008).  Chughtai and Buckley (2008) distinguish the trust trait from a state of trust 
(see also Rotter, 1967; Mooradian et al, 2008).  The trust trait is held to be an 
important determinant of the trust state (Chughtai & Buckley, 2008), and that state 
itself is variable across time and in different contexts, subject to external influences.  
In these ways, the study of trust resembles recent study of professional scepticism.   
 
Further, Chughtai and Buckley (2008) describe a connection between trust and 
belief.  Mooradian et al (2008) describe belief as an extreme of trust, with cynicism 
its corresponding opposite; akin to optimism and pessimism, respectively.  These 
concepts are important to study of professional scepticism, because trust is a known 
threat to auditor independence, and the fundamental purpose of independence is to 
facilitate professional scepticism.   
 
In the auditing context, exploring trust as a factor of scepticism illustrates how belief 
is relevant to the notion of scepticism by also relating to trust’s corresponding 
opposite (Shaub & Lawrence, 1996; Quadackers et al, 2014):  disbelief, or 
presumptive doubt (Nelson, 2009; Van Peursem, 2010; Glover & Prawitt, 2014), 
which expects a degree of client dishonesty (Nelson, 2009; Quadackers et al, 2014; 
Bell, Peecher, and Solomon, 2005).  Both extremes thereby involve some degree of 
ex ante auditor bias.   
 
6 For examples, see Rose, 2007; Quadackers et al, 2014; Shaub and Lawrence 1996; Choo and Tan 2000; Rose, 
Rose & Dibben, 2010. 
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 The notion of trust as a substantial factor in auditors’ professional scepticism is 
supported by Luippold et al’s (2015) findings that auditors’ ability to identify 
earnings management is reduced by a propensity to be distracted by the client to 
focus on cleaner accounts.  This suggests a siloed or myopic approach wherein 
management’s representations are adopted as helpful (trusted), rather than recognised 
as potential diversions from less-pleasant truth.  Low trust scores are considered a 
signal of higher scepticism (Rose, 2007; Hurtt et al, 2013; Quadackers et al, 2014).  
The effect of significant trust, therefore, is similar to the effect of significant distrust 
(presumptive doubt) in that both represent some degree of bias. 
 
Trust is an important and valued human trait that facilitates relationships, both 
personal and professional.  However, extreme trust in an auditor-client relationship 
represents a familiarity threat to objectivity (APESB, 2013), and may result in 
auditors under-assessing risk, over-relying on management representations, failing to 
collect sufficient appropriate evidence (Glover & Prawitt, 2014), and/or failing to 
evaluate the veracity of the evidence collected.  Trust is therefore a significant aspect 
of audit risk; and in excess, it can be considered a precursor to expressing an 
inappropriate opinion when financial statements are materially misstated. 
 
Extreme distrust is also a threat to audit, in that gathering of too much evidence, and 
completion of unnecessary audit tasks are inefficiencies (Glover & Prawitt, 2014) 
that increase firm costs and potentially damage auditor-client relationships due to 
increases in time taken and billed cost of services (Trotman, 2006).   This threat does 
not expose auditors to regulatory or civil actions, as the excessive-trust threat can, 
however it does attract criticism (Trotman, 2006) and it may be argued that there are 
many more workplace pressures on auditors that deter inefficiencies than there are to 
deter trust.  Workplace pressures that affect both these (dis)trust extremes, and act as 
barriers to scepticism, are discussed in section 2.7, below. 
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Harding & Trotman (2015) differentiate orientations of scepticism to explore 
differences between judgments and actions (Nelson, 2009), with “outward 
orientation focused on the veracity of management representations versus inward 
orientation focused on the justification of audit conclusions reached including 
evidence relied on” (Harding & Trotman, 2015, p.2).  Using Hurtt’s (2010) Trait 
Scepticism Scale, Harding & Trotman (2015) found no difference between treatment 
groups, meaning that although an outward orientation increases scepticism in actions, 
it does not appear to influence scepticism in judgments.  This sticky outward 
orientation suggests that a position of (dis)trust in management assertions is not 
easily challenged, supporting the view that the scepticism trait is quite fixed (Cohen 
et al, 2014; Carpenter & Reimers, 2013; Hurtt, 2010).   
 
Rasso (2015) and Harding & Trotman (2015) agree, having found that when both 
aspects of scepticism are engaged, auditors utilise more broad and comprehensive 
audit procedures and focus on higher quality evidence.  In other words, if scepticism 
trait, expresses as anything other than neutral (that is, as trust, distrust or presumptive 
doubt), that trait arguably represents an inherent auditor bias, requiring that other, 
more flexible, behaviours compensate in order to deliver an objective and 
appropriately risk-responsive audit. 
 
2.4  Scepticism as a Combination of Trait + Skill 
Fukukawa & Mock (2011) and Anderson (2009, p.384) assert that many judgements 
are made by individuals on the basis of their personal beliefs, as well as their skills, 
while Nelson and Tan (2005) claim that audit opinions are influenced by a range of 
personal characteristics, including skill sets, as well as personality traits.  As Hurtt 
(2009, p.150) explains, “professional scepticism can be both a trait (a relatively 
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 stable, enduring aspect of an individual) and also a state (a temporary condition 
aroused by situational variables).” 
 
Consistent with the International Auditing Standards definition, Grenier (2014) more 
specifically refers to the components of professional scepticism as a combination of 
both evidence scepticism and self-criticism.  The former may be aligned with the 
trait aspect of scepticism, representing fundamental attitudes toward the evidence.  
The latter represents assessment of the manner by which the evidence is evaluated.  
Grenier (2014) found limited support for inward scepticism, but neither he nor 
Harding & Trotman (2015) conclude that skill alone is sufficient to increase 
scepticism.  Harding & Trotman (2015) assert that both aspects, described in their 
study as inward and outward orientations, are necessary for the purpose of increasing 
professional scepticism, as neither is sufficient in isolation. 
 
Clear distinction between how the trait and skill aspects of skepticism manifest is 
important, because it is the skill aspect that would be more vulnerable to context 
effects, given that traits are inherent and therefore invariable in the short term. 
However, professional skepticism also includes a situational characteristic to 
professional skepticism, with variability in expression being dependent upon 
contextual pressures and motivations (Westermann et al, 2014; Glover & Prawitt, 
2014).   
 
2.4.1  “questioning mind, being alert”   
Van Peursem (2010, p.27) describes skepticism as seeking toward “possibilities of 
‘truths’ of which [auditors] may not be aware”, and uses the term “curiosity” (p. 24) 
to distinguish skeptical auditing from the ritualized activities that do not 
meaningfully assess evidence.  Such curiosity is particularly important in audits of 
financial information prepared in accordance with principles-based accounting 
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 standards, and across jurisdictions with varying degrees of standard precision 
(Grenier et al, 2015) because the range of possibilities is increased.   
 
The problem of auditing in conditions of ambiguity is intensified in audits involving 
complex estimates (Frank & Hoffman, 2015; Rasso, 2015; Glover & Prawitt, 2014; 
PCAOB, 2012b), for example. Principles-based accounting standards are common 
(Grenier et al, 2015), but they also increase auditors’ exposure to criticisms of 
judgment (Kadous & Mercer, 2012) and litigation (Grenier et al, 2015).  Whilst 
principles-based accounting standards are more accommodating of diversity than 
rules-based standards, Grenier et al (2015) assert that they are counterproductive for 
audit because ambiguity encourages practices which undermine judgment.   
Conversely, it is also argued that rules-based standards are counter-productive to 
quality audit because they discourage thorough assessment of risks unique to specific 
audit engagements in favour of ‘tick-box’ auditing (Trotman, 2006), similar to the 
‘defensive auditing’ mentality arising from litigation exposure (Brown et al, 2014). 
 
Those with high tolerance of ambiguity (or low uncertainty avoidance) are likely to 
exhibit low levels of skepticism (Cohen et al, 1993; Hughes et al, 2009; Hurtt et al, 
2013; Grenier et al, 2015) and this may be exacerbated by some cultural influences 
(Hughes et al, 2009).  Grenier et al’s (2015) solution to the risks arising from 
ambiguity is to gather evidence of making quality judgments that encompasses more 
than the following of auditing standards: Use of firm-devised judgment frameworks 
(Barrows et al, 2010) to “help auditors improve the quality of their judgments by 
more holistically considering complex issues” (2015, p. 339; Barrows et al, 2010), 
and even compensate for less rigorous technical expertise (Backof et al, 2014).  
However, Grenier et al (2015) note that whilst the outcomes are likely to exceed 
those from the use of computerized decision support tools, more evidence of the 
process may be necessary to defend against litigation in the event of audit failure.   
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Nonetheless, auditors tend to work at a lower level of abstraction (Rasso, 2015) 
because it is more natural, less difficult, and less time consuming (Frank & Hoffman, 
2015), in practical audit situations.  Of particular interest to this research is the notion 
of uncertainty (Peecher et al, 2013b) being introduced by the process of making 
judgements, in addition to the uncertainty surrounding evidence being evaluated.  
According to Frank & Hoffman (2015, p.3):   
If being forced to process information in an unfamiliar manner increases 
participants’ uncertainty regarding the task, it is possible that the differences 
observed with respect to ‘‘perceived risk’’ and ‘‘likelihood of adjustment’’ 
may reflect differences in uncertainty rather than, or in addition to, 
differences in skepticism. 
 
2.4.2  “critical assessment of evidence” 
Van Peursem’s (2010, p.24) description of evidence as an “instrument to assess 
truth” is useful because it not only highlights the central role of evidence in the 
process of auditing, but it also reminds us that it is not an answer in itself.  Evidence, 
in all its forms, is that to which auditors must apply their skepticism – not only in 
judging the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence gathered to reduce 
ambiguity, but also in being curious about the veracity of the evidence, and being 
self-critical about the ways in which such curiosity is applied. 
 
Rasso (2015) explains that auditors make sequential judgments about evidence 
throughout the evidence collection process, informing decisions whether to continue 
seeking further evidence (after Gibbins, 1984; Knechel & Messier, 1990), and that 
improper interim judgments result in insufficient evidence, which is consequently 
interpreted by others as a lack of professional skepticism. In addition, Rasso (2015), 
after Griffith et al (2014), asserts that even experienced auditors have difficulty 
processing and synthesizing contrary evidence in particular, which should be 
interpreted as clues that gathering of further evidence is warranted. 
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Auditors must, therefore, be critical of their judgments (Harding & Trotman, 2015; 
Grenier, 2014; Peecher et al, 2013b; Bell et al, 2005); and Bell et al (2005) extend 
this by asserting that being self-critical is a means of exercising scepticism about 
one’s own judgments (Grenier, 2014). Grenier (2014, p. 5) asserts that self-criticism 
is especially important to scepticism because it “facilitates specialist consideration of 
potential misstatements not readily discernible from the evidence”.  Like all humans 
attempting to make sense of information, auditors look for patterns (Wilensky & 
Resnick, 1999; Grenier, 2014), yet fraud schemes do not neatly follow patterns or 
present unequivocal red flags that enable clear identification.  The patterns that do 
show are often subtle, and sometimes as patterns of omission, and the apparent red 
flags may be mere hints of a much more substantial story.   
 
Auditors must not only obtain evidence that persuasively (AUASB, 2013b, para. 5) 
supports accounting assertions, but also question the quantity and reliability of that 
evidence, to the extent that they obtain “sufficient appropriate evidence” upon which 
to base an appropriate audit opinion (AUASB, 2013b, paras. A28:A31).  This is 
particularly important because most audit evidence is supplied by the audit client 
organisation itself ( AUASB, 2013b, para.A28); a party dependent upon obtaining an 
unmodified audit report, with the means, and potential motivation, to supply oral 
misrepresentations and/or false physical documentation which ostensibly support 
fraudulent financial assertions (Erickson , 2000; Wells, 2003; AUASB, 2013a).   
 
Auditing Standard guidance material also notes that evidence includes information 
which contradicts assertions (Backof et al, 2014), as well as corroborative 
information (AUASB, 2013b, para. A28).  While the nature of contradictory 
evidence is not elaborated upon, this is an extremely important concept to include 
because explicit acknowledgement is an enabler of objectivity, as described above.  
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 Hurtt et al (2013) note that “audit standards, such as SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002) requires 
[American] auditors to adjust scepticism based on evidence obtained”, reinforcing a 
notion that scepticism is not only controllable, but directly responsive to evidence.  
Encouragingly, Kizirian et al (2005) and Harding and Trotman (2015) have found 
this to be so. 
 
However, in at least some instances, auditors are not sufficiently sceptical and do not 
obtain sufficient appropriate evidence (PCAOB 2012a, in Grenier 2014), particularly 
regarding aggressive assumptions and complex estimates (Backof et al, 2014; 
Griffith et al, 2014).  In 80% of the SEC enforcement action cases studied by Beasley 
et al (2001), auditors “failed to gather sufficient evidence” – sometimes pervasively, 
and sometimes in some material area.  In 40% of cases, auditors over-relied on 
management explanations and did not “challenge explanations that were inconsistent 
or refuted by other evidence the auditor had already gathered” (Beasley et al, 2001, 
p. 64).  Generally in these cases, auditors failed to maintain an attitude of 
professional scepticism (Beasley et al, 2001). 
 
Rasso (2015, p.11) presents a possible explanation: 
…task complexity is negatively related with professional skepticism. More 
difficult tasks could actually induce higher skeptical action due to the 
increase in focus required by the higher difficulty. On the other hand, as 
suggested by the results in this study, higher complexity could cause an 
auditor to prematurely conclude a task, such as searching for audit evidence, 
simply because the task is cognitively draining. Such an end to the task could 
be later interpreted that the auditor failed to display an appropriate amount 
of professional skepticism. 
 
Although increased professional scepticism has been shown to increase evidence 
gathering (Harding & Trotman, 2015) it is not yet clear from the literature whether 
that evidence gathering genuinely addresses the requirement for “sufficient 
appropriate evidence” (AUASB, 2013d) or is merely busy-work; gathering a greater 
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 quantity of evidence which may or may not be of appropriate quality or relevance 
(Harding & Trotman, 2015; Hurtt et al, 2013).  This distinction between auditor 
judgments and actions (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Hurtt et al, 2013) is not yet 
resolved in the literature. 
 
Auditing Standard guidance acknowledges that sometimes (AUASB, 2013b, para. 
A28) gaps arising from missing evidence, and/or refusal by management to supply 
requested information, constitute evidence.  Auditors must acknowledge what they 
do not know (Grenier, 2014) and accommodate those gaps in their assessments and 
management of risk.  Uninterrupted fraud schemes generally continue for well over a 
year (ACFE, 2002; Wells, 2003), and as perpetrators gain confidence as their scheme 
continues, they tend to become less fastidious about covering their tracks (Wells, 
2003).  They may even cease to produce false evidence or make false accounting 
entries that could make the transactions appear more authentic (Wells, 2003).  
Consequently, false ‘evidence’ for fraudulent transactions may be available for some 
accounting periods but not others.  This inconsistency is an example of change which 
constitutes evidence and a red flag for risk reassessment.  
 
Therefore, the mere existence of evidence is not an appropriate basis upon which to 
form a professional opinion that an assertion is supported:  Auditors must first 
exercise professional judgement (AUASB, 2013b, paras. 16, A31) to form an opinion 
as to whether the evidence itself is reasonable: Whether enough has been 
accumulated (AUASB, 2013b, para. A29) to appropriately represent the entire 
population from which it is drawn, and whether it is of appropriate quality (AUASB, 
2013b, para. A30). 
 
But not all audit evidence is equal, in terms of reliability, persuasiveness, or even 
form.  Backof et al (2014) draw upon a body of psychology literature to attribute lack 
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 of scepticism when evaluating evidence to the manner in which evidence is 
presented, identifying particular difficulties with text form evidence, rather than 
problems with reliability or persuasiveness.  As it is not feasible to insist that client 
representations be presented in a preferred graphical format (Backof et al, 2014) to 
make judgments easier (Wright, 1995), this research argues that auditors can utilise 
prompts (Grenier, 2014) to improve scepticism in terms of the process of evaluating 
text evidence. 
 
Grenier (2014) attests that failure to identify fraud cues is due to auditors’ 
overconfidence about their ability to evaluate evidence.  That is, reliance on 
information skepticism (traits) alone, and ignoring, or under-utilising process 
skepticism (skill).  This emphasizes the importance of the role of process skepticism 
skill, because “only Self-Criticism leads auditors to increase their consideration of 
potential misstatements (errors or fraud) that are not readily discernable from the 
evidence” (Grenier, 2014, p.23).   
 
In light of all the above, skepticism skill may be considered the factor which is 
situationally responsive, applied in different ways, or to different degrees according 
to conditions, to complement or counteract an inherent skepticism trait, and elicit a 
situational mindframe which is consistent with a state of professional scepticism.  
 
2.4.3  Learning Scepticism Skill 
Hurtt et al (2013, pp 50, 54, 69) refer to use of skill to overcome biases and improve 
professional scepticism.  Skills can be learned.  Indeed, Luippold et al (2015, after 
Nelson, 2009 and Quadackers et al, 2014) assert that auditors are taught to exercise 
professional scepticism.  Mastery of skill is subject to influences such as talent or 
aptitude (inherent ability), learning opportunities, refinement via practice, and 
encouragement.  In other words, this suggests that the combined effects of training 
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 and workplace practice should, over time, extend an individual’s inherent position to 
construct increasing capacity for scepticism.  This concept has been explored in 
academic research, and Peecher et al (2007), Knechel et al (2010) and Hurtt et al 
(2013) acknowledge that experienced auditors improve audit quality. 
 
Nelson (2009) and Hurtt et al (2013) explicitly acknowledge experience and training 
as important facilitators of professional scepticism, and Hurtt et al (2013, p.51) 
clearly distinguishes this as being “in addition to” the underlying, and more static, 
scepticism trait.  Nelson (2009) introduces the caveat that experience is helpful for 
professional scepticism if (emphasis added) it is appropriate experience:  That is, 
experience which increases knowledge of “errors and non-errors and the patterns of 
evidence that suggest a heightened risk of misstatements” (p.7).  Rose (2007) 
concurs that all experience is not equal, finding that general experience is not helpful, 
where fraud-related experience is. 
 
Contrary to the above research findings, other research on experience-effects has 
found that more experienced auditors are less sceptical than their juniors (Pinsker et 
al, 2009; Payne and Ramsay, 2005; Grenier, 2014), apparently due to increased use 
of heuristics and grounding in past (mis)interpretation of anomalies, and are over-
confident of their juniors’ abilities (Peecher et al, 2013b).  Cassidy and Buede (2009) 
agree, asserting that increased experience “is often accompanied by an unjustified 
increase in self-confidence” (p. 454), and even that expert judgements are generally 
“no better than chance” (p. 454).  Other research asserts that auditors are reluctant to 
be self-critical of their judgments (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Grenier, 2014), 
attributing the reluctance to ego threat.  These observed disparities reinforce the 
notion of skill learning by suggesting that professional scepticism can also be 
forgotten, or fall victim to a false sense that experience is a proxy for critical self-
reflection upon one’s thinking processes.   
37 
 
  
Glover & Prawitt (2014) recognise that current training, supervision and mentoring 
facilitates professional scepticism in audit firms, but suggest that further training, 
adoption of common terminology and consistent use of judgment frameworks will 
improve professional scepticism on an ongoing basis.  Whilst Smith & Kida (1991) 
assert that biases seem to persist in auditors, Trotman et al (2009) propose that biases 
may be overcome by adopting a ‘pre-mortem’ approach to workplace brainstorming:  
That is, considering in advance, what might go wrong, with an approach that 
assumes the benefit of audit team hindsight.  Hurtt et al (2013) highlight the 
influences that sceptical and non-sceptical seniors and supervisors may have on 
junior auditors over time, so it is important that in-house training, supervision and 
mentoring be modelled appropriately. 
 
Formal education may play a more levelled role in this regard, with professional 
auditor education being particularly instrumental in development of professional 
scepticism skills (IFAC, 2010).  Bazerman et al (2002) call for formal education to 
encompass understanding of biases, so that auditors may be better equipped to 
identify their errors and to deal with them appropriately.  This would involve an 
individual recognising their own inherent trait position, so that they can practice the 
skills required to achieve an appropriately sceptical state.  Hurtt et al (2013) propose 
that overcoming bias may be best addressed by education which trains auditors to 
consider information from alternate perspectives, similar to how law is debated 
(Pinsker et al, 2009) and more thoroughly understanding the underlying features of 
potential problems, such as Carpenter et al’s (2011) finding that forensics training 
improves auditors evaluation of fraud risk. 
 
Grenier (2011) asserts that telling auditors to be more sceptical is not effective; they 
must instead be primed to evaluate their thinking processes in the workplace and/or 
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 trained to think differently about their own thinking processes (Hurtt et al, 2013).  
Prior research does offer other means of achieving this, including Plumlee et al’s 
(2012) finding that auditors who are trained to generate alternate explanations for 
unusual evidence and to assess the plausibility of the explanations were more likely 
to arrive at an appropriate judgment of the circumstances.  In addition to Plumlee et 
al’s (2012) approach, Hurtt et al (2013, p.54) suggests that such training also include 
“considering multiple alternatives in addition to management’s preferred alternative, 
and auditors challenging the thinking of other auditors”. Peecher et al (2013a) also 
agree that auditors should also be trained to be sceptical of the judgments made by 
other audit team members.   
 
In any platform, skill development is a mechanism by which those with lesser 
inherent abilities might learn to demonstrate capacity to perform at a level 
comparable with, and even in excess of, those who have relatively greater inherent 
abilities that have not been honed.  It is also a mechanism by which those with sound 
inherent abilities might develop their abilities to an advanced level of competence.   
 
For immediate purposes, this research accepts the assumption derived from the 
Auditing Standards that all auditors are capable of exercising scepticism.  For that 
purpose, professional scepticism should be considered a product of both trait and 
skill because, after exclusion of outlier influences, suboptimal levels of trait 
scepticism can generally be improved by addressing associated skills, including 
capacity to respond to both intrinsic and extrinsic prompts to heighten scepticism as 
appropriate to situations involving risk.  This premise is reinforced by existing 
research identifying facilitators of professional scepticism 7.   
 
7 Examples include Westermann et al, 2014; Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Beasley et al, 2001;  
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 2.5  Levels of Scepticism 
Prior research that finds that some auditors are more sceptical than others (Harding & 
Trotman, 2015; Grenier, 2014), provides evidence to support the notion of varying 
levels of scepticism.  The term insufficient professional scepticism also attracts the 
attention of regulators (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Backof, 2014; Hurtt et al, 2013; 
Trompeter et al, 2013; PCAOB 2012a; CAQ 2010).  Westermann et al (2014) refer 
to degrees of professional scepticism; and others explicitly refer to such as levels 
(Harding & Trotman, 2015; Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Hurtt, 2013).   
 
Glover & Prawitt (2014) take the notion of levels further, placing characteristics of 
scepticism on a continuum, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, below.  Glover & Prawitt 
(2014) intend that the continuum will be of ex ante help (O’Donnell et al, 2015) to 
auditors in applying scepticism matched to assessed risks, rather than as means of 
assessing auditors or measuring scepticism exhibited, and to enable consistent 
application of scepticism by auditors and quality reviewers alike.  However, the 
authors acknowledge that guidance material should be developed to aid application 
of the continuum concept in practice.  The authors’ reference to a ‘Neutral’ 
perspective reflects regulatory intention that the auditor does not assume anything 
(Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Westermann et al, 2013; Hurtt, 2010); instead taking a 
position absent of bias (Quadackers et al, 2014; Nelson, 2009) and a purely objective 
approach to the evidence.  As this explanation of professional scepticism is 
consistent with the requirements of the Auditing Standards and relatively 
unambiguous, Neutrality is the descriptor adopted for the purposes of this research. 
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 Figure 2.1   A Continuum of Scepticism 
 
SOURCE:  Glover & Prawitt, 2014, p.P3 
 
Glover & Prawitt (2014) also describe a continuum of evidence assessment, 
indicated by the line in Figure 2.1 which links the Neutral and Presumptive Doubt 
areas.  In Gover & Prawitt’s (2014) evidence continuum, less evidence is collected 
and evaluated at the Trust end of the continuum, constituting less effort, compared 
with more evidence at the other (Westermann et al, 2014), constituting greater effort 
(Peytcheva, 2014).  The authors attribute a relationship between these continua to 
reflect perceptions of audit risk, wherein less evidence is required in low-risk 
scenarios that engender trust, and more evidence in high-risk scenarios that provoke 
distrust due to complexities, identified anomalies or inconsistent/contrary evidence 
(Glover & Prawitt, 2014).  Failure to gather sufficient appropriate evidence aligns 
with insufficient professional scepticism (Beasley et al, 2001) and excessive trust 
(Glover & Prawitt, 2014).  Accordingly, highly sceptical auditors efficiently alter 
their audit procedures in response to risk indicators (Carpenter and Reimers, 2013; 
Peytcheva, 2014), however Peytcheva (2014) highlights that it is important to 
recognise that increased evidence does not necessarily equate to increased evaluation 
of evidence (Peytcheva 2014).   
 
Further, Kang et al (2015) note that sceptical action requires more than sceptical 
judgment.  That is, an appropriate response (action) to audit risk is a consequence of 
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 utilising professional scepticism for the purpose of gathering and evaluating 
sufficient appropriate evidence, appropriate to the risk.  Sceptical disposition, or 
sceptical judgment, are not, of themselves, enough to reduce audit risk.  The action, 
or outcome, which completes the scepticism process, would involve design of 
appropriate audit procedures, as well as documentation of those procedures and 
subsequent audit judgments. 
 
Despite Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) association of Neutrality with attitudes free of 
assumption (and therefore the greatest professional scepticism), they identify the 
entire continuum as a range of scepticism, with the professional range encompassing 
the entire Neutral and Presumptive Doubt areas, excluding only Complete Trust and 
Complete Doubt.  The reasoning for the breadth of this professional range is not 
clear, however it is relevant that Neutrality and Presumptive Doubt are strongly 
represented because they are the two dominant perspectives of professional 
scepticism emerging from regulation and recent academic research, with no 
consensus as to which of the two is the most appropriate (Quadackers et al, 2014). 
 
Whilst Glover & Prawitt’s (2014, p. P4) continuum represents “gradations” of 
incrementally different scepticism levels, it does not distinguish a professional range 
from a range of scepticism that may be exhibited by a layperson who has neither the 
diligence of a professional nor the complete (dis)trust of a non-sceptic.    Therefore it 
is not possible at this time to translate differences across the continuum to measure a 
professional level of scepticism. 
 
Glover & Prawitt (2014) argue that auditors should (and therefore are able to) choose 
the level of scepticism they exhibit, and that it is important they choose different 
levels across the continuum which match the circumstances of their audit tasks.  For 
example, in situations of heightened risk, sceptical auditors would adopt a 
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 presumptive doubt perspective (Westermann et al, 2014; Quadackers et al, 2014).  
This capacity for change reflects the notion of ‘state scepticism’ (Nelson, 2009; 
Hurtt, 2010), and Glover & Prawitt (2014, p. P4) state that auditors must maintain 
their “questioning mind” at all points of the continuum so that they can respond 
appropriately in light of ongoing risk assessments. It is not clear whether the authors 
are referring to questioning of the evidence required/obtained (trait scepticism) or of 
the thinking processes utilised to evaluate it.   Further, Glover & Prawitt (2014) do 
not identify how an auditor’s scepticism is placed on that continuum by anyone other 
than the individual applying it, or by means other than that individual’s judgment:  
Each individual’s choice of scepticism to apply depends entirely on the individual’s 
assessment of risk they perceive in the circumstances (Glover & Prawitt, 2014), and 
such assessments may be deficient (Beasley et al, 2001), influenced by unconscious 
trait biases. 
 
Further complicating the challenge of defining a cohesive professional level of 
scepticism, prior research (Harding & Trotman, 2015; Carpenter & Reimers, 2013) 
observes no correlation between trait and state scepticism (Hurtt, 2013; Khan & 
Harding, 2013; Harding & Trotman, 2015).  The authors suggest that these 
observations may reflect order effects in measurement, which could be addressed in 
further research (Harding & Trotman, 2015), but in any case the notion of some 
degree of independence between the factors is noted.   
 
Consequently, a coherent measure of professional scepticism arguably must consist 
of a combination of both trait scepticism and its situational factor (Hurtt et al, 2013).  
Given the  reasonably static nature of trait scepticism (Hurtt, 2010), and the more 
fluid, situational (Hurtt 2010; Westermann et al, 2014; Glover & Prawitt, 2014) 
nature of scepticism skill, the level of overall scepticism may be subject to change 
over time and/or under differing conditions (Glover & Prawitt, 2014). 
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2.6  Measures of Professional Scepticism 
Numerous methods have been used in prior research to study auditor scepticism.  
Hurtt (2010) notes that it is difficult to draw inferences from such a body of research 
due to inconsistent measurement.  Formal training is not an appropriate factor for 
measuring scepticism skill, or capacity to adopt a professionally sceptical state 
(Cohen et al, 2014; Westermann et al, 2014; Hurtt 2010), because all auditors 
undertake the same education (within same jurisdictions, if not comparable 
internationally); nor is experience an appropriate base upon which to measure 
scepticism skill, due to the inconsistency of research findings. 
 
Some utilise audit tasks alone as a means of comparing auditor judgements to arrive 
at between-subjects measures. Examples include participant preparation of audit-
related questions, and self-rating of perceived accountability and (dis)comfort (Kang 
et al, 2015).  Examples of prior empirical studies that provide relevant background to 
inform the method adopted for this research are summarised in Appendix 2, 
beginning on page 226.   
 
Such contributions from prior empirical research are very helpful for the purpose of 
clarifying relationships between scepticism-relevant variables.  However, these 
studies do not employ methods which could be used to address the current research 
problem or research questions: None of these studies attempt to define a level of PS 
with which auditor performance can be compared, from either the Trait perspective 
or a situational State perspective.  Further, there remains a missing link in the Trait 
and State discussion, being the situational variable(s) which interact with the 
relatively static Trait variable to influence the various States.  Situational variables 
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 are acknowledged and accommodated in some studies, but there is no consensus 
about definition.  For the purposes of this research, that link is referred to as Skill. 
 
Finally, the vast majority of prior studies utilise audit scenarios and recruit auditors 
as subjects, which does not facilitate inclusion of others for the purpose of 
differentiating a Professional Scepticism level from alternate levels of scepticism.  
Audit-specific tasks can not be administered to non-audit participants because they 
will not understand how to do what is required for the task.   
 
Therefore, to achieve the objectives of this research, it was necessary to focus upon 
the prior conceptual literature, which discusses levels of scepticism, and offers 
potential explanations for the variables which link trait scepticism to various 
scepticism states.  The conceptual literature was drawn upon to develop a research 
model to enable exploration of the Skill variable, and to the broader psychometric 
literature was explored for the purpose of adapting an appropriate scepticism 
measurement method to accommodate that model. 
 
Studies which address the trait aspects of scepticism utilise instruments such as 
Hurtt’s (2010) Scepticism Scale, and the Wrightsman (1991) and Rotter (1967) Trust 
Scales, introduced in section 2.3.  Quadackers et al (2014) propose that the Hurtt 
(2010) scale measures scepticism from a Neutrality perspective, whereas an inverted 
trust scale (Rotter’s 1967 scale) measures scepticism from a Presumptive Doubt 
perspective.  Comparing the two scales in an audit-task experiment, Quadackers et al 
(2014) found that they equally predict professional scepticism in low risk conditions, 
but only the inverted trust scale results were significant in high risk conditions, 
which is attributed to Neutrality being less effective than Presumptive Doubt in 
circumstances where heightened scepticism is necessary.  Given that higher risk 
audits are of greatest concern to auditors, Quadackers et al (2014) suggest that their 
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 use of an inverted trust scale provides a generally more reliable measure of 
professional scepticism than the Hurtt (2010) scale.  
In some studies, the Hurtt (2010) scale has signalled no significant difference in 
professional scepticism between manipulated groups (Carpenter & Reimers, 2013), 
which is attributed to the fixed nature of a trait (Cohen et al, 2104; Carpenter & 
Reimers, 2013; Hurtt, 2010) as measured by this scale.  However, despite 
acknowledging that professional scepticism consists of both trait and skill aspects 
(Cohen et al, 2014; Westermann et al, 2014; Hurtt, 2010), both the above types of 
scales attempt to measure only the trait aspect.  Hurtt (2010) notes that use of single-
dimension constructs to measure professional scepticism make it difficult to identify 
which sub-construct is being measured. 
 
Other research 8 attempts to measure both aspects, but do so using a combination of 
the Hurtt (2010) trait scale plus a series of audit tasks.  However, in such studies, the 
task results do not combine with the trait scale results in such a way as to provide an 
overall single measure of professional scepticism.  Also, the tasks used in such 
studies are not appropriate for administration to non-audit participants to derive a 
‘professional’ level of scepticism because the activities are audit-specific.   
More recently, Peytcheva (2014) utilised combined measures.  This project involved 
use of “two different state skepticism prompts … [one] based on the presumptive 
doubt view of professional skepticism … [plus] a cheater-detection prompt based on 
social contracts theory” (Peytcheva, 2014, p.28).  This approach contrasts 
substantially with the other research described above because one of the constructs is 
reversed.  That is, Presumptive Doubt has previously been associated with trait 
scepticism, such as in the work of Glover & Prawitt (2014) and Quadackers et al 
8 For example, see Khan and Harding, 2013; Carpenter & Reimers, 2013. 
46 
 
                                                 
 (2014).  However, it is consistent that Peytcheva (2014, p. 28) refers to the Social 
Contract mechanism in terms of “activating” a “frame of mind”, which has 
previously been associated with the more fluid scepticism.  In this sense, the 
Presumptive Doubt construct is applied to explore whether an appropriate state has 
been invoked by the use of scepticism prompts. This measure (involving assessment 
of audit-specific task performance, given the presence or absence of prompts, against 
a normative solution) was more successful for students, but not auditors, than the 
cheater-detection prompt, which produced no effect for either group (Peytcheva, 
2014).  The Hurtt (2010) scale was utilised to measure trait scepticism, though no 
significant differences were observed between groups, and overall results were again 
significant for students but not auditors (Peytcheva, 2014).  
 
A further consideration, highlighted by Peytcheva (2014) is that more must be 
understood about the relative importance of trait versus state scepticism (Nelson, 
2009; Hurtt, 2010; Carpenter and Reimers, 2011; Peytcheva 2014) when constructing 
an overall measure. 
 
2.7  Limitations of Professional Scepticism 
The development and manifestation of sceptical behaviour is subject to a range of 
internal and external influences, including regulation, education, religion, social and 
workplace conditioning and norms, and life experiences.  Barriers may include 
identifying what scepticism actually is, gaps in identified competence between audit 
standards and the identification of fraud in general.   
 
In attempting to understand reasons for sub-optimal professional scepticism, prior 
research (Westermann et al, 2014; Hurtt et al, 2013) has identified numerous factors 
that may positively and negatively affect how and when it manifests.  Among these, 
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 is Westermann et al’s (2014, p.4) finding that workplace pressures can be barriers to 
effective scepticism (Hurtt et al, 2013; Svanström, 2015), including “inspection, 
litigation risk, client importance, time-budget pressure, workpaper review and formal 
evaluation”.  Such barriers have also been noted in other publications (including: 
Nelson 2009; PCAOB 2012a; Hurtt et al. 2013; Westermann et al, 2014; Vera-
Muñoz, 2015), along with documentation practices (Van Peursem, 2010; Rasso, 
2015; Westermann et al, 2014); partner and supervisor attitudes and expectations 
(Carpenter & Reimers, 2013; Peecher et al, 2013b) and even audit regulation (Glover 
& Prawitt, 2014; Peecher et al, 2013b).  Van Peursem (2010, pp. 24, 27) adds poor 
planning, cost cutting, and over-reliance upon systems and computer-assisted 
techniques to that list. Further, common auditing procedures may exacerbate the 
problem in that the veracity of procedures may be overestimated, with those 
involving detailed instruction or specific interpretation inhibit professional 
scepticism (Rasso, 2015).  These factors increase the possibility that negative 
influences may outweigh the positive influences in some audits. 
 
The above research highlights that the expression of a sceptical attitude is influenced 
by auditors’ intrinsic properties, as well as by numerous extrinsic factors, but it is not 
yet clear whether the degree of positive(negative) extrinsic influence is offset or 
amplified by individual auditors’ intrinsic abilities. 
 
However, scepticism is both a personality trait (Hurtt, 2010) and a cognitive function 
(Birnberg, 2011), and the varying degrees of scepticism exhibited by auditors are 
necessarily influenced by varying degrees of self-interest and rationality (Nelsona et 
al, 2003).  Following their study of SEC Enforcement Actions, Beasley et al (2001) 
assert that “in many of the fraud cases, it appeared auditors simply chose not to 
pursue identified audit issues” (Beasley et al, 2001, p. 65).  Some possible ethics-
related explanations for this behaviour is provided, but Beasley et al (2001) do not 
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 describe the basis for that causality.  In a study of New Zealand audit failures, Van 
Peursem (2010) attributes audit failures to ritualised audits, arising from professional 
structures and legitimating practices that inhibit scepticism. 
 
Mintz (1995) suggested that the behaviour gap between knowledge and actions is 
resolvable only by normalising detailed analysis.  However, Rasso’s (2015) view is 
that even senior auditors have difficulty assimilating details to form a big picture 
view.  Such a view would facilitate identification of gaps, though Rasso (2015) 
further asserts that auditors are not good at recognising patterns in the evidence even 
when that evidence is complete, and fail to accommodate negative evidence. 
 
Mintz’ (1995) stance, however, may be considered an extension of Bastiat’s (1845) 
enduring assertion that terminology must be normalised, reducing the mystery 
surrounding the term ‘fraud’. Openness is the antithesis of fraud, and normalisation 
is the connection between theoretical knowledge and personal experience.  
Normalising cognitive challenges is not so simple though: Emotional influences are 
under-researched (Hurtt et al, 2013), and therefore stress responses, mood and other 
factors which may impact upon responses to risk are poorly understood. Nolder 
(2012) suggests that this is an important and under-researched area as auditors’ 
emotional reactions in high-risk settings can influence their level of skepticism. She 
notes, ‘‘In general the risk research provides strong evidence to suggest that an 
auditor’s affective response to risks significantly contributes to variations in his/her 
skeptical judgments and actions’’ (Nolder 2012, 11). 
 
Further influences are neurobiological, such as prefrontal cortex influences on 
rationality and manifestations of self-interest.  For example, Fleming, Thomas & 
Dolan (2010) have found that activity in the subthalmic nucleus area of the brain 
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 signifies stress and human predisposition to avoid difficult decisions and challenges 
to the status quo, suggesting that auditors may resist identification of material fraud.   
 
Prior research has revealed that human capacity to exhibit scepticism is influenced 
not only by how we utilise our brains, but also by the structure, chemistry and 
electrical activity in our brains.  Previous studies of auditor behaviour in general, and 
of scepticism in particular, identify environmental and cognitive/emotional barriers 
to professional scepticism in auditors, but ignore neurobiological factors which are 
inextricably interconnected with the cognitive and emotional factors that influence 
human perception of evidence and the various stages involved in evaluation of that 
evidence.  Examples of these biological factors, which may be barriers in themselves, 
and/or underpin whether, and how, the other barriers manifest, are explained in the 
remainder of this section.   
 
When misstatements or anomalies are identified, individuals may rationalise that 
what they have found is an error, rather than a signal of possible fraud.  These types 
of false rationalisations are formed with faulty logic (Nelsona et al, 2003). Thus even 
natural propensity for scepticism can be impeded by false logic and biases in the 
application and interpretation of data.  One such impediment is confirmation bias 
(Trompeter & Wright, 2010; Hurtt et al, 2013; Fukukawa & Mock, 2011), which 
appears particularly problematic in terms of management representations. 
 
The frontal and prefrontal areas of the human brain are utilised for complex thought, 
such as hypothesis and criteria evaluation, risk assessment and decision making 
(New Scientist, 2010).  This area of the brain also stores past perceptions (New 
Scientist, 2010), suggesting that it may also be responsible for heuristic influences 
which may introduce unconscious biases to simplify complex tasks. 
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 The prefrontal cortex develops most significantly in early adulthood, and has been 
positively correlated with maturing capacity to assess risk.  This development is vital 
to the audit process because the purpose of the requirement to exercise professional 
scepticism throughout audit is to enable continual assessment of audit risk; that is, 
the risk of forming an inappropriate audit opinion.  On this basis, it could reasonably 
be expected that younger auditors are less sceptical than their seniors.  This is of 
interest because much of the coal-face audit work is undertaken by junior audit team 
members, and the audit opinion is formed on the basis of that work, signed off by 
experienced auditors.  However, such a proposal is inconsistent with prior research 
findings that suggest junior auditors are more sceptical than their seniors, as 
discussed above at 2.4.3.  A possible explanation for this conundrum may be that 
junior auditors may require more evidence upon which to base their judgments, as 
compensation for lacking the heuristic benefits of experience.  Alternatively, as Hurtt 
et al (2013) suggest that audit seniors’ accountability for client retention might 
explain their relatively lower scepticism.   
 
In the absence of a benchmark of professional scepticism, this relative comparison is 
not entirely useful though: It is possible that senior auditors are exhibiting 
professional scepticism and that the ‘more sceptical’ juniors are excelling.  At face 
value, the above concepts suggest a brief window of ‘most optimal’ scepticism in 
early-career auditors with perhaps only two or three years’ experience.  Future 
research that clarifies this may contribute knowledge of significant interest to 
academics, professional bodies and professional practitioners in terms of audit team 
structure, professional development and audit partner rotation practices. 
 
To further complicate the task of evaluating one’s own thinking processes 
(scepticism skill), auditors may need to undertake their evaluations in unique ways, 
because it is noted that individuals are subject to different biases and undertake 
51 
 
 different thinking processes as a result of unique brain development and accumulated 
life experiences (Peecher et al, 2013b).  Further, activity in the subthalmic nucleus 
area of the brain appears to predispose decision makers to avoid difficult decisions in 
favour of maintaining a status quo (Fleming, Thomas & Dolan, 2010).  Suggestion 
that humans are hard wired to avoid scepticism may help explain suboptimal 
judgements even by auditors with ostensibly well-developed analytical skills.   
 
2.8  Summary 
The assumption in the Auditing Standards that a professional level of scepticism can 
be exercised by all (AUASB, 2013b) audit team members is undermined by evidence 
that neurobiological influences may present a natural, base-level impediment to 
professional scepticism.  Further, this inherent impediment may be exacerbated, to a 
greater or lesser extent, by personal biases and external conditions that also present 
barriers to professional scepticism.   
 
As facilitators (prompts) of professional scepticism are offered in the literature, it is 
argued that auditors who exhibit traits that are not professionally sceptical, could 
achieve professional scepticism by developing skills to apply such facilitators to 
compensate for the inherent shortfall and achieve a state of professional scepticism.  
Such skills would be required to a lesser or greater extent in different individuals, 
and, as auditors are required to exercise professional scepticism throughout the audit 
process, those skills may be required to maintain the mindframe at all times, and not 
only in response to higher or lower levels of assessed risk. 
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 Chapter 3:  Developing a Research Model  
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter a research model is developed to explore professional scepticism and 
its component parts, to devise an approach to measuring scepticism, and more 
specifically to identify an approach to measuring a professional level of scepticism. 
 
3.2  Problem-solving framework 
A major challenge was the identification of a problem-solving framework 
appropriate to address the initial research question: No single theory of professional 
scepticism is available to address all components of this question.  Equally, Nolder & 
Kadous (2014, p. 1) note that there continues to be a “lack of a guiding [conceptual] 
framework [and this] precludes researchers from building on each other’s work in a 
systematic way”.   
 
In their study, Nolder & Kadous (2014, p.34) offer a proposed [conceptual] 
framework for researching auditors’ judgment to provide a “practical means of 
identifying root causes of and correcting auditors’ failure to exhibit sceptical 
behaviour”.  Nolder & Kadous (2014) reject the trait approach to understanding 
scepticism because traits are held to be stable and difficult to change, which presents 
a bleak outlook for improving audit quality.  Instead, they develop a model which 
links Cognitions, Affections and Conations to describe professional scepticism as a 
construct which can be improved.  Nolder & Kadous (2014) also criticise trait 
measures as “general response tendencies in the abstract” (p. 7) because greater 
specificity is necessary for the purpose of making reliable predictions about 
behaviour.  Their conceptualisation takes auditor attitudes to evidence into account, 
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 which is highly compatible with the approach in this thesis.  However, the example 
Measure of Attitude of Professional Scepticism Components (Nolder & Kadous, 
2014, pp. 35-37) is audit-specific and therefore unsuitable for administration to the 
general public for the purpose of observing a broad perspective of scepticism, from 
which to differentiate a professional level of scepticism.  To answer the research 
question, it was necessary to explore and draw upon a variety of prior works to 
construct a project-specific problem solving framework which would apply beyond 
the specific auditing context.  This was achieved by identifying scepticism-relevant 
constructs in audit regulation and academic literature, and combining them into a 
composite framework useful to satisfy the requirements of the research questions.   
 
The process of developing the [conceptual] framework is described in the following 
sections, and the outcome is presented as a Model of Professional Scepticism. 
 
3.3  Trait Scepticism 
In auditing regulation, professional publications and academic research, dominant 
themes explaining auditor scepticism are attitudes, and propensity to exercise the 
appropriate attitudes.  These issues are identified as trait characteristics (Hurtt, 2009), 
which influence how evidence is interpreted and utilised to inform judgments.   
 
Traits are considered to be stable characteristics (Peytcheva, 2014; Rose et al, 2010; 
Carpenter & Reimers, 2013).  As individuals have relative differences in beliefs and 
attitudes, it can reasonably be expected that the trait platform potentially introduces 
varying degrees of personal bias into the process of judgment making.  A wide range 
of attitudes toward information/evidence in the general community may represent a 
wide range of biases if those attitudes reflect different propensities to accept or 
challenge information/evidence.  Auditors, however, are all expected to have the 
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 same attitude to evidence, and that attitude is far more constrained than could be 
expected of the general community: That is, auditors must maintain an open mind, 
free of bias, accumulating sufficient appropriate evidence until such time as a 
judgment is manifest. 
 
3.3.1  Professional Biases 
Poor judgment has previously been explained in the literature on anchoring 
heuristics, recognition heuristics and higher order thinking.  Butler (1986) claims that 
anchoring is widely used by accountants, and that anchoring is predominantly 
internal, and remains unaffected by new cognitive information.  This means that 
auditors will expect to experience in the future more of what they have personally 
experienced in the past, and those who have not experienced a range of financial 
misstatements (or fraud) are likely to believe they never will, and therefore they will 
be less alert to such misstatements that do arise, even if they understand, 
hypothetically, that it is a possibility.  Therefore, over time, personal experience 
which reinforces cognitive shortcuts can constrain knowledge (Bastiat, 1845; Butler 
1986; Mintz, 1995; Hall, 1996; Burns, 2002), and reinforce the Trait propensity to 
expect more of the same in future.   
 
This suggests that experience is a subjective influence, and therefore it is potentially 
a barrier to professional scepticism.    
 
 
3.3.2  Neutrality 
More consistent with the Auditing Standard requirement that auditors maintain an 
attitude that includes a questioning mind, and to critically assess evidence (PCAOB, 
2012b; AUASB, 2013b), are the concepts of Neutrality and Presumptive Doubt 
(Nelson, 2009), which were introduced in Chapter 2.  Glover & Prawitt (2014) place 
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 scepticism on a continuum, with the professional range encompassing the Neutral 
and Presumptive Doubt perspectives described by Nelson (2009), and excluding only 
Complete Trust and Complete Doubt at the extremes.   
 
Although the literature does not establish which of these perspectives most 
appropriately represent professional scepticism (Quadackers et al, 2014), this 
research argues that the Neutral perspective most closely represents the auditor’s role 
of merely opining on the basis of the evidence, rather than asserting anything 
(Liddell and Scott, 1940 in Van Peursem, 2010; Cohen et al, 2014), and the 
obligation to maintain an objective position, free of assumption or bias.  Neutrality, 
or objectivity, is therefore aligned, for the purposes of this research, with ideal 
professional scepticism wherein sufficient appropriate evidence speaks for itself. 
 
In acknowledging this, it is therefore appropriate to shift Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) 
continuum placement of Neutrality so that it is centred to align with the point of 
objectivity, representing 100% scepticism. This is consistent with the requirements 
that Auditor judgements must be made in the public interest (APESB, 2013; Beasley 
et al, 2001) and in compliance with the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 
rather than in the interests of the auditor, or the interests of the audit client (APESB, 
2013).  This supposes that auditors can exercise appropriate objectivity with which to 
evaluate the interests of a diverse body of financial statement users, and assess the 
materiality of any misstatements in terms of whether the decisions of those users 
might potentially be affected.  
 
On a continuum from one extreme to the other, there will be relative changes through 
neutral and presumptive doubt, and until evidence is available to the contrary, such 
changes could reasonably be assumed to be incrementally consistent.  Therefore, in 
the continuum adopted for this research, at least the end parts of the ‘professional’ 
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 range of Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) model, which was presented at Figure 2.1 on 
page 41, should be retracted somewhat to recognise a more gradual transition from 
‘complete’ (dis)trust to professionally sceptical, and to accommodate levels of lay 
scepticism which fall short of ‘professional’.  This extension of Glover & Prawitt’s 
(2014) model is illustrated in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 3.1   A Neutral view of the Scepticism Continuum 
AFTER Glover & Prawitt, 2014   
 
 
Such a shift results in movement of Presumptive Doubt to the field between 
Neutrality and Distrust/Extreme Distrust.  This movement does not defy the 
principles expressed by Nelson (2009), but it does support a nexus between the 
works of Nelson (2009) and Glover & Prawitt (2014) whilst also accommodating the 
concept of incremental transition across the trait spectrum. 
 
Evidence is expected to feature greatest in judgments made from a neutral, or 
sceptical, position, with lesser weighting applied to those judgments which are also 
informed by trust or distrust biases (Cohen et al, 2014).   Glover & Prawitt (2014, 
p.3) agree, proposing a continuum of evidence behaviours which correspond to their 
proposed scepticism continuum, enabling auditors “to take the perspective that is 
most appropriate considering the circumstances applicable to each audit area and 
assertion”.  This means that Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) evidence curve is straight, 
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 ranging from very little evidence at the Trust end (in situations of low risk) and 
extensive evidence at the Complete Doubt end of their continuum (in situations of 
high risk, demanding a heightened scepticism approach). 
 
However, “it is important to keep in mind that applying such a continuum to a 
specific account and assertion takes place after a careful and rigorous initial risk 
assessment” (Glover & Prawitt, 2014, p.3).  This means that different parts of any 
audit may involve behaviours at very different points on their evidence continuum, 
which is preferable because “taking a presumptive doubt approach for the whole 
audit would result in over collection of audit evidence in many areas and result in a 
suboptimal balance of effectiveness and efficiency” (Glover & Prawitt, 2014, p.2).  
That is, Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) evidence line refers to conscious behaviours, 
responsive to considered risk assessments. 
 
At this point, I extend Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) model to acknowledge relative 
differences in degrees to which evidence speaks for itself in formation of judgments 
from a default position, in the absence of risk assessments and/or any prompts to 
increase scepticism.   In the default position, professional scepticism is influenced by 
the interaction of Trait and any Skills, at a subject’s disposal, but not required in 
default situation.  This means that when Skills are latent, attitudes to evidence will be 
dominated by the inherent Trait attitude.  Therefore, in situations which do not 
involve risk assessment, or other prompts to engage scepticism-related Skills, 
propensity to evaluate evidence will depend upon the subject’s Trait position.  
 
At the Extreme Trust and Extreme Distrust ends of the Trait continuum, subjects are 
similarly biased in pre-emptive belief or disbelief.  At these extremes, no evidence 
will be utilised in the formation of judgments that arise from biases unless a situation 
requires them to engage Skills that influence their behaviour toward heightened 
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 scepticism.  This contrasts with the Neutral (Professionally Sceptical) default Trait 
position, where judgments are formed purely on the basis of evidence, regardless of 
situational requirements. 
 
In the following diagram, Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) evidence approach, from an 
informed risk-assessed position, is depicted by the dashed line, and the weighting of 
evidence considered when making judgments from a default position is depicted by 
the red line.  Both evidence depictions are consistent with the premise that higher 
scepticism involves more evidence (Glover & Prawitt, 2014), but potential 
differences in evidence behaviours may arise according to situational needs and 
interplay with the inherent disposition of the subject. 
 
Figure 3.2   Relative Weightings of Evidence 
 
AFTER Glover & Prawitt, 2014 
 
The roles of trust and distrust and explored further in the following sections, along 
with continuing discussion of the relationship between biases and evidence. 
 
3.3.3  (Dis)Trust  
Trust is one type of inherent bias, and is connected to existing beliefs (Khan & 
Harding, 2013) and directly influences how information is perceived and 
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 accommodated.  Humans are predisposed to trust (Fleming, Thomas & Dolan, 2010), 
and trust can prevail against opposition until such time as evidence of sufficient 
weight and/or proliference causes the person to evaluate the merits of his/her position 
of trust toward the subject matter.    
 
This means that judgments made under condition of trust may be arrived at on face 
value of evidence, or even without critical evaluation of any evidence.  Even though 
trust can be revoked in light of sufficient appropriate evidence, such evidence may 
not be immediately recognised by a trusting person.  Trust is therefore 
counterproductive to fraud prevention and detection efforts.  
 
Distrust is considered as the flip-side of trust, with biases due to distrust having 
similar impacts on evidence evaluation (Glover & Prawitt, 2014).  On a continuum, 
relative changes in levels of presumptive doubt form a transition from neutrality to 
distrust.  In the auditing context, the most notable difference between trust and 
distrust is that trust potentially exposes auditors to increased audit risk, whereas 
distrust potentially increases audit inefficiency.  Audit risk is obviously of greater 
importance than inefficiency, due to the legal impacts and undermining of the 
assurance function.  Nonetheless, as both biases are contrary to the expression of 
scepticism, both are relevant to the study of scepticism.  Extreme biases, expressed 
as extreme trust or distrust, are expected to have the greatest negative impacts on 
expression of scepticism (Glover & Prawitt, 2014). 
 
3.3.4  Extreme (Dis)Trust 
At its extreme, trust represents belief in that the relative importance of evaluating the 
sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence falls in favour of merely confirming 
expectations (McMillan & White, 1993; Bamber et al, 1997).  Belief is “an 
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 acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof” which 
constitutes “a firmly held opinion” (Oxford University Press, 2015).   
 
Like trust, belief is a socially desirable attribute in that it is essential for healthy 
interpersonal relationships, but it is problematic in an audit context because wholly 
subjective bias is completely contrary to professional scepticism.  In an audit context, 
belief is highly undesirable because such extreme bias poses unacceptable audit risk.  
Extreme distrust, herein referred to as cynicism, is not a socially desirable trait, 
because it represents the polar opposite of behaviours that nurture relationships or 
circumstances.  Cynicism is undesirable in an audit context also, because an attitude 
so biased that it consistently assumes all assertions are non-believable would be 
exceedingly counterproductive. 
 
Glover and Prawitt’s (2014) continuum is consequently extended to accommodate 
incremental changes in trait positions, extending from a position of greatest trust bias 
(belief), through neutrality, to the opposite extreme of cynicism, as depicted in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 3.3   A Composite Trait Continuum 
 
 
 
 
This diagram is now adapted to indicate relative levels of bias across the continuum.  
In the following figure, the red line illustrates the transition from greatest levels of 
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 bias at the extremes of the continuum, through zero bias at the point of greatest 
neutrality. 
 
Figure 3.4   Relative Positions of Bias 
 
 
Interestingly, this diagram curve also represents the persuasiveness of evidence 
necessary to alter the position of bias.  The greater a person’s trust or distrust toward 
a person, thing or idea, the more tolerant they will be of ambiguity, which means that 
evidence does not play an important role in judgments.  Small quantities of low 
quality evidence are accepted to confirm expectations (McMillan & White, 1993; 
Bamber et al, 1997), but in order to revise beliefs from a strong bias position, 
evidence which contradicts beliefs must be more persuasive before it is accepted 
(Hurtt, et al, 2013).  This is a problem for extremely biased auditors because 
tolerance of ambiguity has a negative association with scepticism (Cohen et al, 1993; 
Hughes et al, 2009; Hurtt et al, 2013; Grenier et al, 2015).  This means that at both 
ends of the continuum, more evidence is required to change pre-existing expectations 
than is required from moderately biased position.   
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 From a neutral perspective, no evidence is required to counteract biases, because 
biases do not set up expectations at the neutral position.  Rather, the neutral 
perspective entails flexibility in the gathering of sufficient appropriate evidence, 
driven by risk indicators (Carpenter and Reimers, 2013; Westermann et al, 2014; 
Peytcheva, 2014; Glover & Prawitt, 2014). 
 
In the following figure, the red line depicts the quality and quantity of evidence 
required to counteract the various levels of inherent bias. 
 
Figure 3.5   Evidence Required to Counteract Bias 
 
AFTER Hurtt et al, 2013. 
 
The trait characteristics discussed in this section are presented in general terms, 
describing a broad range of generic attitudes that are expected to remain reasonably 
stable in the short and medium term.  As such, the continuum of traits represents a 
generalised platform of collective trait positions.  However, auditors, as a particular 
sub-set of people in general, are expected to maintain a professionally sceptical 
attitude, and must therefore consider whether their inherent position on the 
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 generalised platform is appropriately sceptical, and if not, to adopt strategies to 
achieve an appropriate state of professional scepticism. 
 
3.4  State Scepticism 
Whilst it is recognised above that ideal expression of professionally sceptical traits 
would equate to ideal neutrality and freedom from bias, it is also acknowledged in 
the literature that scepticism may be situationally responsive (Brown-Liburd et al, 
2013).  Changes in scepticism level might arise internally, such as from the process 
of (re)assessing risk; or from external prompts that more or less risk may be 
encountered.  That is, auditors may induce a state that will complement the trait 
position, correcting for any underlying bias, as appropriate to the situation at hand.    
 
In suggesting that a state of less than 100% scepticism is acceptable, it is noted that 
extreme scepticism in situations of low risk would result in excessive effort and 
operational inefficiency.   This suggests a range of professionally sceptical 
behaviours may be acceptable for the purpose of appropriately conducting an audit.   
 
Until evidence is available to suggest otherwise, it is assumed that relative changes 
across the continuum, through neutral and presumptive doubt, from extreme to 
extreme, are incrementally consistent. Therefore, in this model, the outer parts of 
Glover & Prowitt’s ‘professional’ range are contracted somewhat to accommodate 
incremental changes in scepticism which reflect the transition from professionally 
sceptical toward states which are more influenced by subjectivity.  This mid-range of 
scepticism, between professional scepticism and biases, is referred to as lay 
scepticism for the purposes of this research.  Some distinction between layperson and 
professional scepticism is warranted because Trotman (2006) argues that audit 
professionals attract even higher expectations of judgment accuracy than other 
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 professionals, despite the requirement that they make such judgements about often 
highly ambiguous accounting practices and deceptively concealed fraud.  
 
Without asserting limits to which such a range of states might extend, the concept of 
professional scepticism as a range of states, rather than an absolute position, is 
illustrated in Figure 3.7.   
 
Figure 3.6   A Professional Scepticism Range 
 
 
 
The professional range may or may not overlap with a range of scepticism exhibited 
by laypersons.  According to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, some prior 
research has found no significant within-group differences between scepticism levels 
of auditors and students, but differences between groups.  Other studies identify 
relative differences between auditors with, for example, varying experience.  It is 
possible that an appropriately sceptical state may be an individual’s default 
mindframe, or a mindframe augmented to include more scepticism.  Examples of 
augmenting factors include prompts arising from an individual’s accumulating 
learning and experiences (skills), or from situational influences such as supervisor 
instruction; providing potential to improve upon a trait position to achieve a 
heightened state of scepticism when required.  The relationship between these 
factors, and suggestion of a possible reinforcing feedback loop, is illustrated by 
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 Anderson (2009) who developed the schema to model these issues in a broader 
judgment context. 
Figure 3.7   The Role of Scepticism Augmentation 
 
SOURCE: Anderson (2009, p.384) 
 
Augmentation may arise externally, from prompts that enhance manifestation of 
sceptical attitudes or actions (Khan & Harding, 2013; Grenier, 2014).  This concept 
is of particular interest because objectivity is defined as “a state or quality... 
intentness on objects external to the mind; external reality” (Houghton Mifflin, 2004; 
Random House, 2009).  This is consistent with the earlier definition of scepticism 
generally, and also with the principle that audit judgments must be made in the 
public interest.  However, a potential problem with external prompts is that initiation 
of appropriate scepticism, matched to (re)assessments of risk throughout the audit 
process, would be dependent upon the presence of reliably consistent external 
prompts, also matched to those (re)assessed risks.  Such an expectation is likely to 
present an unrealistic supervision burden.  Further, reliance upon external prompts 
may be unreliable if such use is subject to the limitations of theoretical (external) 
knowledge, identified above, wherein biases dominate over integrated (internalised) 
knowledge.  Such a phenomenon may explain observations that sceptical judgments 
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 do not always result in sceptical actions (Khan & Harding, 2013; Harding & 
Trotman, 2015).  
 
The Auditing Standards require that all members of audit teams (AUASB, 2013b) 
maintain professional scepticism throughout audits (AUASB, 2013b), placing the 
onus on individuals to challenge their own judgment processes, as needed.  This 
necessitates the use of internal prompts by those individuals whose inherent trait 
position is other than professionally sceptical, to achieve and maintain a state of 
professional scepticism. 
 
The process of self-initiating scepticism prompts suggests that skills are necessary to 
recognise times of need for increased professional scepticism, integrate knowledge of 
suitable augmentation prompts, and to assess the efficacy of implementing those 
prompts.  This would facilitate maintaining of a questioning mind during 
(re)assessment of risks and critical assessment of evidence. It is supposed that 
internalised prompts may give rise to more authentic sceptical behaviours, possibly 
bridging the gap between sceptical judgments and sceptical actions.  It is further 
supposed that routine use of internalised prompts may become integrated to such an 
extent that trait shifts occur, over time, toward a more professionally sceptical 
inherent position.  That is, an individual who possesses a high level of such skill may 
enhance a less-than-professionally sceptical inherent position to achieve a 
professionally sceptical state, appropriate to the circumstances.   
 
3.5  Scepticism Skill  
This research extends the prior research stance that professional scepticism is a 
product of both trait and state (Nelson & Tan, 2005; Anderson, 2009; Westerman et 
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 al, 2014; Grenier, 2014) by proposing that a state of professional scepticism is a 
combination of trait and skill. 
 
This research proposes that skill is the factor which is situationally responsive, 
applied in different ways, or to different degrees according to conditions, to 
complement or counteract an inherent skepticism trait, and elicit an overall state of 
professional scepticism.  It is important to note that when auditors choose an 
appropriate level of skepticism (Glover & Prawitt, 2014) to match risk, they can only 
do so by utilizing more, or more advanced, Skills, because Traits are considered 
fixed, at least in the short-term (Peytcheva, 2014; Rose et al, 2010; Carpenter & 
Reimers, 2013).  An implication of this is that an auditor’s capacity to be risk-
responsive is potentially Skill-dependent.  This premise is consistent with Glover & 
Prawitt’s (2014) alignment of scepticism with more or less evidence evaluation and 
the notion of ‘state scepticism’ (Nelson, 2009; Hurtt, 2010; Glover & Prawitt, 2014). 
 
3.5.1  A Nexus of Trait and Skill 
The emphasis on a ‘state’ in this chapter (Hurtt et al, 2013; Harding & Trotman, 
2015), distinguishes a position of objectivity from the trait aspect of professional 
scepticism by virtue of skills being required to change in response to specific risk 
situations.  This is in direct contrast to traits, which are generally more enduring:  
Less subject to change, and more consistent across many situations. The 
interrelationships between skills and traits must be acknowledged.  On the basis of 
the descriptions in this chapter, a scepticism trait may be thought of as a foundation 
which provides parameters for openness to enquiry; which may or may not fall short 
of the goal of a professionally sceptical state. 
 
Prior research has identified a link between trait and skills, examples of which are 
described above as ‘prompts’ (Khan & Harding, 2013; Grenier, 2014) and 
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 ‘augmentation’ (Nelson, 2009; Peecher et al, 2013b).  For the purposes of addressing 
the immediate research problem, a more explicit recognition of the nexus between 
trait and skill is necessary.  Consequently, the notion of augmentation is adopted; and 
whilst ability to adopt external prompts may be helpful to achieving state scepticism, 
the relatively greater benefits of internal prompts is emphasised.  Where adoption 
and utilisation of prompts is sufficient to influence manifestation of scepticism, and 
achieve a state other than an inherent position, any change must be a consequence of 
learned behaviour, because the alternative explanation is innate behaviour, which 
would be accommodated within the trait position, and result in no change to state.   
 
On this basis, the capability of an individual to augment his/her given trait to achieve 
state scepticism is therefore referred to in this research as scepticism skill.  Further, 
such skill may be put to use to a greater or lesser degree, and/or in varying 
combination, as required by different situations. 
 
Consistent with Grenier’s (2014) view, which specifically defines the components of 
professional scepticism as a combination of both evidence scepticism and self-
criticism, auditor scepticism skills may be both: Self-critical reflective skills which 
enable recognition that heightened scepticism is necessary; and technical skills to act 
upon such self-prompts in gathering and evaluating evidence.  Carpenter and 
Reimers (2013) refer to reflections and assessments as ‘sceptical judgments’ and to 
evidence gathering, and other behaviours in response to the judgments, as ‘sceptical 
actions’.   
 
Skills are known to develop, sometimes rapidly (Bandura, 1993), in response to new 
learning and experiences.  This capacity for change differentiates skill development 
from heuristic bias because it is less subject to anchoring in personal belief systems:  
For example, an individual’s innate (dis)trust of the roadworthiness of an unfamiliar 
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 vehicle is independent of that person’s learned driving skills, even though it may 
influence the ways in which those skills are utilised whilst driving that vehicle for the 
first time, in order to remain safe.  A highly skilled driver will have more tools 
available than a novice to use in response to threats to safety, and those tools are 
adaptable to new situations and expressed more readily. This analogy is appropriate 
to auditing because it illustrates expression of skill in terms of openness to 
reassessment of, and response to, situations of ambiguity, uncertainty and risk.  
 
In this light, Sceptical Behaviour may change in response to prompts (Noviyanti & 
Winata, 2015) that initiate more or less scepticism skill to achieve a more or less 
sceptical temporary state, appropriate to the situation.   Prompts to achieve a more 
sceptical state do not always result in sceptical actions, or behaviour (Khan & 
Harding, 2013; Harding & Trotman, 2015), but if an individual does take appropriate 
action (Grenier 2014; Harding & Trotman, 2015) as a consequence of achieving an 
appropriately sceptical state, such behaviour may be described by the equation: 9   
Situational Scepticism Behaviour = Trait + Skills in Action 
SitSB = f (T + SkA) 
 
To facilitate understanding of the effect of such prompts on behaviours, it is first 
useful to understand the characteristics of a state in the absence of such prompts.  
That is, an individual’s default scepticism mindframe, including the stable trait plus 
the skills available to the individual, without the influence of specific situational 
prompts.  Understanding of the default mindframe is expected to facilitate 
comparison with Scepticism Behaviour for the purpose of empirically evaluating the 
9 A multiplicative relationship was considered, but an additive approach was favoured for the purposes of 
exploring the bilateral scales used for the purpose of this research.  The possibility that a multiplicative 
relationship may reveal further insights, particularly in terms of statistical analysis, is accommodated in the 
Further Research Opportunities section of Chapter 7. 
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 interplay of prompts and sceptical behaviours. Therefore, the default position is of 
particular interest to this research, and is represented by the adapted equation:  
Default Scepticism Mindframe = Trait + Skill 
DSM = f (T + Sk) 
 
 
3.5.2  Preferred Scepticism Skills 
It is important to recognise that not all skills are of equal value: For example, over-
reliance on heuristics, or prominent heuristic biases, can lead to counter-productivity 
problems, as described earlier in this chapter.  To determine preferred skills, we 
return to the Auditing Standard definition of professional scepticism, which extends 
the notion of audit risk by drawing focus squarely to evidence.   
 
The Auditing Standards stipulate technical processes involved in exploring for risks 
of material misstatement (AUASB, 2013c), but the forming of rational assessments 
of risk remain a matter of judgment (AUASB, 2013c).  The understanding obtained 
from initial risk assessment informs the audit plan and the sufficiency and 
appropriateness of further evidence to be gathered and analysed (AUASB, 2013c).  If 
analytical skills are not applied appropriately at this stage, the audit plan may not 
include missed cues, and therefore may not be appropriately responsive to the real 
risks of misstatement.  On that basis, this research is interested in skills that reflect 
curiosity, as representative of likelihood to conduct more thorough risk explorations. 
 
Also of particular interest to this study are enquiry skills which encompass analysis 
of evidence, and attitudes toward analysis.  As auditors are expected to gather and 
evaluate more persuasive evidence in circumstances of heightened risk (AUASB, 
2013d), a positive relationship is expected between skills involving consideration of 
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 evidence and risk assessment.  On that basis, this research assumes that individuals 
who are least tolerant of ambiguity are more likely to gather sufficient appropriate 
evidence, and then utilise that evidence to inform their judgments. 
 
Prior research asserts that scepticism is partly attributable to traits (Hurtt, 2010), and 
also that overall expression of professional scepticism is situational (Brown-Liburd 
et al, 2013).  It is also acknowledged above that skills may be accommodated into the 
trait position, but that further expression is flexible and responsive:  A person does 
not cease to have a skill when it is not being expressed (Bandura, 1993).  Therefore, 
it is the base-line of these further skills that this research attempts to capture. 
 
3.5.3  Auditor & Fraud Investigator Roles 
Demand for fraud expertise is greater than ever (Logan, 2009; Zipkin, 2009; ACFE, 
2005a; Simpson, 2004) and it is increasing further (Zipkin, 2009) in response to 
increasing fraud incidence (Zipkin, 2009) and increasing fraud sophistication (ACFE, 
2009; Abernethy, 2005; CRT, 2005; Nigrini & Meuller, 2014).   
 
Auditors are not required to be fraud examiners, or to acquire fraud investigation 
skills.  However, auditors are well-placed, by virtue of their roles and expertise, to 
identify fraud schemes, which may then be referred to investigators for a fraud 
examination engagement.  Fraud engagements are only initiated after fraud is 
suspected, and are wholly distinct from external auditors’ financial statement 
assurance engagements.  Suspicions of financial statement or other sophisticated 
frauds can only be raised by those with sufficient expertise and professional 
scepticism to query the truth and fairness of financial statements and other evidence.  
Auditors have the greatest relative knowledge to contribute to the field of financial 
statement fraud detection, and are best placed to fill the demand for detection 
expertise at the early identification and pre-examination stage. 
72 
 
  
3.5.4  Fraud Investigators’ Professional Scepticism 
QFIs are deemed to exemplify professional scepticism for several reasons.  Firstly, 
the nature of their work involves heightened scepticism at all times, rather than only 
in response to assessed risk.  This is because when fraud is already suspected, 
inherent risk and control risk will always be high, and therefore it is imperative that 
heightened skills are employed to reduce the risk of failing to detect appropriate cues 
for the purpose of assessing the risks, formulating hypotheses, and planning 
procedures to gather relevant evidence.  To this extent, a fraud engagement may be 
considered somewhat similar to a high-risk audit; but the procedures also 
accommodate the following increased challenges. 
 
For the purpose of planning the investigation, QFIs attempt to identify cues about the 
expected fraud, but this process frequently involves evidence that is deliberately 
concealed so that the perpetrator can evade detection.  This contrasts with audit for 
error, wherein the evidence is in plain sight.  Although auditors must increase 
scepticism in response to increased risks, such as fraud cues, QFIs working on a 
fraud case would need to exercise this heightened scepticism at all times. 
 
In fraud investigations, the nature of cues is potentially more varied and ambiguous, 
in that anomalies may be disguised as something else.  For example, anomalies may 
show up as omissions in a procedure or transaction trail or pattern, or be hidden in 
plain sight within false evidence.  Evidence is frequently deliberately concealed by 
perpetrators for the purpose of evading detection. Auditors are not expected to verify 
the authenticity of evidence; instead utilising evidence from independent third 
parties, where possible, because it is generally considered more persuasive than 
client-produced documentation (AUASB, 2013d).  As QFIs specialise in the 
deceptive features of fraud, manifesting as fake transactions, false representations, 
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 and fraudulent documentation, they are deemed, for the purposes of this research, to 
be more sceptical in terms of evidence analysis. 
 
Further, evidence in fraud cases is often circumstantial, given that one of the defining 
characteristics of fraud is intent (ACFE, 2007a, p367).  Intent is very difficult to 
prove in the absence of a confession, so therefore the quality of circumstantial 
evidence (ACFE, 2007a, p.8), and its relationship to ‘hard’ evidence, must be strong 
enough to withstand the scrutiny of the courts.  All such evidence must be 
authenticated to satisfy the courts or it can be ruled inadmissible (ACFE, 2007a, 
p.146; ACFE, 2013), and a chain of evidence (ACFE, 2007a, p.158) must be 
recorded throughout the investigation and prosecution processes.  These 
complications attest to the thoroughness with which fraud investigators’ evidence 
must be collated and presented. 
 
Finally, the scope of fraud investigators’ evidence is somewhat different to that of 
auditors.  Auditors are required to gather sufficient evidence, which is appropriately 
persuasive for the purpose of forming an opinion that provides reasonable assurance 
that the accounts are fairly stated, in all material respects.  The methods of evidence 
collection, analysis, results and judgments must be documented, which also provides 
evidence in terms of procedural quality, and it is this documentation which may 
protect auditors in the event of prosecution.   In contrast, fraud investigators are 
required to gather a broader range of evidence which might include accounting 
information and procedural documentation, similar to that used by auditors, as well 
as interview recordings or transcripts, interviewee statements, confessions, and even 
background and financial information about the income, assets, liabilities and 
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 activities of individuals associated with the case.10  All such information must be of 
greater probative value.  This means that the evidence contributes to facts (ALRC, 
2006) which provide proof (Farlex Inc, 2015; ACFE, 2007a, 2013).  Given that 
persuasiveness and reasonable assurance do not constitute proof, auditors’ 
responsibility is not as onerous in terms of evidence collection. 
 
Overall, QFIs are expected to have greater evidence-related scepticism skills.  
Therefore, QFIs are used to set the benchmark of professional scepticism. 
 
3.6  The Professional Scepticism Model 
The primary objective of this study is to identify a professional level of scepticism, 
enable separate measurement of individuals’ traits and skills, and identify whether 
the overall individuals’ scepticism scores (net of counter-effects) fall within the 
professionally sceptical range.  The term Enquiry is used to incorporate the concept 
of enquiry skills into the research model.  This section combines Enquiry with the 
Trait and Skill concepts described above, to collate a composite model of 
professional scepticism. 
 
The model in Figure 3.8 depicts Scepticism as a combination of Trait and Skill 
factors.  The X axis represents the continuum of traits, which extend from the 
extreme of Belief to the opposite extreme of Cynicism.  A point of professional 
scepticism is identified in the centre, which represents a neutral position, unfettered 
by bias in either direction.   
 
10  More information about evidence requirements for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting fraud is 
freely available on the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ resources website at 
http://www.acfe.com/search.aspx?SearchText=evidence&Section=939, last accessed 27/7/16. 
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 The Y axis represents skill in terms of enquiry. Due to the association between 
evidence and enquiry, made in section 2.4, this research proposes that graphic 
depiction of the use of enquiry skills may be expected to follow a similar curve to the 
curve depicting the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence utilised in the 
forming of judgements or opinions, in Figure 3.3, above, with the most neutral 
(professionally sceptical) individuals making the greatest use of enquiry skills.  
Complete neutrality would involve high quality enquiry to high quality evidence, and 
allowing that evidence to determine fact on its own merit.  In each of the opposite 
extremes, zero evidence is analysed.   
 
However, it has also been noted that skills may augment or counteract an inherent 
trait position, so a possibility must be acknowledged that the enquiry curve could 
skew for certain individuals or groups of individuals, perhaps aligning with, 
counteracting or augmenting, their trait positions. 
 
From the discussion in this chapter, summarised in the research model, a number of 
hypotheses are derived.  These hypotheses are designed to test the veracity of the 
model in addition to exploring for answers to the research questions. 
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Figure 3.8   A Composite Model of Professional Scepticism  
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 3.7  Hypotheses 
To explore whether auditors exhibit a professional level of scepticism, the following 
research questions were posed:   
 
RQ 1:  Do auditors and other groups exhibit different levels of scepticism? 
and 
RQ 2:  Do auditors exhibit professional scepticism? 
 
In order to explore for, and differentiate, a professional level of scepticism from lay 
scepticism, (dis)trust and extreme-(dis)trust levels, it is necessary to consider traits 
and skills that encompass a wider range of the continuum than would be represented 
by auditors alone.  Consequently, in addition to researching auditors, this study 
involves capturing data from a broader range of participants, whose scores may be 
compared with those of auditors. 
 
Two groups of non-audit participants are of particular interest for this purpose:  
Those who can reasonably be expected to demonstrate very high levels of objectivity 
in evidence analysis (extremely sceptical states); and those who are not generally 
required to demonstrate a professional level of scepticism (Laypersons).  The first 
group is to consist of qualified fraud investigators (QFIs), whose collation and 
assessment of evidence must be of the highest standard for admissibility in court if a 
case proceeds to prosecution, and who are therefore assumed to possess particularly 
well developed enquiry skills.   
 
Another group is to consist of general members of the public (Laypersons), who may 
exhibit degrees of scepticism anywhere on the continuum.  This group may include 
evidence experts such as legal personnel, but is generally expected to include 
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 participants who do not necessarily incur the specific professional obligations 
attributed to members of the QFI and auditor groups.   Analyses revealed differences 
between these (non-audit) professionals and other members of the Layperson group, 
and the group was subsequently subdivided into Sophisticated (professionals) and 
Non-sophisticated (other) groups. 
 
The survey data will be explored to test reasonableness of the continuum concept, the 
proposed relationship between trait and skill factors, levels of scepticism, and 
establishment of a professional level of scepticism.  Hypotheses which guide this 
procedure are described in the following section, and are expressed in a more 
statistical manner in chapter 4: Method. 
 
3.7.1  Trait Range Hypotheses 
The range hypotheses address RQ 1 by establishing the presence of a variable Trait 
factor as set out in the Professional Scepticism Model at Figure 3.9, above.   
 
Hypothesis 1:  Auditors are less trusting than other groups  
 
To explore for whether the Auditor group has, in general, a more neutral default Trait 
position than other participants, the mean Auditor group Trait scores are compared 
with all other participants’ Trait scores. 
 
If there are differences, the directions of bias (trust or distrust) will be explored.   The 
means of all the separate groups’ scores will be compared to test whether there are 
any significant differences in default Trait biases, and if any of the group means are 
situated near the Neutral point of the continuum.   
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 Given that trust and belief are more socially desirable traits than distrust and 
cynicism, the mean of Layperson bias scores is expected to skew, to some extent, 
toward the belief side of the continuum.  Whilst QFIs’ work is evidence-based, it is 
predicated on the assumption that something is amiss, and therefore QFIs are 
expected to embed, over time, a small habitual bias toward distrust.  This expectation 
also encompasses a possible vocational selection aspect in that those who are highly 
trusting may not seek a career in fraud prevention and detection. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Auditors have a more consistent Range of Biases than other groups 
 
The distribution of Trait scores is relevant to establish the instrument’s capacity to 
capture the ranges of Traits across the continuum, within groups, to the extent 
allowed by the inherent positions of the study’s participant samples.  The groups’ 
standard deviations will be used to explore for consistency of characteristics within-
groups.   
 
It is expected that Auditors exhibit more consistent Traits than other participants.  
Auditors are required to exhibit scepticism (AUASB, 2013b), which entails 
suspension of judgment and allowing evidence to speak for itself, and if this is 
reflected as a default Trait, it is expected that the range of Trait scores will be 
reasonably constrained in comparison to other participants’ scores.  In contrast, Non-
sophisticated Laypersons are expected to exhibit a broad range of biases across the 
belief/cynicism continuum, reflective of a broad range of natural, social, educational 
and other environmental influences.   Further, whilst QFIs are expected to exhibit a 
small distrust bias, as described above, some members of that group may also fall 
within the Neutral range by virtue of their evidence-based vocation, and together 
these approaches are expected to reflect a broader Trait range when compared with 
Auditors. 
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3.7.2  Skill Hypothesis 
This research proposes that Auditors utilise Skills when exercising professional 
scepticism, which serve to decrease ambiguity and increase confidence in judgments.   
 
Hypothesis 3:  Auditors are more Skilled than Laypersons, but less skilled than QFIs 
 
If the Skill sub-scale is an indicator of scepticism skill, it is predicted that Auditors’ 
Skill scores will be higher than those of Non-sophisticated Laypersons, who are, in 
general, not required to obtain or utilise professional skills of this nature.  
 
However, it is also expected that Auditors’ Skill scores will be lower, on average, 
than QFIs’.  As described in section 2.5, QFIs’ work involves evidence that must be 
of a standard that is admissible in court, or there can be no prosecution.  As the 
standard of admissible evidence in criminal cases is very high, QFIs are expected to 
exhibit the highest level of skill.   
 
 
3.7.3  Scepticism Level Hypotheses 
The Scepticism hypotheses are framed in accordance with a composite scoring 
system.  First, to facilitate comparison, the raw bias score is reversed so to arrive at a 
unidirectional score expressed as a positive number.  This number indicates a level of 
bias, but not a direction of bias.  The skill and trait aspects of scepticism are then 
combined to produce an overall measure of scepticism between 0 and 100.  The 
composite score assigned to the highest level of overall scepticism is 100, 
representing judgments based on evidence deemed reliable and evaluated without 
material bias.   
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 The hypotheses in this section begin with exploration for diversity in overall 
scepticism scores as a precursor for establishment of discrete scepticism levels.   
 
Hypothesis 4:  Auditors have a more consistent range of Scepticism than other 
groups 
 
In the first instance, the standard deviation of the QFI group’s Scepticism scores is 
compared with the standard deviation of Non-Sophisticated Laypersons’ scores to 
test whether there are observable differences in the ranges of Scepticism scores.  It is 
expected that the null hypothesis will be rejected because QFI group’s standard 
deviation will be smaller, due to a degree of professional homogeneity that is not 
necessarily shared by Non-sophisticated Laypersons.  If this is the case, the concept 
of groupings will be validated, and tests comparing results between groups will be 
more meaningful. 
 
Alternate hypotheses will seek to establish whether Auditor scores are also 
significantly more consistent than those of Non-Sophisticated Laypersons, as is 
expected by virtue of their professions.  A third alternate hypothesis will test whether 
the range of QFI Scepticism clusters more effectively than that of Auditor 
Scepticism, and finally, Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism is compared with Non-
sophisticated Layperson Scepticism.   
 
Hypothesis 5:  Auditors’ Scepticism level is higher than Laypersons’, but lower than 
QFIs’ 
 
In the first instance, the means of the Sophisticated Layperson group’s Scepticism 
scores is compared with the means of Non-Sophisticated Laypersons’ scores to test 
whether there are observable differences.  It is expected that Sophisticated 
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 Laypersons’ mean score will be higher, reflecting greater scepticism than exhibited 
by Non-sophisticated Laypersons. 
 
The next alternate hypothesis will seek to establish whether Auditor Scepticism 
scores are significantly greater than those of Sophisticated Laypersons, as is expected 
by virtue of their profession.   And finally, the third alternate hypothesis tests 
whether mean QFI Scepticism is greater than mean Auditor Scepticism. 
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, a professional level of scepticism will be 
established that reflects QFI skills, with which the Auditor scores will be compared 
by testing the final Hypothesis, below. 
 
3.7.4  Professional Scepticism Hypothesis 
This final hypothesis extends the results of hypotheses 4 and 5 above.  If the nulls of 
those hypotheses are rejected, the notion of scepticism levels is supported.   A lower 
boundary of a professional level of scepticism will subsequently be set at a point on 
the composite Scepticism scale which represents two standard deviations of the mean 
QFI score from its uppermost end, thereby establishing a range to accommodate the 
majority of professionally sceptical attitudes.  This calculation is dependent on 
figures extracted from the survey data, so the procedure, and the rationale behind it, 
is explained in section 4.6: Data Analysis Methods. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Auditors’ Professional Scepticism is equal to, or higher than, the 
minimum benchmark for Professional Scepticism. 
 
This hypothesis tests whether Auditors’ Scepticism scores fall within the 
‘professional’ range of scepticism by observing whether the Auditors’ scores are 
greater than the benchmark established as above.   
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The proportion of Auditor group scores which meet or exceed the lower boundary 
represents, for the purpose of this research, the proportion of auditors who are likely 
to express professional scepticism, even in the absence of external prompts. 
 
3.8  Summary 
Scepticism is represented on a continuum for the purpose of enabling transition from 
prior relative measurement systems, which compare auditors with other auditors, 
toward a discrete measurement system.  The aims are to identify a professional level 
of scepticism, enable separate measurement of individuals’ traits and skills, and 
identify whether the overall individuals’ scepticism scores (net of counter-effects) 
fall within the professionally sceptical range. 
 
In combination, the X and Y axes of the Scepticism Model represent all variations in 
individuals’ scepticism – at a particular time in their trait and skill development.  For 
example:  At the extremities of the continuum, an individual with traits indicating an 
extreme level of belief or cynicism is expected to utilise no new evidence in the 
forming of his/her attitude to information, and is expected to form judgements or 
opinions on the basis of bias alone.  Such a person would require a large quantity of 
high quality new information to override existing biases and possibly influence the 
pre-formed biases.  In contrast, small quantities of low quality information may 
disproportionately reinforce existing biases. 
 
Another example is that in the intermediate areas of the continuum, an individual 
with traits indicating a disposition of trust or distrust, is expected to have engaged 
with some evidence over time, that informs their dispositional beliefs.  New 
information may or may not be sought for new decisions, and new information which 
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 is haphazardly or accidentally discovered may or may not be regarded with an 
appropriate degree of enquiry skill.  The greater the degree of trust or distrust, the 
more evidence will be required to persuade against existing biases. 
 
The Scepticism Model is used, for the purposes of this research, to explore for 
default levels of scepticism, but it could also represent changes in default position 
over the long-term, as well as situational scepticism, wherein relevant skills may be 
activated in response to requirements to heighten scepticism in the short-term.  Each 
of these positions could be plotted on the Model according to individual participants’ 
trait (X axis) and skills (Y axis) at that particular point in time, and in that particular 
situation. 
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Chapter 4: Method  
4.1: Introduction  
International Auditing Standards mandate that all audit team members are expected 
to exercise a professional level of scepticism throughout the audit (AUASB, 2013b).  
To explore this two research questions were posed: 
 
RQ 1:  Do auditors and other groups exhibit different levels of scepticism? 
and 
RQ 2:  Do auditors exhibit professional scepticism? 
 
Identifying a professional level of scepticism on a continuum enables the transition 
from prior relative measurement systems which compare auditors with other 
auditors, toward a discrete measurement system which allows a comparison between 
auditor performance and the level of performance mandated by regulation.   
 
In the absence of a discrete measurement system, it is not possible to quantify the 
level of scepticism mandated by regulation, or the levels of scepticism exhibited by 
auditors.  This exposes a measurement gap between the regulated expectation of a 
professional level of scepticism and criticism that auditors are not always sufficiently 
sceptical.  That gap persists because auditor scepticism has not yet been measured in 
terms of whether it can be categorised as ‘professional’ or not.  Consequently, 
auditors have no scientifically objective means to ex-ante evaluate potential exposure 
to breach of the mandatory requirement to exercise the professional scepticism, or to 
identify the specific nature of the exposure for the purpose of applying relevant 
remedial treatment.  Closure of this measurement gap may allow auditors to identify 
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 and respond to a scepticism deficit before a problem arises that necessitates 
qualitative scepticism measurement by the courts; enabling auditors to mitigate the 
risk of audit failure due to lack of professional scepticism, and thereby mitigate risk 
of sanctions for such breaches.   
 
Many previous research instruments were developed specifically for the audit 
context, utilising vignettes or discrete audit tasks11, which were intended to replicate 
auditor behaviours in response to client cases.  To address the research question ‘Do 
auditors exhibit indicators of professional scepticism’ this is not an appropriate 
approach, as it is necessary to first establish what the levels of scepticism are in order 
to identify a benchmark for professional scepticism.  The case study approach is 
generally used to derive relative measures of scepticism, rather than the discrete 
measures necessary for benchmarking; and given that it is possible that the people 
who exhibit the highest levels of scepticism may, or may not, be auditors, the 
measurement instrument must be one which can engage a wide variety of 
participants for the purpose of establishing levels.  
 
This research extends prior studies that have measured auditor scepticism relative to 
other auditors, and that psychometrically tested auditor judgement in general, by 
identifying the ‘professional’ level of scepticism, and assessing auditors’ scepticism 
according to that benchmark.   
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows:  Firstly, the research design is 
introduced, and the methods of data collection and participant recruitment are 
described.  Next, the procedure used to develop the survey instrument is described, 
along with methods of producing scores for the sub-scales and overall scepticism.  
11 See, for example, Grenier (2014). 
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 Following this, are methods of analysing the data collected by the survey instrument, 
and explanations of ethical considerations.  
 
4.2:  Research Design 
The research design in this study adopts a survey approach based on scalable items 
that generically allow the assessment of default characteristics of scepticism in terms 
of respondent attitudes to information.  The survey also gathered ordinal and nominal 
data about skills/experiences which may influence development and/or manifestation 
of those characteristics.  A wide variety of potential participants were approached 
because all people are users of information, and could be expected to have a range of 
skills in accessing and interpreting information and in their inherent attitude to 
available information.  Data gathered from the general population set the generic 
parameters for attitudes to information.  Data was collected to explore for features in 
the results that identify patterns in attitude scores within and between sub-groups that 
exhibit different scepticism levels, and to explore for features that may be unique to 
the audit profession.  Discussion of participants, and their roles in the research, 
continues in the next section.   
 
 
4.2.1  Participant Groups 
In this study three primary groups were required to be a part of the survey groups.  
These were qualified fraud examiners, auditors and laypersons.  An expectation of 
the scepticism exhibited by these groups was identified. 
 
As this research involved the measurement of the current level(s) of scepticism 
utilised to meet regulatory requirements and facilitate identification of fraud, and it 
was not known what proportion of the audit population could be affected by innate 
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 limitations, or to what degree, this study’s survey instrument was delivered to a 
sample drawn from the general (non-audit) population, from which base-line 
statistics were collated and compared with samples drawn from audit and fraud 
expert populations.  This was to serve to extend scepticism measurement to three 
clearly identifiable groups, which can reasonably be expected to exhibit scepticism 
traits across different points on the scepticism continuum as follows: 
 
Table 4.1   Expected Scepticism Ranges 
Sample group Expected scepticism ranges 
Qualified Fraud Investigators Professionally Sceptical   
Auditors Sceptical and/or Professionally Sceptical  
General public Entire continuum 
 
 
The measurement scale used to identify placement of these groups on the continuum 
is explained later in this chapter. 
 
The rationale for delivering the survey to these three target groups is as follows: 
 
1. Qualified Fraud Investigators (QFIs).  This is a professional group, consisting 
of people who have met preliminary benchmarks of relevant education, 
workplace experience, and specialist anti-fraud training (ACFE, 2015b).  
Consequently all members are expected to be at least twenty-three years old.  
Demographic data was collected to observe for differences correlating to age 
groups and years of experience. 
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 Qualified Fraud Investigators may be from the disciplines of law, policing, 
psychology/criminology, information technology, education or 
accounting/auditing, with interrelated knowledge and skills the purposes of 
fighting fraud.  The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2015a) is a 
globally recognised professional body, with which the author is affiliated, and it a 
seminal source of reference for this research.  However, the inclusive term ‘QFI’ 
is used for the purposes of this research to include all who have undertaken 
formal fraud-specialist education, in recognition of other means of specialist 
qualification, such as via formal specialist tertiary study. 
 
The objective of QFIs differs from that of auditors in that the QFI approach is 
based on an assumption that investigation ends in prosecution.  This has the 
effect of raising the quality of evidence obtained, as required to support such 
action, because both physical and circumstantial evidence must be admissible in 
courts of law.  All evidence must be authenticated to be admissible (ACFE, 
2007a, 2013), which means that QFIs must be rigorous in their collection, storage 
(ACFE, 2007a) and critical assessment of all types of evidence, including 
tangible evidence, electronic evidence and verbal representations (ACFE, 2007a, 
2013).  In the absence of evidence which meets the stringent requirements of the 
courts for prosecution purposes, there is no case.  And as QFIs' work involves 
preparation of cases for prosecution and evaluation of evidence which itself may 
be fraudulent, this group expected to exhibit the highest level of evidence-based 
decision making, manifesting as the highest level of scepticism skill.   
 
For the purposes of this research, fraud training must be taken to mean more than 
a mere awareness of the notion that fraud exists.  The awareness must mean a 
conscious acknowledgement of the essential and common pre-conditions, 
constructs, characteristics and consequences of fraudulent behaviour.   Therefore, 
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 in order to preserve the specialist nature of this group, those with formal training 
which constitutes only part of a qualification, or with informal training, are 
excluded from the QFI group. 
 
Membership of this group is identified by responses to Question number 28, at 
the very end of the questionnaire.   
 
2. Financial statement auditors.  This group is expected to have specialist 
knowledge from accounting education, workplace experience and mentoring.  As 
all members of audit teams are required to exhibit a ‘professional’ level of 
scepticism in the conduct of audits (AUASB, 2013b), this group should include 
all accountants who perform some role in the external audit function; from 
undergraduate/assistant accountant through to engagement partner, to reflect 
normal audit workplace arrangements.  Identification of qualification levels and 
roles enabled analysis of correlation between these and other variables.  
 
Participants in this group are expected to have experienced varying amounts of 
education and training in accounting, audit and related matters, but not 
necessarily to have undertaken specialist fraud training.  Graduate accountants 
have introductory awareness of fraud by virtue of their tertiary auditing course, 
but specific fraud education is not a requirement of accredited accounting courses 
in Australia.  To control for the possibility that fraud training may be offered 
within accounting degrees elsewhere in the world, or taken as an elective or 
further stand-alone study, participants were asked to identify whether they had 
undertaken any informal training (e.g.: workplace development) or formal 
education, and if so, whether that was part of a qualification or the primary focus 
of the qualification. In the first instance, data was collected from accountants 
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 who specialise in audit, as well as accountants who perform other accounting 
functions. As both experience the same tertiary and professional education, 
differences were expected to arise due to workplace experiences and specialist 
training.  Participants who indicated they had undertaken formal fraud education 
that was the primary focus of a qualification were deemed to have exceed the 
information exposure expected for a qualified auditor (who does not specifically 
specialise in fraud), and were therefore reallocated to the QFI group.   
 
It may be that only those accountants most capable of scepticism are attracted to 
auditing work; but data suggesting otherwise may present an opportunity for 
important future research. 
 
3. Laypersons.  For the purposes of this research, the term ‘laypersons’ included all 
participants who are not QFIs or external auditors.  This group was not expected 
to have any specialist knowledge, education or experience in the fields of 
accounting generally, auditing in particular, or fraud.  However, general public 
lay-persons are users of a great diversity of information, including information 
about money, and numerous contexts of risk.  On a daily basis, they may evaluate 
and form opinions about information they encounter, and to determine what 
constitutes fact.   
 
This group is expected to include a diversity of participants, such that it includes 
non-accountant users of financial statements, in both personal and business 
contexts, as well as trained accountants who have never worked in audit.  To 
explore for any relevant differences between members of this group, descriptive 
questions are included to discover respondents identifiable as sophisticated lay-
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 users by virtue of an employment role such as CEO, CFO, or company director, 
as well as a question regarding accounting training.   
 
4.2.2  Sample Selection 
The research is conducted in the English language, and promoted only in English.  
Although promoted world-wide, it is reasonably expected that only those who were 
willing and able to communicate in the English language would self-select to 
participate. 
 
All participants must be a minimum of 18 years old for two reasons.  Firstly, in 
Australia this is the legal age of competence to enter into financial agreements, so it 
is deemed to represent the minimum age that potential participants assess 
information for the purpose of financial decision making.  The age of legal 
competence is also deemed the minimum age that potential participants in all 
countries can assess the research invitation and Participant Information Sheet and 
provide informed consent to engage in the research.  Secondly, in Australia, 
university students will usually be, or turn, 18 years old during their first year of 
study.  It is therefore also the minimum age that undergraduate assistant accountants 
will join an accounting firm, and possibly its audit team.  Participants were advised 
of the age restriction in the Participant Information Sheet, and an age demographic 
question was included in the survey to identify any participants whose data should be 
excluded. 
 
Other standard demographic data was collected to observe for other differences, 
including those correlating to gender, education and years of experience.   
 
For each of the groups, a minimum of 30 respondents was required, being the 
minimum for reasonable exploration of the characteristics within and between groups 
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 (Bouma & Ling, 2004).  The total number of respondents required for the main study 
was therefore a minimum of 90. 
 
It was expected that classification of participants into the required groups may 
require judgment in some instances.  For example, a sophisticated layperson CEO or 
CFO may have been involved in a fraud examination by virtue of their role, without 
having undertaken specialist fraud education or a professional accounting 
qualification. Therefore, the survey remained open to collect more than the minimum 
number of participants for each group, in case some participants had to be reallocated 
or excluded. The full set of data was downloaded from the Survey Monkey server on 
Monday, 17th March 2014, being forty three days after the 3rd February survey 
launch. 
 
4.3: Data collection  
To maximise the number of participants recruited during the data collection period, 
invitations12 to representatives of all three target groups were released via social 
media in the first instance, in anticipation of a snowball effect (Westermann et al 
2014), leveraging differences in user networks to increase diversity in the desired 
cluster samples.  It was anticipated that invitations via social media would snowball 
to reach a broad range of respondents, with varying experiences and perceptions, 
which is very important for differentiating general norms from expert attitudes, and 
which is of fundamental importance to this study.  Most of the people recruited in 
this way were categorised, according to their demographic data, as belonging to the 
Layperson group.  
 
12  The brief social media invitations directed potential participants to the long-form Invitation and Participant 
Information Sheet hosted on a purpose-made website.  Both forms are included in Appendix 3. 
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 To ensure the minimum numbers of QFI and Auditor participants were recruited, a 
modified strata/cluster sample approach was then adopted to supplement numbers in 
these two groups.  This entailed issuing of blanket invitations to relevant ACFE 
discussion boards and LinkedIn professional groups, allowing members to self-
select.  In addition, individual invitations were sent to members of those groups, 
being those members who enabled direct contact from within basic membership list 
searches. 
 
All group 1 (QFI) and group 2 (auditors) participants were invited to forward the 
invitation to their own contacts, to leverage this convenience sampling approach with 
further snowball opportunities.  In this way, a greater diversity of data was collected 
given the international nature of online networking fora and that such networks 
commonly also include contacts in peripheral and even unrelated fields.   
 
This process is further explained in the following section.  
 
4.4: Participant Recruitment Method. 
The pilot and main-study questionnaires were both administered online, utilising 
Survey Monkey, an online survey data collection tool.  The survey was delivered 
electronically in order to:  
- Minimise completion time to less than three 6-minute chargeable units of auditor 
time; as means of increasing the Auditor Group response rate; 
- Make use of skip logic to further relieve perceived time burden on users for 
whom certain questions are not relevant; 
- Reach a very broad cross section of people to increase diversity in the General 
Public group; and 
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 - Improve participation numbers by enabling potential respondents to start and 
complete the survey at a time and place of their choosing and convenience. 
 
In addition to the time savings and distribution ease described above, social media 
was the preferred method of participant recruitment due to its capacity to: 
- Increase the possible number of participants as compared with personal 
invitation/email alone; 
- Facilitate reaching of a larger number and diversity of people in the General 
Public group than the author could personally invite; and 
- Reduce bias in participant selection (invitation) by releasing the survey in a 
variety of interest group areas and allowing it to spread through friend/contact 
networks.  As people in networks do not tend to have wholly identical interests, it 
was expected that ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ would distribute the survey exposure to 
interest groups and networks well beyond the limits of my personal imagination 
and reach. 
 
An important challenge with this approach was ensuring that all potential participants 
would be provided with all the relevant information about the research that would 
qualify their consent as ‘informed’, and therefore meet the requirements of the 
project’s ethical clearance.  As the largest possible number of data sets was 
considered most desirable, a degree of self-momentum in distribution was to be 
encouraged and facilitated, whilst ensuring that the survey itself was not separated 
from the supporting explanatory information that would necessarily be attached to 
enable informed consent.   
 
To facilitate appropriate dissemination of Participant Information and track the 
progress of recruitment through the data collection period, a blog site was established 
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 at www.kerriodonnell.wordpress.com to host the study’s background material, 
ethical clearance information, contact details and a hyperlink to the survey.  
Centralised hosting enabled promotion via a brief overview form of initial invitation, 
which was deemed more suited to the social media environment, without loss of due 
process. The survey instrument was hosted by Survey Monkey at 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BKB58JZ.    
 
Invitations launched via LinkedIn and ResearchGate were published using the 
author’s personal identity, but a temporary Facebook identity (What do you Think? at 
https://www.facebook.com/whatdoyouthinkresearch) was created to launch the 
invitation on that platform, to maintain consistency with the blog host site title and 
present the research project with topic-specific formality.  The Facebook page also 
replicated the background and Participant Information material published on the blog 
host page, to improve the appeal of the page and to encourage potential participants 
to click through to the survey. 
 
Functionality within the Facebook platform provided all viewers with the 
opportunity to also ‘like’ the post, or the host page, which would distribute the post 
to all the follower contacts of that viewer, further distributing the survey invitation to 
a wider audience.  To facilitate the snowball effect further, an overt request to 
forward-promote was included in all invitations, and the host blog site also included 
buttons to allow visitors to easily forward-promote the site to their own networks via 
Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter. 
 
The title of the host blog site appears to have attracted some respondents, in itself, 
because the Wordpress blog statistics reveal that some users landed on the site as a 
result of browser searches for similar titles or surveys in general, distinctly identified 
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 from those who clicked through from one of the launch platforms.  Nonetheless, 
during the data collection period, the study was actively promoted as follows: 
 
The invitation was distributed by private message to all the author’s email and 
LinkedIn contacts, and posted to a variety of public and approved-member LinkedIn 
groups, encompassing potential participants for all three prospective participant 
groups.  It was also released to a similarly broad-spectrum research community via 
ResearchGate.   
 
Limitations are noted for use of social media in the conduct of formal research. Most 
notably, the snowball approach was only representative of social media users 
connecting with the snowball network-range, within the data collection period, rather 
than representative of the global adult population.  However, the snowball method of 
obtaining cluster samples is considered appropriate to this exploratory research 
because it mitigates researcher bias in selection of the general public group.   
 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that self-selection bias remains a potential 
influence on the results of this research.  That is, those of a particular personality 
orientation, or affected by relevant similar educational or social influences, may take 
part and thereby dominate each of the sub-samples.  The sizes of the QFI, Auditor 
and SL sub-groups are not large enough for meaningful analysis of global 
representativeness, so this presents an opportunity for future research with a much 
larger data set.  However, during the data analysis phase of this research, in section 
4.6, below, each of the sub-sample groups are compared and the results explored.  
The results indicated differences which generally suggest that each of the groups 
appropriately represent the target population for the purposes of this exploratory 
study.  
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 To specifically capture members of each of the three groups, further promotion was 
undertaken as follows. 
 
Group 1 – QFIs 
Public-access Facebook pages were identified using the search term “fraud”, 
prioritising professional groups with large memberships and which allowed posts to 
the timelines. 
 
In addition, the Association of Certified Fraud Investigators (ACFE), which boasts a 
global membership of more than 75,000 members (ACFE, 2015a), maintains various 
discussion fora on its website at www.acfe.com to which this researcher has access.  
Invitations were posted to these fora to attract both certified (qualified) and associate 
members to participate, though entry dates suggested that day-to-day traffic on these 
fora was not high during the data collection period. 
 
The main ACFE LinkedIn group also enabled personal contact between members via 
private messaging within the platform.  The invitation was therefore sent to 121 
members, including those flagged as ‘top contributors’ and others who were not 
identified by the platform as first or second level contacts, and therefore likely to 
have already seen the invitation.  
 
Group 2 – Auditors 
Public-access Facebook community groups were identified using the search terms 
“audit”, and “auditing”, again prioritising those groups with large memberships and 
which allowed posts to the timelines.   
 
Facebook posts to fraud- and audit-related pages quickly redistributed from target 
readerships to General Public audiences though, as observable by interim Survey 
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 Monkey reports that showed a large majority of survey respondents reported no 
training in accounting or fraud, and no experience in an audit team. 
 
Consequently, as above, 106 private messages were sent to members of Accounting 
& Audit LinkedIn groups. 
 
Group 3 - Laypersons 
For the purpose of increasing diversity, further Facebook posts were published.  The 
search term “small business” was used first, to return results deemed representative 
of general public users of financial and other accounting information. The 
“education” search term was chosen to reveal laypersons who may be more likely to 
support an educational research project by participating and forward-promoting; and 
other search terms were chosen simply to increase diversity due to dissimilarity with 
other search terms; or randomly, by entering a couple of letters into the Facebook 
search box and selecting terms that appeared. 
 
To broaden the range of the network to the widest possible demographic spread 
within the data collection window, these posts to a variety of popular pages 
representing a variety of interest (rather than geographic) communities, encouraged 
diversity in socioeconomic and educational status as well as social, cultural and 
spiritual belief systems. 
 
For this group, priority was given not to professional groups, but to any with large 
memberships and which allowed timeline posts.   
 
An Invitation to Participate is included at Appendix 3, and a Participant Information 
Sheet is included at Appendix 4. 
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 4.5  Survey Instrument Development 
The survey intends to measure a each respondent’s scepticism.  Previous attempts to 
measure professional scepticism do not accommodate the conceptual differences 
between trust and distrust, which are both barriers to scepticism, but with opposing 
attitudes.  Nor do they accommodate the effects of skills that may influence how 
scepticism traits manifest.  Therefore, a new scale was developed to match the 
context of the research questions for this study.   This study is unique in seeking to 
compare levels of auditor scepticism with laypersons and a QFI benchmark.   
 
The need to involve a psychometric instrument to measure respondents’ scepticism 
presented a challenge to this research in that the researcher did not have access to the 
most well established psychometric tools, which are restricted to use by registered 
psychologists.  Consequently, the specific components of this research are measured 
via publicly accessible instruments which best matched the research constructs.  
Three instruments that fit this purpose were identified, each of which has been tested 
and reviewed in prior research, and described below.  The three are:  Budner’s 
Intolerance of Ambiguity scale (1962), The Wrightsman Interpersonal Trust scale 
(1991); and The Curiosity and Exploration Inventory-II by Kashdan et al (2009). 
 
Importantly, the survey questions do not reflect an audit-specific workplace context, 
so that non-auditors were able to answer the exact same content questions, and with 
the double benefit of mitigating any audit workplace-specific heuristic bias.  
Responses to the personality questions and skill questions should enable 
identification, at the time of taking the survey, of: 
- Inherent scepticism levels (bias position); 
- Learned scepticism skill levels; 
- Overall default levels of scepticism; and 
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 - Comparison of these overall levels of scepticism against the mandatory level 
required by regulation. 
 
4.5.1  Survey Structure   
Separate measurement of the trait and skill aspects of scepticism should provide for a 
more comprehensive understanding of how skills aspects function, as distinct from 
the previously explored personality aspects, allowing for exploration for any 
apparent limitations to, or facilitators of, skill development.  These developments 
contribute to more comprehensive consideration of variables, enabling more 
sophisticated discussion about the hypotheses. 
 
The questionnaire was structured so that questions were grouped into three sections:  
Demographic, scepticism content, and supplementary background data.  Basic 
demographic questions were administered first.  The intention of using this structure 
was to: 
• allow respondents to become engaged in the instrument by answering simple and 
reasonably non-sensitive questions  about their gender, age, education and 
employment, before moving on to the more personal questions about attitudes;  
• start with general questions that did not define a subject matter, but allowed 
respondents to focus upon themselves, and establish a norm of selecting genuine 
rather than perceived ‘best’ answer choices; and 
• gather all the simple, but essential, data at the very beginning, so that if 
respondents started to feel burdened by the attitude questions, they would know 
from experience that not all pages contained complex questions, and see by the 
progress bar on the current page screen that they had substantially completed the 
survey.  Therefore they may be less likely to quit. 
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 All variables from this section are associated with the study’s hypotheses, such as 
identification of auditing group members, and/or were gathered to compare with the 
findings of prior studies. 
 
The second section addresses the most important points of the research; requiring 
participants to reflect upon how they think.  Scores derived from the three sub-tests 
in this section were combined to produce each respondent’s scepticism score.  The 
three elements within this section are adapted from prior research:   
a) The Wrightsman (1991) Interpersonal Trust scale is a seminal scale that has 
been utilised in prior research of auditor scepticism (such as Rose et al, 2010) to 
measure participants’ inherent levels of trust toward others.  In this study it is 
used to measure participants’ inherent levels of trust, in general, at the time of 
completing the survey, which indicated both the level and direction of inherent 
bias.   
b) Budner’s (1962) Intolerance of Ambiguity scale was chosen by virtue of its 
simplicity, appropriateness to a broad community cross-section, and its sustained 
use in the behavioural decision making literature.  Specifically, intolerance of 
ambiguity (high uncertainty avoidance) is associated with professional scepticism 
(Cohen et al, 1993; Hughes et al, 2009; Hurtt et al, 2013; Grenier et al, 2015). 
Intolerance of ambiguity relates to desire for evidence and to managing the risks 
arising from uncertainty.  Whilst such intolerance may be categorised as a 
personality trait in the general context, its particular relationship to the role of 
evidence suggests that this instrument may be well suited to measure the extent to 
which further information is gathered.   
 
Very low levels of intolerance (high tolerance) of ambiguity are expected to have 
little or no influence on overall scepticism scores, because such persons would 
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 not be motivated to enact evidence gathering skills to resolve the ambiguity.  In 
contrast, very high levels of intolerance (low tolerance) of ambiguity, is expected 
to initiate desire for further information, manifesting as gathering of evidence,   
which involves conscious action and information-sourcing skill to determine 
which evidence should be gathered.  This directly reflects auditors’ obligation to 
make sceptical judgments on the basis of evidence, and represents the first 
variable skill in this study’s overall professional scepticism measure. 
c) The Curiosity and Exploration Inventory-II by Kashdan et al (2009) was 
included to explore for its potential to measure how people think about the 
information they have gathered.   On the basis that a curious person would not 
merely gather evidence and then merely accept it at face value, as a checklist 
item, it is expected that those with high Curiosity and Exploration scores would 
be more likely to critically analyse the information they gather.  This directly 
reflects auditors’ obligation to critically assess audit evidence, and represents the 
second variable skill in this study’s overall professional scepticism measure. 
 
Finally, in the third section of the instrument, background data is collected.  Some of 
this is for the purpose of identifying Group 1 participants, for example.  In this 
section, participants are also asked to self-rate their scepticism, to explore how well 
auditor respondents are able to self-reflect.  This is the only time that the term 
‘scepticism’ is mentioned in the survey; partly to elicit more natural responses from 
informed respondents, and partly to mitigate confusion in lay-respondents who may 
interpret the term differently to the audit context, and frame their responses toward 
an unnecessarily pronounced trust bias. 
 
At the end of the survey there was a disclosure that explains that lay terminology was 
employed for the purpose of the survey because the term ‘scepticism’ can be 
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 interpreted in very different ways, which could lead participants toward answer 
choices that don’t genuinely reflect their views.   
 
This questionnaire was pilot tested for user-friendliness and potential to capture data 
across the continuum, and the main study data was further tested, as described in the 
following sections.  A complete list of all the questions initially presented to 
participants is included at Appendix 5, and the list of questions ultimately utilised for 
the purpose of measuring scepticism are presented in section 4.6  The Professional 
Scepticism Scale Question Set, below. 
 
 
4.5.2  Pilot Testing 
Before administration to the main study participants, the survey instrument was pilot 
tested to gather feedback about user-friendliness and establish whether the 
instrument could capture a diversity of scores across the proposed scoring 
continuum. 
 
The pilot group consisted of Laypersons with some understanding of financial 
reporting.  These participants were undergraduate and postgraduate coursework 
students enrolled in an Accounting major at the study’s host university.  This group 
was expected to have basic knowledge, education, and possibly practical experience 
in the field of accounting and auditing, but no specialist knowledge of fraud.  
Students in their first or second year of education were deemed to represent that 
section of the general public which is expected to be least sceptical if training and 
workplace experience are facilitators of scepticism. 
 
To enable basic exploratory analysis, a minimum of 30 pilot respondents (Bouma & 
Ling, 2004) were sought.  The primary purposes of this test were threefold:  To seek 
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 feedback on the user friendliness of the online survey, and whether any technical 
logic errors threatened its capacity to capture all the required data.  Finally, the data 
was examined to observe for means of refining the instrument prior to the main data 
collection. 
 
The pilot cohort of students was invited to participate via bulk email distributed on 
my behalf by the University of Tasmania’s Division of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Students & Education).  Therefore it can be reliably assumed that the invitations 
were successfully delivered.  However, the timing of invitations, five days after the 
release of examination results, meant that student exposure to the invitation was 
severely reduced, resulting in a very poor response rate.  Of 31 commencing 
participants, five did not complete the survey.  The five incomplete data sets were 
deemed to be withdrawals of consent, so all data from these participants was 
withdrawn from the study.  This resulted in 26 usable data sets, which were used to 
gather feedback about survey usability and to observe whether the data being 
collected was potentially useful for testing the hypotheses.   
 
Feedback 
The pilot instrument contained an extra free text field at the end, inviting participants 
to provide feedback or general comments.  Data sets were first examined for entries 
in that field which could reveal errors, inconsistencies or user-unfriendliness that had 
not been identified earlier.  The only problem identified at this stage was in fact a 
major one: The 5-point Likert scale headings in question 18 contained an error in that 
both ends of the scale contained ‘likely’ options.  This was reported by three 
respondents, but fortunately only affected the response choice of one respondent, 
whose selection was adjusted to reflect the option indicated in the feedback.  This 
error was reported, and corrected, on the first day of the week-long pilot period.   
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 To reduce repetition for users, to improve topic flow, and to facilitate more effective 
skip-logic, several demographic items in Part A were re-ordered.  To reduce 
perceived burden on participants, a progress bar was added to the bottom of every 
screen, indicating the percentage complete.  This was considered to be particularly 
important for encouraging participants during the middle sections of the survey, 
which contained the largest sub-scale question sets.  In addition, page headings were 
hidden from view on the basis that they increased reading without adding value to 
participants. 
 
Potential 
Five items flagged for exclusion from the instrument to substantially improve an 
initial Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.714.  However, the very small and homogenous pilot 
sample was not representative of the larger samples required, so it was ultimately 
decided to retain the questions in case they presented opportunities afforded by larger 
and more heterogeneous samples. 
 
4.5.3  Instrument Refinement  
The methods utilised to refine the initial exploratory survey instrument to extract 
those questions which were most useful to measure scepticism, and its component 
aspects, are described in this section.  These tests were conducted using the main 
study data to capture the fundamentally important influences of QFI and auditor 
characteristics in addition to the broad-spectrum Layperson characteristics. 
 
No test of inter-rater reliability was conducted, as all data were coded automatically 
using computerised system set up by a single researcher.  All data points flagged by 
that system for manual coding were reviewed by the same researcher and 
accommodated by adjustment to the automated system.   
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 Cronbach Alpha scores were used to measure the internal consistency (Allen & 
Bennett, 2012) of non-demographic test items.  Initially, all scale-type items were 
tested, with poor result.  Items flagged by SPSS as being least consistent with 
unidimensionality (overall scepticism) were eliminated in turn until the maximum 
possible Alpha for the available scale items was achieved.  An eleven item scale 
emerged from this process, with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .943, and scores ranging 
from a minimum overall score of -26 and maximum possible overall score of +22.  
Whilst this suggested an instrument and scoring system that would accommodate the 
continuum concept, it was noted that two distinct distribution curves were observable 
for Layperson participants.  This prompted further exploration of groupings.   
 
Consequently, the Laypersons group was further divided into sophisticated and non-
sophisticated sub-groups, with the sophisticated category including those respondents 
who reported accounting training, experience of a fraud event, or informal fraud 
training.  The above test was repeated using the following participant categories: a) 
all participants (n = 291); b) sophisticated participants (groups 1, 2 and 3, n = 138); 
and c) non-sophisticated participants (group 4, n = 153), to observe for patterns. 
 
When multiple options were suggested by SPSS for elimination to improve the 
Alpha, items that did not appear in the first-extracted scale, above, were eliminated 
first.   
 
Descriptive statistics for each of the resulting 17-item Scepticism Scale instrument 
questions are shown in the following table: 
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 Table 4.2  17-item Inventory - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Qn 
# Question Text 
Theoretical 
Score Range 
Actual 
Range Mean Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 If you give the average person a job to do, and leave them to do it, they will finish it successfully. -2 : +2 -2 : +2 1 0 0.97 
2 People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but few people stick to them under pressure. (R)  -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 -1 1.37 
3 People usually tell the truth, even when they know that they would be better off lying. -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 -1 1.25 
4 Nowadays people commit a lot of crimes and do bad deeds that go unnoticed. (R) -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 -1 1.28 
5 Most students do not cheat when taking an exam. -2 : +2 -2 : +2 1 1 1.03 
6 Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. (R) -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 1 1.27 
7 Most people are basically honest. -2 : +2 -2 : +2 1 1 0.90 
8 If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will be fair to you. -2 : +2 -2 : +2 1 1 0.98 
9 Most people lead clean, decent lives. -2 : +2 -2 : +2 1 1 0.96 
10 Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they’re afraid of getting caught. (R) -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 1 1.17 
11 In the long run, it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and complicated ones. 0 : 4 0 : 4 2 3 0.98 
12 Do you question the way you approach thinking about important decisions? 0 : 4 0 : 4 2 2 1.26 
13 If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure that they were not seen, they would do it. (R) -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 0 0.98 
14 If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things in great detail and supervise them closely. (R) -2 : +2 -2 : +2 0 0 0.88 
15 Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had a chance. (R) -2 : +2 -2 : +2 -1 -1 0.9 
16 An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know much. 0 : 4 0 : 4 2 2 0.83 
17 The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 0 : 4 0 : 4 2 1 1.01 
 
The (R) notation signifies items which are reverse-scored. 
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 Table 4.2 indicates a diversity of responses to all questions when the results are 
viewed in aggregate.  It indicates that the most consistent responses, overall, were to 
question 16, and the least consistent responses were to question 2.   
 
For completeness, the same data were examined per group, and those results are 
presented in Appendix 6.  Whilst the grouped tables enable observations of differing 
score ranges and item scores between groups, these results do not, in isolation, 
encompass sufficient explanatory power to enable the making of meaningful 
conclusions about such differences.  However, the instrument refinement undertaken 
in the remainder of this section indicates a useful scale when items are viewed 
collectively, rather than individually, and therefore more meaningful observations are 
expected from exploration of the score statistics across the full scale. 
 
In the meantime, the data were explored for statistical relationships between items, 
and those relationships are presented in the following table: 
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Table 4.3  17-item Inventory – Correlation Matrix 
 
Item Number 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
K
en
da
ll'
s t
au
_b
 
1 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 .585
** .683** .504** .619** .475** .618** .657** .736** .511** .353** .470** .182** .232** .052 -.160** 
-
.251** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .305 .002 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
2 
Correlation 
Coefficient .585
** 1.000 .663** .607** .542** .620** .688** .532** .604** .729** .538** .596** .337** .355** .191** -.050 -.213** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .329 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
3 
Correlation 
Coefficient .683
** .663** 1.000 .573** .640** .665** .700** .681** .754** .624** .381** .519** .340** .310** .145** -.045 -.208** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .377 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
4 
Correlation 
Coefficient .504
** .607** .573** 1.000 .347** .503** .648** .573** .488** .515** .388** .457** .192** .277** .041 -.109* 
-
.285** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .413 .031 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
5 
Correlation 
Coefficient .619
** .542** .640** .347** 1.000 .453** .513** .513** .627** .576** .474** .539** .221** .165** .061 -.161** 
-
.261** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .234 .002 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
6 
Correlation 
Coefficient .475
** .620** .665** .503** .453** 1.000 .601** .462** .573** .571** .373** .394** .546** .469** .346** .114* -.034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .501 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
7 
Correlation 
Coefficient .618
** .688** .700** .648** .513** .601** 1.000 .690** .712** .576** .404** .480** .272** .305** .092 -.059 -.291** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .076 .252 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
8 
Correlation 
Coefficient .657
** .532** .681** .573** .513** .462** .690** 1.000 .697** .438** .315** .392** .152** .206** -.010 -.177** 
-
.350** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .845 .001 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
9 
Correlation 
Coefficient .736
** .604** .754** .488** .627** .573** .712** .697** 1.000 .583** .370** .475** .260** .273** .105* -.084 -.258** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .041 .101 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
10
 
Correlation 
Coefficient .511
** .729** .624** .515** .576** .571** .576** .438** .583** 1.000 .557** .625** .364** .349** .209** -.031 -.176** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .538 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
11
 
Correlation 
Coefficient .353
** .538** .381** .388** .474** .373** .404** .315** .370** .557** 1.000 .494** .253** .307** .146** -.007 -.112* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .004 .895 .026 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
12
 
Correlation 
Coefficient .470
** .596** .519** .457** .539** .394** .480** .392** .475** .625** .494** 1.000 .225** .267** .108* -.120* 
-
.187** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .030 .017 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
13
 
Correlation 
Coefficient .182
** .337** .340** .192** .221** .546** .272** .152** .260** .364** .253** .225** 1.000 .467** .496** .243** .165** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .001 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
14
 
Correlation 
Coefficient .232
** .355** .310** .277** .165** .469** .305** .206** .273** .349** .307** .267** .467** 1.000 .286** .380** .198** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
15
 
Correlation 
Coefficient .052 .191
** .145** .041 .061 .346** .092 -.010 .105* .209** .146** .108* .496** .286** 1.000 .248** .343** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .305 .000 .004 .413 .234 .000 .076 .845 .041 .000 .004 .030 .000 .000 . .000 .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
16
 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.160
** -.050 -.045 -.109* 
-
.161** .114
* -.059 -.177** -.084 -.031 -.007 
-
.120* .243
** .380** .248** 1.000 .579** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .329 .377 .031 .002 .025 .252 .001 .101 .538 .895 .017 .000 .000 .000 . .000 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
17
 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.251
** -.213** -.208** 
-
.285** 
-
.261** -.034 
-
.291** 
-
.350** 
-
.258** 
-
.176** 
-
.112* 
-
.187** .165
** .198** .343** .579** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .501 .000 .000 .000 .000 .026 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 . 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
This table indicates significant relationships between the seventeen scale items. 
 
111 
 At the end of this procedure, the reduced instrument was subjected to confirmatory 
factor analysis to establish whether the instrument had been refined appropriately.  
This confirmed that the scale measured the two factors required by the research 
model, even after reduction of scale items using Chronbach’s Alpha. 
 
This study identified two dimensions that contribute to forming professional 
scepticism: traits and skills.  To assess whether this was reflected in the reduced 
survey instrument, a factor analysis was undertaken in order to ascertain whether two 
factors appeared in the analysis. 
 
Although a pre-requisite criterion of Factor Analysis is normality, the analysis was 
applied to the non-normal distribution (Allen & Bennett, 2012) within the Non-
sophisticated Layperson cohort because the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy, at .914, indicated that the data was suitable for factor analysis 
(Allen & Bennett, 2012).  A number of Pearson correlations were greater than 0.3, 
and the Bartlett’s Test significance was less than 0.05, so factor analysis was 
explored further (Allen & Bennett, 2012).  All MSA values were above 0.7, 
indicating strong relationships between variables (Allen & Bennett, 2012), however a 
wide range between high and low communalities values again reflects differences in 
responses to the skills questions. 
 
Using all participants’ data, 60.891% of variances were explained by two underlying 
factors.  Whilst those items identified solely for factor 1 involve strong loadings, 
particularly for the trait items, many of the factors load onto both factors.  A Pattern 
Matrix, extracted via Principal Axis Factoring, and a Structure Matrix, rotated via 
Promax with Kaiser Normalisation method, similarly display dual loadings.   
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 Seeking explanation, testing was repeated with data split between sophisticated and 
non-sophisticated groups.  Of particular interest are the effects of non-normal 
distribution, and perhaps inconsistently biased responses, and/or implications arising 
from most of the scale items being scored across a +/- range.  The results are 
summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 4.4   Summary of Factor Analyses  
Test 17 Items 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .914 
Bartlett’s Test significance .000 
Possible deletions indicated by Measures of 
Sampling Adequacy 
None 
Communalities Across the scale, 5 items 
scored < .5 13 
Number of Factors 2 
Cumulative Percentage of variances explained 60.891 
 
 
To observe for problems associated with negative scores associated with the bipolar 
scale items, these were all converted to positive numbers by adding the maximum 
negative score value (of -2) to all responses for that item.  This was considered 
preferable to squaring the values because it preserved the differences between 
positive and negative scores.  That is, a score of -2 would be differentiated from a 
score of 2, being four points apart on the bipolar scale and the scepticism continuum.  
Results were consistent with using the raw item scores. 
 
Items with the lowest communality were qualitatively reviewed, and two further 
changes made to the instrument.   
13 For the NSL group (n = 153), all items scored > .5.  Differences between respondent cohorts present an 
opportunity for future scale development research, as described in Chapter 7. 
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1. Item 15m was considered worthy of inclusion on the bases of: 
a)  Simplicity of interpretation.  The meaning of the questions should be clear 
to respondents. 
b)  Contribution to the trait attitude scale.   
 
2. Item 16b was excluded on the basis of its double-negative wording, and 
consequent possibility of confusion to participants, and with particular 
consideration of respondents for whom English was not a primary language. 
 
Reliability and Factor analyses were repeated, and the remaining 17 items resulted in 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .910, which exceeds the generally accepted level of 0.7 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994, in Rose et al, 2010, p. 151).  Two factors explain 
62.638% of the variances.  The KMO measure of sampling adequacy is significant 
at .915, with no items flagged for exclusion by an MSA of less than 0.5. 
 
The scepticism scale derived from the above analyses is presented in the following 
table. 
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 Table 4.5   Factor Matrix - 17 items 
   Factor Allocation 
New 
Scale Item 
Number 
Original 
Item 
Number 
Source 
Factor 1 – 
Trait 
Scepticism 
Factor 2 –
Scepticism 
Skill 
1 15a 
Wrightsman 
(1991) 
.789  
2 15b .879  
3 15c .903  
4 15d .716  
5 15f .658  
6 15g .781  
7 15h .811  
8 15i .717  
9 15j .814  
10 15l .827  
11 16c (Budner, 1962) .577  
12 24 Original Item .729  
13 15e Wrightsman 
(1991) 
 .577 
14 15k  .511 
15 15m  .590 
16 16a (Budner, 1962)  .593 17 16g  .721 
 
 
This proposed scale, by virtue of its statistical reliability and definition of two 
coherent factors, is considered optimally useful to address the research questions 
posed in this study.  The residual cross-over between factors is not entirely 
unexpected, given the interrelationship and feedback loop between skills and traits 
identified in Chapter 2.  Grenier (2014, p. 15) also noted a “substantial degree of 
overlap between [his similarly defined] evidence skepticism and self-criticism 
constructs”.   The commonalities are therefore not of concern for the purposes of this 
research. 
 
Factor 1 is dominated by items that relate to the Trait dimension of professional 
scepticism.  They consist mainly of items adapted from the Wrightsman Trust Scale 
(1991), plus an inward-looking item from the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale 
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 (Budner, 1962) and an original item which explicitly asks respondents to rate the 
frequency with which they question their thinking approach.  These questions prompt 
respondents to evaluate on the basis of personal experience, and thus represent 
underlying attitudes that may manifest along the trait continuum which ranges from 
positions of trust, through objectivity, to distrust.  Factor 1 then, is a measure of trait 
scepticism. 
 
Factor 2 is dominated by items that relate to the Skills dimension of professional 
scepticism.  They consist mainly if items adapted from the Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale (Budner, 1962), plus three items from the Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991), 
which require participants to evaluate the behaviour of others, and represent attitudes 
about uncertainty and openness to evidence.  Any such evidence may or may not be 
in conflict with belief biases.  Factor 2 then, is a measure of scepticism skill. 
 
4.6  The Professional Scepticism Scale Question Set 
The questions derived from the initial composite survey instrument, determined to be 
most useful for measuring scepticism, and subsequently utilised for is study’s 
Professional Scepticism Scale are re-numbered and presented as follows: 
 
1. If you give the average person a job to do, and leave them to do it, they will 
finish it successfully. 
2. People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but 
few people stick to them under pressure. (R)  
3. People usually tell the truth, even when they know that they would be better off 
lying. 
4. Nowadays people commit a lot of crimes and do bad deeds that go unnoticed. (R) 
5. Most students do not cheat when taking an exam. 
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 6. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. (R) 
7. Most people are basically honest. 
8. If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will be fair to you. 
9. Most people lead clean, decent lives. 
10. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they’re afraid of getting 
caught. (R) 
11. In the long run, it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems 
rather than large and complicated ones. 
12. Do you question the way you approach thinking about important decisions? 
13. If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure that they were 
not seen, they would do it. (R) 
14. If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things in great detail and 
supervise them closely. (R) 
15. Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had a chance. (R) 
16. An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know 
much. 
17. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 
 
The (R) notation signifies items which are reverse-scored. 
 
 
4.7  Scoring Method 
All questions require participants to rate their views using 5-point Likert type scale 
measures.  All items, with the exception of question 12, are bilateral and rated 
according to the following options: 
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 Agree strongly 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree  
Disagree strongly 
 
For all items, zero scores reflect the point of least bias, or greatest Neutrality, being 
the point at which evidence is more likely than bias to inform decisions.  A score of 
zero therefore represents scepticism. 
 
Items 1-10 and 13-15 
A variant of the original Wrightsman (1991) scoring method was utilised in that the 
7-point Likert scale was adapted to a 5-point scale to match the remainder of the 
instrument, but there were no further changes.  This scale is bipolar, or bilateral, 
ranging from +2 at the Agree Stongly end to -2 at the Disagree Strongly end.  
Consistent with the original scale, items 2, 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, and 15 are reverse-scored. 
 
Items 11, 16 and 17 
Budner’s (1962) original scoring method for the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale was 
adapted, in that the direction of scoring has been reversed to integrate logically with 
the Trust scale.  This scale is unilateral, and the adapted scores range from 0 at the 
Agree Stongly end to 4 at the Disagree Strongly end.  The purpose of reversal was to 
ensure that the lowest score matches the 0 midpoint of the Wrightsman Trust Scale.  
This procedural intersection reflects the conceptual intersection of greatest trait and 
skill scepticism at the central point of the Professional Scepticism Model in section  
3.6  The Professional Scepticism Model. 
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 Item 12 
Question 12 is rated according to the following options: 
Rarely or never 
On occasion 
Sometimes 
Usually 
All the time 
 
The question 12 scale is unilateral, with scores ranging from 4 at the Rarely or Never 
end to 0 at the All the Time end.  Again, the lowest score matches the 0 midpoint of 
the Wrightsman (1991) Trust Scale. 
 
4.7.1  Research-specific Sub-Scale Scores 
For the purposes of exploring the separate Skill and Trait factors in this research, the 
relevant sub-scale items for each factor are used as separate sub-sets, as distinguished 
in Table 4.5. 
 
Trait Sub-Scale  
Trait scores are calculated by summing Items 1 – 12, and converting the total value’s 
sign to positive value by squaring the variable and then finding the square root.  This 
is because the sub-scale analyses are specifically concerned with the existence of a 
Trait bias, rather than the detail of any such bias.  These raw scores, are then 
converted to a percentage using the syntax: 
Percentage = 1 - (Positive Raw Trait Score/28) * 100 
where 28 is the maximum possible range of scores above 0. 
 
After conversion, the highest possible score of 1.0 represents the most neutral Trait 
position, and thus the greatest propensity for scepticism. 
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Skill Sub-Scale  
Skill scores are calculated by summing Items 13 – 17, and then converting the total 
value’s sign to positive, as above.  These raw scores, are then converted to a 
percentage using the syntax: 
Percentage = 1 - (Positive Raw Skill Score/14) * 100 
where 14 is the maximum possible range of scores above 0. 
 
After conversion, the highest possible score of 1.0 represents the greatest skepticism 
Skill. 
 
4.7.2  Formal Scores 
Subjects who complete the 17-item Scepticism instrument received two scores: A 
Bias Score and a Scepticism Score.  These scores were intended for different 
purposes, and were derived from dual-purpose usage of the survey instrument items, 
as follows. 
 
Bias Indicators 
These scores are distinct from Scepticism scores, and are intended solely for the 
purpose of clarifying the polarity of any scepticism deficiencies identified in overall 
scepticism scores.  That is, whether a bias is of a Trust nature or a Distrust nature.  
Bias Scores were calculated as the sum of each participant’s Wrightsman (1991) 
Trust Scale item scores (items 1-10 and 13-15), which sit within the possible scoring 
range of -26 to +26.   
 
Whilst the numeric result is useful for exploring the continuum in this research, it is 
not necessary to disclose this number to test subjects.  Rather, it is the positive or 
negative sign associated with the total bias score which is potentially useful 
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 feedback, and which should be viewed in conjunction with the overall Scepticism 
score, below. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the score is used to look for differences, in terms of 
means (median or rank) as well as dispersion.  The sign identifies the polarity, or 
direction, of bias, and therefore can be useful for deciding upon relevant skill 
development activities for those whose Scepticism scores do not represent the 
desired level of scepticism.  On the basis that appropriate skills may offset trait 
deficiencies, insights which enable matching of training to deficiencies may be more 
effective than generic training.  For example, bias scores suggest a high level of trust 
in others (at the positive sign end) could result in increased audit risk or, conversely, 
a high level of distrust (at the negative sign end) could result in audit inefficiencies. 
 
Scepticism Scores  
Next, each subject’s Scepticism Score was calculated as the sum of all item scores.  
The raw total of all item scores sit within the possible scoring range of -26 to +42 
before conversion.   
 
The Raw Score is first converted to a positive value by squaring the variable and then 
finding the square root.  This positive Total is then converted to a percentage using 
the following Excel syntax: 
Percentage = 1 - (Positive Raw Scepticism Score/42) * 100 
where 42 is the maximum possible range of scores above 0. 
 
The highest possible scepticism score of 100% represents the highest level of 
Professional Scepticism, and the lowest possible score of 0% represents the greatest 
subjectivity.   
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 4.8  Data Analysis Methods 
This study involved two main exploratory foci.  The investigation firstly addresses 
the research hypotheses, seeking to assess whether a benchmark, or level, of 
professional scepticism was identifiable, and whether there were significant 
differences between groups in terms of scepticism.  To that end, descriptive statistics 
are reported overall, and for each of the groups.   
 
The second focus emerged by virtue of utilising a newly derived scepticism 
instrument and measurement system.  Whilst the method of refining that instrument 
and establishing its measurement method are explained in section 4.5, above, 
addressing the research questions also necessitated testing of hypotheses that 
addressed the establishment of scepticism levels.   
 
The demographic and other supplementary data captured by the initial long-form 
instrument was also analysed to explore the validity of the sample groupings in light 
of expected group characteristics and the results of hypothesis testing.   
 
Data analysis was therefore conducted in three stages, as follows:   
1. Examination of Trait scores to observe for representativeness across the 
Continuum as a precursor for establishment of scepticism levels; 
2. Descriptive statistics, including Trait, Skill and Scepticism score 
observations; and 
3. Testing of hypotheses. 
 
Prior to testing, the data was examined for eligibility.  Acknowledging that the 
snowball method of collecting cluster samples via social media and a public online 
survey may allow participants to submit multiple survey attempts, or incomplete 
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 attempts, the raw data was first examined for eligibility.  Data submitted by under-
aged participants was excluded by sorting and visual examination of the raw data in 
spreadsheet format.  This data was similarly examined for the purpose of deleting 
incomplete submissions and any duplicates identified by virtue of matching Internet 
Protocol addresses and descriptive data points. 
 
The methods utilised for the specific analysis stages are explained in the following 
sub-sections. 
 
4.8.1  Continuum Representation 
Given that the research model centres on a continuum of attitudes, the breadth of 
Trait data was of great importance.  Therefore, comparisons of Trait score ranges 
were conducted, with the shapes of data distributions, and standard deviations of 
group scores supplementing comparisons of means to verify that a broad enough 
range of data were captured to enable comparison of group characteristics and 
establish levels of overall scepticism.   
 
4.8.2  Descriptive Statistics 
The raw data were explored to identify characteristics and trends among subjects.  
These observations were initially made using simple descriptive statistical analysis.   
 
Next, the data were sorted according to demographic data, and examined for 
usefulness in terms of groupings that reflect the expected relevant (non)expertise 
characteristics.  Descriptive statistics are reported overall, and for each of the groups.   
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 4.8.3  Testing of Hypotheses 
The Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) software, version 21, was used 
first to explore all scale-form data for normality as a prerequisite of t-testing (Allen 
& Bennett, 2012). Depending on the nature of the data distributions obtained, most 
of the hypotheses were addressed using parametric t-tests.  If the data violated the 
normality and symmetry assumptions, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests or 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests were utilised to determine whether the null hypotheses 
could be rejected.   
 
In the following sections, methods of testing the Bias, Skill, Trait, and overall 
Scepticism hypotheses are specified in turn. 
 
Trait Range Hypotheses 
These hypotheses were tested using participants’ Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991) 
scores only.  When evaluating the Bias sub-scale test results, although the scale 
centres around a central point of zero, the hypotheses have been framed in such a 
way as to avoid use of zero as the test value to maintain usefulness of the confidence 
interval.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  Auditors are less trusting than other groups 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that auditors exhibit the 
same level of trust/distrust bias as QFIs and layperson participants.  That is, there is 
no difference between the belief-cynicism Bias sub-scale scores of auditors and other 
respondents.   The mean level may be neutral (score of 0), or indicative of bias in 
either continuum direction.   
 
H10 µ Auditor Bias = µ all other participants’ Bias  
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 If the null hypothesis is rejected, differences in mean bias scores would be explored 
between groups.  If Trust is in itself a predictor of Neutrality, as is suggested by use 
of this same Trust scale in prior research, it would be expected that Auditors are less 
biased than Laypersons and QFI specialists.  The alternative hypotheses are, 
therefore: 
 
H11 µ Auditor Bias < µ Layperson Bias 
H12 µ Auditor Bias < µ QFI Bias 
For both alternate hypotheses to be supported, the mean auditor participant score will 
be lowest, of the three groups, on the belief-cynicism continuum.  Although QFIs are 
expected to be most sceptical of all the groups, their work is predicated on the basis 
that fraud exists in the information they gather and analyse.  Therefore QFIs are 
expected to take a Presumptive Doubt approach to scepticism, which would equate to 
a cynicism bias tendency in the Trust/Distrust items within the scepticism scale.  
This contrasts with the Neutral approach expected of Auditors.  Therefore Auditors 
are expected to be less biased according to the Bias sub-scale. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Auditors have a more consistent Range of Biases than other groups 
 
The groups’ standard deviations were used to explore for greater consistency of 
characteristics within the Auditor group than in Non-sophisticated Laypersons. The 
null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that the Auditor group 
members’ Trait characteristics are no more consistent than the Trait characteristics of 
laypersons: 
 
 H20 σ Auditor Bias = σ other participants’ Bias 
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 If the null hypothesis is supported, the notion of auditors exhibiting a less diverse 
range of default trait biases than non-auditors is not supported.  The alternative 
hypothesis, testing for greater consistency of the Neutrality characteristic in the 
Auditor group, is: 
 
 H21 σ Auditor Bias < σ Non-sophisticated Layperson Bias 
 
 H22 σ Auditor Bias < σ QFI Bias 
 
For the null hypothesis to be rejected, the range of auditor participants’ bias scores 
would be narrower on the belief-cynicism continuum than other participants’ scores, 
further elucidating the results of mean testing, above.   
 
 
Skill Hypothesis 
The testing in this section is conducted using scores derived from the Skill sub-scale 
items. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Auditors are more Skilled than Laypersons, but less skilled than QFIs 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that auditors exhibit the 
same level of skill as all other participants.  That is, there is no difference between 
the skill scores of auditors and other respondents. 
H30 µ Auditor Skill = µ other participants’ Skill 
Given the professional requirements pertaining to Auditors, the alternate hypothesis 
is therefore: 
H31 µ Auditor Skill > µ Non-Sophisticated Layperson Skill 
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 However, the obligations of QFIs with regard to evidence are arguably greater than 
the requirements for Auditors.  Therefore, the second alternative hypothesis is that 
Auditors’ skill scores would be lower than QFI participants’ skill scores : 
 
H32 µ Auditor Skill < µ QFI Skill 
The highest scores indicate greater skill, and the lowest scores indicate lesser skill.  
Therefore, for the alternate hypothesis 31 to be supported, the mean auditor 
participant score would be higher on the skill sub-scale, and for the alternate form of 
hypothesis 32 to be supported, the mean auditor participant score would be lower 
than the mean QFI score. 
 
 
Scepticism Level Hypotheses 
The Scepticism hypotheses are framed in accordance with the composite scoring 
system, described in section 4.7.2  Formal Scores, which combines the Trait and 
Skill factors.  This score is expressed as a percentage, with the higher scores 
representing greater scepticism. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Auditors have a more consistent range of Scepticism than other 
groups 
 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that there are no 
identifiable differences in the ranges of overall Scepticism scores, when compared 
between groups, to support the discussion of between-group Scepticism 
characteristics.  Specifically, there is not enough homogeneity between the 
composite scores of auditors support meaningful discussion of those scores as 
distinct from any other respondents. 
 
127 
 H40 σ Auditor Scepticism = σ Non-Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism 
This research posits that if the null hypothesis is rejected, it may be possible to 
identify discrete differences between groups.  To that end, alternative hypotheses 
explore whether the professional and Sophisticated Layperson groups reflect more 
consistent scepticism characteristics than Non-sophisticated Laypersons, as follows: 
 
H41 σ QFI Scepticism < σ Non-sophisticated Layperson Scepticism 
H42 σ Auditor Scepticism < σ Non-sophisticated Layperson Scepticism 
H43 σ QFI Scepticism < σ Auditor Scepticism 
H44 σ Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism < σ Non-sophisticated Layperson 
Scepticism 
 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Auditors’ Scepticism level is higher than Laypersons’, but lower than 
QFIs’ 
 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that there are no 
identifiable differences in overall Scepticism scores between groups.  Specifically, 
there is no difference between the composite scores of auditors and other respondents 
to suggest different levels of scepticism. 
H50 µ Auditor Scepticism = µ Non-Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism 
This research posits that if the null hypothesis is rejected, it may be possible to 
identify discrete differences between groups, and subsequently arrive at levels of 
scepticism.  To that end, alternative hypotheses explore for expected differences, as 
follows: 
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 H51 µ Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism > µ Non-sophisticated Layperson 
Scepticism 
 
H52 µ Auditor > µ Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism 
H53 QFIs have higher Scepticism  than Auditors 
 
 
Professional Scepticism Hypothesis 
This hypothesis directly addresses RQ 2 by comparing Auditors’ Scepticism scores 
with a benchmark that denotes the lower limit of a professional scepticism range. 
 
The lower limit of the professional scepticism range is derived from standard 
deviation statistic calculated using the unadjusted Raw Total scores of QFI 
participants.  As reflected in Hypothesis 4, the QFI scores were expected to cluster 
quite closely, reflecting professional homogeneity.  For the most part, this 
expectation was observed in the data collected from the sample, however the overall 
range of results extended across much of the scale, as is demonstrated in Figure 4.1, 
following. 
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 Figure 4.1  QFI Scepticism Score Distribution Boxplot 
 
 
 
The data were then explored to observe for the existence of any outliers which might 
unduly influence the results.  A small, yet distinct, group of results at the trust end of 
the continuum was subsequently identified.  This grouping is highlighted by the blue 
circle in Figure 4.2. 
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 Figure 4.2  Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot: QFI Scepticism Scores 
 
 
 
To utilise the QFI results, without undue effects of the outliers, the data was reduced 
by approximately 5 percent, so the results then reflected 95.4% of the QFI 
population, and eliminating outlier bias.  This research thereby adopts the procedure 
used by Staheli et al (1987), who defined “the range of normal” in the same way.  
The procedure is appropriate for comparison of the QFI sample (n = 41) with the 
Auditor sample (n = 45) because “[w]ith the two standard deviation cutoff, bias has 
reached asymptote by a sample size of about 15 and it would seem safe to compare 
conditions with different numbers of observations as long as each had at least 20” 
(Miller, 1991, p.912). 
 
The lower limit, or Professional Scepticism Benchmark, was therefore calculated 
using the following syntax: 
Lower PS Limit = (1 – (σ / Raw Scepticism Score range) * 100) * 2 
where the standard deviation is 7.426, and the possible Raw Scepticism Score range 
(of -26 to 42) is 68. 
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 By applying this method, the lower limit of professional scepticism is 100 – 21.8 = 
78.2%. Whilst it is noted that future studies, with much greater numbers of 
participants, may lead to revised standard deviations and thus revised attitude score 
ranges, for the purposes of this study, the above standard deviations set the 
boundaries of score ranges as follows:   
 
Table 4.6   Scepticism Score Range Boundaries 
Scepticism Attitude Score Range % Established by Participant 
Group(s) 
Subjectivity 0 – 50 50th percentile representing the nexus 
of subjectivity and scepticism 
Scepticism 51 - 77 Mid-range 
Professional Scepticism 78* - 100 2 x QFI standard deviations of the 
maximum Scepticism score (100%) 
 
* rounded 
 
This means that, at the time of testing, subjects with scores of 78% or higher would 
be considered to have a default attitude of Professional Scepticism; subjects with 
scores in the range of 51 – 77% would be considered to have an attitude that 
encompasses scepticism; and subjects with scores of 50% or below would be 
considered to have a predominantly subjective attitude.  
 
Hypothesis 6:  Auditors’ Professional Scepticism is equal to, or higher than, the 
minimum benchmark for Professional Scepticism. 
 
Hypothesis 6, which predicts that Auditors are professionally sceptical, is expressed 
as follows: 
H6 Auditor Scepticism > 78.15% 
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 The proportion of Auditor group scores which meet or exceed the lower boundary 
represents, for the purpose of this research, the proportion of Auditors who exhibit 
indicators of professional scepticism. 
 
4.9  Ethical considerations 
This study was approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Committee, and assigned the ethics reference number H0013643.  To satisfy the 
requirements of Ethics approval, a host website was utilised to centrally publish all 
relevant background material, a formal invitation to participate, a comprehensive 
participant information sheet, and a hyperlink to the online survey.  The host website 
also stated the Ethics approval number and included contact information for the 
student researcher, supervisors and Ethics Committee.  The matter of consent was 
addressed in the participant information sheet as well as in the online survey. 
 
To elicit the most authentic responses from participants, use of the term “scepticism” 
was limited, and thus the title of the online research sites were labelled “What Do 
You Think?” rather than duplicating the title of the research thesis.  The extent of 
limited disclosure is precisely defined as: omission of the specific term ‘scepticism’ 
from the Invitation, Information Sheet and Survey questionnaire.  The term was, 
however, used at the end of the survey for the purpose of assessing participants’ 
understanding of the term and self-reporting their personal level of scepticism, and in 
a disclosure at the very end of the survey, where participants were offered an 
opportunity to indicate if they wished their data to be withdrawn from the study.  No 
participants withdrew at that stage. 
 
The use of limited disclosure was not intended to mislead participants in any way, or 
to conceal the purpose of the research.  Prospective participants were informed that 
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 the purpose of the research was to measure how a particular balance of experience 
and knowledge are used to gather and assess information, which is the same issue 
expressed in layman’s terms.   
 
Use of the official research title in information provided to participants would have 
been counterproductive if it led to inconsistency between audit and non-audit 
definitions, which would damage the usefulness of the scale in that inter-group 
responses could not be combined or compared.  That would undermine the purpose 
of the project, which is to explore and understand any differences identified.   
 
The term “scepticism” is known to all auditors, as defined for this research.  It is 
emphasised in the Auditing Standards, professional papers and regulatory 
recommendations, and is also prominent in legal cases against auditors.  Therefore 
use of the term would very likely influence respondents in groups 1 and 2 to select 
what they perceive to be a ‘most correct’ answer rather than that which most reflects 
their true perspective.  This would unduly bias the research data.  The term is not 
understood in the same way by those outside the audit and related fields.  However, 
this is equally as problematic because colloquial usage is usually to mean ‘disbelief’, 
‘doubt’ or ‘cynicism’.  Such misinterpretation of the research purpose and questions 
would influence respondents in Group 3 to answer in ways that are not intended by 
the research. 
 
No identifying information is asked of participants.  All data is confidential, captured 
and stored electronically, and password protected.  The research involves no 
immediate benefits to participants, nor any foreseeable risk other than the 
opportunity cost of volunteering time to complete the survey.   
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 4.10 Summary  
The methods chosen for this research address the research questions by deriving a 
purposeful scale of Professional Scepticism from existing subscales which match the 
constructs identified in the Model presented in Chapter 3.  That Model emerged from 
review and synthesis of existing academic and professional literature, described in 
Chapter 2. 
 
The use of a purposeful scale necessitated methods of refining the proposed 
instrument to assess its capacity to serve two purposes:  Firstly, to capture data that 
reflected a broad range across the continuum of trait attitudes; and secondly, to 
derive a question set which was shown by the captured data to represent the two 
underlying factors of professional scepticism:  an inherent (dis)trust trait, and 
scepticism skill.  The scale refinement procedures resulted in inclusion of 
Wrightsman’s (1991) complete Trust Scale in the professional scepticism test 
instrument, which revealed a serendipitous opportunity to utilise that sub-scale as an 
indicator of bias direction, to enhance interpretation of professional scepticism scores 
and inform means by which scepticism skills might be enhanced. 
 
Further methods were chosen to match the hypotheses to specifically address the 
research questions of whether levels of scepticism were identifiable, and if 
participants in the auditor group of participants express traits and skills which 
combine to reflect a professional level of scepticism.   
 
Finally, methods were chosen to utilise the supplementary data collected by the 
instrument, but which was not included in the scepticism scale, to further explore the 
rigour of the scale in terms of its capacity to capture the relevant constructs, and to 
explore for differences in individuals’ ability to self-assess their sceptical position. 
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 Chapter 5:  Data Analysis Results  
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter is structured to reflect the Method described in Chapter 4:  After 
defining a usable data set, descriptive statistics were derived, and the participant 
groups are presented.  Next, the results of testing the research hypotheses are 
reported, followed by a summary of all groups’ scepticism range results.   Discussion 
of the results is presented in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2  Defining the Data Set 
Data was gathered via the online survey between 3rd February 2014 and 9th April 
2014 and downloaded in Excel format for initial analysis.  According to Survey 
Monkey, the number of participants at the time of data download was 360, but only 
296 of those participants had appropriately completed the survey.     
 
The responses were then inspected for eligibility.  One pair of entries was deemed to 
have been made by a single layperson individual, several weeks apart, after having 
completed a fraud course.  The first of the two entries was retained because it was 
considered more representative of that participant’s default Trait and Skill position, 
and less likely to be prejudiced by repetition and the recency of this new fraud-
related experience (Arnold et al, 2000; Cushing & Ahlawat, 1996).  A further four 
sets of data were excluded, because those respondents indicated being less than 18 
years old, which did not satisfy the ethical approval criteria.   
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 The final usable participant data represented a sample size of n = 291, including 
more than the target minimum of 30 participants for each of the QFI and Auditor 
groups. 
 
5.3  Participant Groups 
Respondents’ data were categorised to the QFI, Auditor or Layperson groups 
according to their responses to direct questions about roles and qualifications.  To 
reduce coder error, the group codes were automatically assigned via a Microsoft 
Excel IF function.   
 
All participants were thereby initially allocated to the three groups, as follows: 
 
Table 5.1   Initial Group Allocations 
Group n 
1 QFIs 41 
2 Auditors 45 
3 Laypersons 205 
n =  291 
 
Each group contains more than 30 members, which was predetermined as the 
minimum number of group participants required for the purpose of statistical 
analysis.  However, before addressing the hypotheses, the groups’ data were 
subjected to further inspection to verify that a broad enough range of data were 
captured across the Trait continuum, which forms the basis of the research model.  
For this purpose, results of the well-established Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991) were 
plotted and compared. 
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 Figure 5.1 illustrates frequency distributions for each of the three initial groups.  It is 
observed that the majority of QFI and Auditor group members’ responses cluster 
around the central point of greatest scepticism, represented by a score of 0.  In 
contrast, most participants in group 3 have scores which reflect higher levels of trust 
and distrust.   
 
Figure 5.1   Trait Frequency Distribution 
 
 
Whilst a higher degree of bias amongst Laypersons is consistent with expectations 
formed during the literature review, the result was not as evenly distributed as 
expected, prompting further exploration of Group 3. 
 
The exploration revealed that Group 3 participants who reported some practical 
experience of fraud, or informal fraud training, or accounting training that does not 
encompass employment in auditing or fraud fields, exhibited higher levels of distrust. 
This group included, for example, company accountants, executives and managers 
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 who have studied accounting and/or undertaken informal fraud-related training. In 
contrast, Group 3 participants without such training exhibited higher levels of trust.  
As the distinction between participant sub-groups was clear, the initial Group 3 
participants were re-coded and reassigned to separate groupings. 
 
This re-coding and reassignment resulted in a revised Group 3, consisting of 
Sophisticated Laypersons; and a new Group 4, being Non-sophisticated Laypersons.  
The terminology was chosen match the nature of the differentiation, which is 
essentially related to (non)sophisticated use of financial information.  Consequently, 
the 291 usable data sets were divided amongst four stratified groupings as follows: 
 
Table 5.2   Final Participant Groupings 
Group n 
1 QFIs 41 
2 Auditors 45 
3 Sophisticated Laypersons 52 
4 Non-sophisticated Laypersons 153 
n =  291 
 
 
5.4  17-item Scale Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the general demographic characteristics of the participants, 
followed by summaries of statistics describing the performance of each group across 
the sub-scales and professional scepticism scale. 
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 5.4.1  Demographic Data 
This section describes the demographic characteristics of the participants.   
 
Forty four percent (127) of respondents were female, and fifty six percent (164) were 
male.  All of the study’s age categories were represented, as illustrated in figure 5.2: 
 
Figure 5.2   Participant Ages 
 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates that eighty two percent of participants held a bachelor degree or 
higher. 
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 Figure 5.3   Participant Education 
 
 
According to Survey Monkey, the 360 survey attempts were made from locations in 
sixty four countries across the globe.  The following figure illustrates the distribution 
of access, with the regions of most prolific access highlighted by darker colours. 
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 Figure 5.4   Countries of Access 
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The respondent data support the dominance of responses from English speaking 
western regions, with seventy percent of respondents reporting that they live mainly 
in Australia, USA, Canada or England.   
 
 
5.4.2  Summary of Scale Score Statistics 
The means and standard deviations of group scores were important for the purpose of 
defining levels of scepticism, because this information facilitated observations of 
score clustering within groups, and observations of differences between groups. 
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 The table on the following page summarises the performance of each group across 
the sub-scales and professional scepticism scale. 
 
Table 5.3   Summary of Scale Scores per Group 
Variable Group Theoretic 
Min/Max 
Actual 
Min/Max 
Mean SD 
BIAS QFI -26 :+26 -12 : + 16 2.854 5.9982 
Auditors -26 :+26 -19 : +12 -.844 7.9600 
SL -26 :+26 -8 : +9 -1.212 6.9093 
NSL -26 :+26 -13 : +18 7.373 11.2272 
TRAIT QFI .000000:1 .3929 : .9643 .737805 .1520711 
Auditors .000000:1 .0643 : 1 .773810 .1539899 
SL .000000:1 .5000 : 1 .826923 .1774312 
NSL .000000:1 .0714 : 1 .497199 .4171716 
SKILL QFI .000000:1 .2143 : 1 .649826 .2252011 
Auditors .000000:1 .2143 : 1 .714286 .2137439 
SL .000000:1 .3571 : 1 .682692 .2071228 
NSL .000000:1 .2857 : 1 .813259 .1530929 
SCEPTICISM QFI .000000:1 .3571 : .9762 .716609 .1651122 
Auditors .000000:1 .4524 : 1 .764550 .1537364 
SL .000000:1 .5238 : .9762 .778846 .1684470 
NSL .000000:1 .3333 : 1 .604420 .2860812 
 
These statistics were fundamental to the testing of the hypotheses in the next section. 
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 5.5  Data Distributions 
Very skewed distributions were expected from the QFI and Auditor groups in terms 
of Scepticism, as well as the Skill and Trait sub-scales, because it was anticipated 
that the majority of participants would score highly.  A flatter distribution was 
expected from the Layperson group(s), for Bias questions in particular, because these 
participants were expected to reflect a broad range of attitudes, divergent from the 
more neutral, evidenced-based perspectives of the professional participants.  
Nonetheless, the extreme differences in distributions were surprising, particularly in 
terms of the extreme Bias scores evident in the Non-sophisticated Layperson bimodal 
distribution. 
 
The distributions for Scepticism and each sub-scale, per group, are presented in the 
following table.  The normal distributions are highlighted in blue rows14. 
 
14 For the purposes of this research, the Shapiro-Wilk statistic was used for all groups’ data, even though the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova method would ordinarily be used for samples >50, such as the Sophisticated 
Layperson group (n = 153).  This is because the Shapiro-Wilk statistic has been found to handle samples of 
up to 2,000 (Lund Research Ltd, 2013), and consistent results were noted between the methods presented in 
Table 5.4. 
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 Table 5.4   Data Distributions 
Tests of Normality 
 GROUP Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Scepticism 
1 .103 41 .200* .963 41 .208 
2 .171 45 .002 .924 45 .006 
3 .274 52 .000 .800 52 .000 
4 .286 153 .000 .747 153 .000 
Trait 
1 .101 41 .200* .954 41 .096 
2 .177 45 .001 .933 45 .012 
3 .281 52 .000 .761 52 .000 
4 .304 153 .000 .747 153 .000 
Skill 
1 .114 41 .200* .953 41 .087 
2 .153 45 .010 .935 45 .014 
3 .262 52 .000 .849 52 .000 
4 .384 153 .000 .702 153 .000 
Bias 
1 .114 41 .200* .971 41 .369 
2 .102 45 .200* .966 45 .207 
3 .241 52 .000 .793 52 .000 
4 .292 153 .000 .754 153 .000 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
The abundance of non-normal distributions has presented substantial challenges for 
testing of hypotheses which were designed to involve comparison of means between 
groups.  However, given that this research involved groupings of attitudes, for the 
purpose of establishing levels, the ranges of scores per group, were as important as 
the means of scores.   In this light, the shapes of the distributions did not compromise 
the research because non-parametric tests were used.  Rather, the shapes of the 
distributions offer support to the research expectations of participant behaviour, and 
contribute positively to the establishment of levels of scepticism.   
 
The challenges were in choosing appropriate statistical tests for scale-form data, 
which would not violate the common normality assumption.  Consequently, non-
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 parametric alternatives, such as Mann Whitney U Tests, Levene tests for Equality of 
Variances Assumed, and Wilcoxon Ranked Sign Tests, were frequently used. 
 
5.6  Testing of Hypotheses   
In chapters 3 and 4, hypotheses were developed to address the research questions by 
exploring the following issues: 
1) Trait Range; 
2) Skills; 
3) Levels of Scepticism; and 
4) Professional scepticism. 
 
The results of testing these hypotheses are presented in turn, as follows. 
 
5.6.1  Trait Range Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that auditors exhibit the 
same level of trust/distrust bias as QFIs and all layperson participants.   
 
Alternate 1:  Auditor/Layperson Bias 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistic (.809, df 205, sig. < .001) confirmed that the combined 
Laypersons groups’ data violated the normality assumption, so a Mann Whitney U 
Test was used to determine whether the mean of Auditor Bias was significantly less 
than the mean of Layperson Bias.   
 
Laypersons (mean rank = 131.98, n = 205), U = 3284.5, z = -3.070, p = .001, two-
tailed, ranked significantly higher than Auditors (mean rank = 95.99). 
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Bias score has a range of -26 to +26.  A mean score of 0 suggests the greatest 
neutrality or least bias.  A negative score signifies distrust, while a positive score 
signifies trust.  The mean score for auditors is –0.844, indicating that Auditors are 
neutral on this scale.  In contrast, the mean Laypersons score is +7.33, which maps 
these participants as trusting. 
 
Table 5.5   H1 Alt1 Summary 
GROUP N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Auditors BIAS 45 -19.0 12.0 -.844 7.9600 
Layperson BIAS 153 -13.0 18.0 7.373 11.2272 
 
 
This test result was significant (p = .001), indicating that there is enough evidence to 
support the alternate hypothesis that, on average, Auditors are less biased than 
Laypersons. 
 
Alternate 2:  Auditor/QFI Bias 
A t test was used to compare the mean of Auditor group’s Bias scores (M = -.844, 
SD = 7.96) with the mean of QFIs’ Bias scores, being 2.854.  Auditors scored 3.699 
points, 95% CI [-1.307, -6.090], below the other group’s average.  This difference is 
statistically significant, t(44) = -3.117, p = .002, two-tailed, and moderate at d = 
0.465. 
 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistic (.971, df 41, sig. = .369) and visual inspection of the 
frequency histogram and stem-and-leaf plot confirmed that the QFIs’ scores were 
approximately normally distributed. 
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 As above, the mean score for auditors is –0.844, indicating that Auditors are neutral 
on this scale.  In contrast, the mean QFI score is +2.854, indicating a moderate trust 
bias (d = 0.465). 
 
Table 5.6   H1 Alt2 Auditor/QFI Bias 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Auditor Bias 45 -19.0 12.0 -.844 7.9600 
QFI Bias 41 -12.0 16.0 2.854 5.9982 
 
 
The results of this test were significant (p = .002), indicating that there is enough 
evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that, on average, Auditors are less biased 
than QFIs.   
 
Hypothesis 2 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that the Auditor group 
members’ Bias characteristics are no more consistent than the Bias characteristics of 
other groups. 
 
Alternate 1: Auditor/Non-sophisticated Layperson ranges 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the distribution of Auditor Bias data were normally distributed (.966, 
df 45, p = 0.207), but the Non-sophisticated Layperson Bias data (.754, df 153, 
p<.001) were not.   Therefore a Levene test for Equality of Variances was utilised.   
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 The results were significant, indicating that the variances are not equal (F = 32.645, 
Sig. <.001).  A t-test for ‘Equal Variances Assumed’ reveal a mean difference of 8 
scale points (-8.2170), (t = -5.500, df 100.586, p <.001, two tailed).   
 
This test revealed marked differences in the ranges of scores for the Auditor and 
NSL groups. 
 
The Auditors’ scores range from -19  to +12, and are distributed in a normal manner 
(SW .966, df 45, p = .207), as illustrated in the following diagram.   
Figure 5.5   H2 Alt1 Auditor Bias Distribution 
 
 
In contrast, the NSL scores are dispersed between two strong clusters, as depicted in 
Figure 5.6, below.  One cluster of scores is largely trusting, and the other is largely 
distrusting.   
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Figure 5.6   H2 Alt1 NSL Bias Distribution 
 
 
This indicates that there are two sub-groups of NSLs which drive the bias profiles, 
ranging from -7 to +18.  Differences in these sub-groups do not seem driven by age 
or gender.  
 
The following boxplot depicts the means, ranges and two standard deviations of the 
means for the Auditor (1) and Non-sophisticated Layperson (2) groups.  It illustrates 
the NSL mean at the Trust extreme of the Auditor response range, and a much 
greater standard deviation, which encompasses much of the entire range of its 
group’s scores.   
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 Figure 5.7   H2 Alt1 Relative consistency of Auditor v NSL Biases 
 
 
 
This illustrates that the majority of Auditors exhibit a far narrower range of biases 
when compared to the majority of non-sophisticated members of the general public, 
whose bias positions span much more of belief-cynicism continuum. 
 
The results of this test were significant (p < .001), providing evidence that Auditors 
have a narrower range of biases than NSLs, around significantly different means, and 
therefore these groups have very different Bias profiles underlying Traits across 
different ranges of the Trait continuum.  This is evident in the following chart, where 
the blue line indicates the point of greatest Neutrality. 
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 Figure 5.8   H2  Summary of Bias ranges – All groups 
 
 
 
 
Alternate 2: Auditor/QFI ranges 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the distribution of QFI data were normally distributed (.971, df 41, p 
= .369).  A Levene test for Equality of Variances was utilised for consistency with 
Alternate 1.   
 
The results were not significant, indicating that the variances are equal (F = 3.630, 
Sig. = .060).  A t-test for ‘Equal Variances Assumed’ reveal a significant mean 
difference of almost 4 scale points (-3.6981), (t = -2.415, df 84, p = .018, two tailed).   
 
This test revealed no significant differences in the distribution of scores for the 
Auditor and QFI groups. 
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 The QFIs’ scores range from -12  to +16, and are distributed in a normal manner 
(SW .971, df 41, p = .369), as illustrated in the following diagram.  This is similar to 
the range of Auditors’ scores, being -19  to +12.   
 
Figure 5.9   H2 Alt2  QFI Bias Distribution 
 
 
 
This distribution is not significantly different (sig. = .060) to Auditor Bias, presented 
in Figure 5.6, above.  However, whilst the shapes and ranges of scores are similar, 
the significantly different means (p = .018), suggest that the Bias profiles of these 
two groups occupy different ranges of the Trait continuum.   
 
The results for this Alternate mean that Auditors have Neutral Traits, whilst QFIs 
have trusting Traits, but there is not enough evidence to reject the Null hypothesis 
because both groups’ scores are equally consistent. 
153 
  
5.6.2  Skills  
Hypothesis 3 
Alternate 1: Auditor/NSL Skill 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the Skill scores of Auditors (.935, df 45, sig. = .014) and of Non-
Sophisticated Laypersons (.702, df 153, p = .000), were not normally distributed.  
Therefore a Mann Whitney U Test was used to determine whether the mean of 
Auditor Skill was significantly higher than the mean of Non-sophisticated 
Laypersons’ Skill.   
 
Non-Sophisticated Laypersons (mean rank = 104.49, n = 205), U = 2678.5, z = -
2.350, p = .018, two-tailed, ranked significantly higher than Auditors (mean rank = 
82.52). 
 
This test revealed significant difference between these groups, but the direction of 
difference was the opposite of expectations.  That is, that NSLs’ Skill was, on 
average, significantly (p = .018) higher than Auditor Skill. 
 
The minimum and mean NSL scores were higher than Auditors, as summarised in 
the following table. 
 
Table 5.7   H3 Alt1 Auditor/NSL Skill 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Auditor Skill 45 .2143 1.0000 .714286 .2137439 
NSL Skill 153 .2857 1.0000 .813259 .1530929 
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Although both groups achieved scores at the maximum end of the Skill sub-scale, 
and the range of scores was similar, the table also reveals that the standard deviation 
of NSL scores was much smaller.  This means that Auditors have greater diversity of 
Skill levels, contrasting with a majority of NSLs having similar Skills, as depicted in 
the following two charts. 
 
Figure 5.10  H3 Alt1 Auditor Skill 
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 Figure 5.11  H3 Alt1 NSL Skill 
 
 
 
This test provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal Skill, but there is 
not enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that, on average, Auditors 
are more skilled than Non-sophisticated Laypersons because the difference was the 
other way around. 
 
 
Alternate 2:  Auditor/QFI Skill 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the Skill scores of QFIs (.953, df 41, sig. = .087) were normally 
distributed.  However, as the Auditor data are not (.935, df 45, sig. = .014), a Mann 
Whitney U Test was used to determine whether the mean of Auditor Skill was 
significantly lower than the mean of QFIs’ Skill. 
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 QFIs’ (mean rank = 39.70, n = 41), U = 766.5, z = -1.356, p = .087, one-tailed, 
ranked lower than Auditors (mean rank = 46.97), but the result was not significant. 
 
This test revealed no significant difference between these groups.  From the data, it 
was observed that both groups shared the same minimum and maximum scores, and 
although the QFI Skill was slightly lower, on average, than Auditors, the difference 
was not statistically significant (p = .087).   
 
The minimum and mean NSL scores were higher than Auditors, as summarised in 
the following table. 
 
Table 5.8   H3 Alt2 Auditor/QFI Skill 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Auditor Skill 45 .2143 1.0000 .714286 .2137439 
QFI Skill 41 .2143 1.0000 .649826 .2252011 
 
 
The diversity of QFI skills, as depicted in the following chart, is similar to Auditors’, 
shown in Figure 5.10, above. 
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 Figure 5.12  H3 Alt2 QFI Skill 
 
 
This test indicates there is not enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis 
that, on average, Auditors are less skilled than QFIs.  However, overall, the Null 
hypothesis is rejected by virtue of Non-sophisticated Laypersons and Auditors not 
having equal Skills. 
 
 
5.6.3  Scepticism Level Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 4 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that there are no 
identifiable differences in the ranges of overall Scepticism scores, when compared 
between groups, to support the discussion of between-group Scepticism 
characteristics.   
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 H4 Alternate 1: QFI Range Differentiation 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the QFI Scepticism (.963, df 41, p =.208) was normally distributed, 
but Non-sophisticated Layperson Scepticism (.747, df 153, p <.001) violated the 
normality assumption with a marked U-shaped bimodal distribution.  Therefore, a 
Levene test for Equality of Variances was utilised.   
 
The results were significant, indicating that the variances are not equal (F = 61.418, 
Sig. <.001).  A t-test for ‘Equal Variances Assumed’ reveal a mean difference of 11 
scale points (.1121890), (t = 3.239, df 111.291, p = .002, two tailed).   
 
This test revealed significant difference between these groups.  Although these 
groups shared similar ranges of Scepticism scores, as indicated in the following 
table, the clustering of scores within those ranges was significantly different (p 
= .002).   
 
Table 5.9  H4 Alt1 QFI/NSL Scepticism 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
QFI Scept 41 .3571 .9762 .716609 .1651122 
NSL Scept 153 .3333 1.0000 .604420 .2860812 
 
 
The following two histograms illustrate a normal shaped distribution of QFI scores, 
which contrasts markedly with the inverse-of-normal bimodal NSL distribution.  It is 
evident that NSLs’ scepticism is less consistent than QFIs’. 
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 Figure 5.13  H4 Alt1 QFI Scepticism Range 
 
 
Figure 5.14  H4 Alt1 NSL Scepticism Range 
 
160 
  
This test provides evidence in support of Alternate 1 that QFI Scepticism (M 
= .716609, SD = .1651122) is more consistent than Non-sophisticated Layperson 
Scepticism (M = .604420, SD = .2860812). 
 
H4 Alternate 2: Auditor Range Differentiation 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the Auditor Scepticism (.924, df 45, p = .006) and Non-sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (.747, df 153, p <.001) were not normally distributed.   
 
A Levene test for Equality of Variances was utilised.  The results were significant, 
indicating that the variances are not equal (F = 73.595, Sig. <.001).  A t-test for 
‘Equal Variances Assumed’ reveal a mean difference of 16 scale points (.160130), (t 
= 4.918, df 137.868, p <.001, two tailed).   
 
This test revealed significant difference between these groups.  Although these 
groups shared similar ranges of Scepticism scores, as indicated in the following 
table, the clustering of scores within those ranges was again significantly different (p 
< .001).   
 
Table 5.10  H4 Alt2 Auditor/NSL Scepticism 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
QFI Scept 41 .3571 .9762 .716609 .1651122 
NSL Scept 153 .3333 1.0000 .604420 .2860812 
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 Auditor Scepticism scores were not normally distributed; instead skewed toward the 
higher end of the scale.  The following histogram illustrates that skew, which again 
contrasts with the inverse-of-normal bimodal NSL distribution.   
 
Figure 5.15  H4 Alt2 Auditor Scepticism Range 
 
 
This test provides evidence in support of Alternate 2 that Auditor Scepticism (M 
= .764550, SD = .1537364) is more consistent than Non-sophisticated Layperson 
Scepticism (M = .604420, SD = .2860812). 
 
H4 Alternate 3: Differentiated QFI & Auditor Ranges 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the QFI Scepticism (.963, df 41, p = .208) was normally distributed, 
but Auditor Scepticism (.924, df 45, p = .006) was not.   
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 A Levene test for Equality of Variances was utilised.  The results were not 
significant, and indicated that the variances are assumed equal (F = .015, Sig = .902).  
A t-test for ‘Equal Variances Assumed’ reveal a mean difference of only 5 scale 
points (.0479417), (t = -1.394, df 84, p = .167, two tailed).   
 
This test revealed no significant difference between these groups.  QFIs and Auditors 
shared similar means and ranges of Scepticism scores, and those scores clustered in 
similar ways, as indicated in the following table (p < .001).   
 
Table 5.11  H4 Alt3  QFI/Auditor Scepticism Ranges 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
QFI Scept 41 .6190 .3571 .9762 .716609 .1651122 
Auditor Scept 45 .5476 .4524 1.0000 .764550 .1537364 
 
This test provides not provide enough evidence to support Alternate 3 that QFI 
Scepticism (M = .716609, SD = .1651122) is more consistent than Auditor 
Scepticism (M = .764550, SD = .1537364). 
 
H4 Alternate 4: Differentiated SL & NSL Ranges 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that both Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism (.800, df 52, p <.001) and 
Non-sophisticated Layperson Scepticism (.747, df 153, p <.001) violated the 
normality assumption.   
 
The shape of the SL Scepticism score distribution resembles the NSL distribution in 
that it is bimodal, as shown in the following chart. 
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 Figure 5.16  H4 Alt4 SL Scepticism Range 
 
 
A Levene test for Equality of Variances was utilised.  The results were significant, 
indicating that the variances are not equal (F = 59.264, Sig. <.001).  A t-test for 
‘Equal Variances Assumed’ reveal a mean difference of 17 scale points (.1744266), 
(t = 5.306, df 151.238, p < .001, two tailed).   
 
However, the distribution of SL scores accommodates a significantly narrower range, 
reflected by a significantly smaller standard deviation (p <.001, two tailed). 
 
Table 5.12  H4 Alt4  SL/NSL Scepticism Ranges 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SL Scept 52 .5238 .9762 .778846 .1684470 
NSL Scept 153 .3333 1.0000 .604420 .2860812 
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This test provides evidence in support of Alternate 4 that Sophisticated Layperson 
Scepticism (M = .778846, SD = .1684470) is more consistent than Non-sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (M = .604420, SD = .2860812). 
 
For Hypothesis 4, overall, the relative similarities and differences between 
Scepticism scores for each of the participant groups are illustrated as follows: 
Figure 5.17  Boxplot of all groups’ Scepticism score ranges 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 
The null hypothesis, which this research seeks to reject, is that there is no difference 
between the composite scores of auditors and other respondents to suggest different 
levels of scepticism. 
 
H5 Alternate 1: SL/NSL Scepticism Averages 
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 The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the Sophisticated (.800, df 52, p < .001) and Non-sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (.747, df 153, p < .001) were not normally distributed.  As the 
distributions shared similar distribution shapes and spreads, a Mann Whitney U Test 
was utilised. 
 
Sophisticated Laypersons Scepticism (mean rank = 124.28, n = 52), ranked higher 
than Non-sophisticated Layperson Scepticism (mean rank = 95.77), and the result 
was significant (U = 2871.5, z = -3.076, p = .001, one-tailed). 
 
This test revealed that SLs are, on average, significantly more sceptical than NSLs (p 
= .001, one-tailed).  In addition to having more homogenous scores, as indicated by 
Hypothesis 4, SL Scepticism is, on average, significantly higher than NSL 
scepticism.   
 
Table 5.13  H5 Alt1 SL/NSL Scepticism Averages 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SL Scept 52 .4524 .5238 .9762 .778846 .1684470 
NSL Scept 153 .6667 .3333 1.0000 .604420 .2860812 
 
The average scores for each group are depicted by the horizontal black lines in the 
following boxplots. 
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 Figure 5.18  H5 Alt1 SL/NSL Scepticism levels 
 
 
This test indicates there is enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that, 
on average, Sophisticated Laypersons are more sceptical than Non-Sophisticated 
Laypersons. 
 
H5 Alternate 2: Average Auditor/Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism Averages 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that the Auditor Scepticism (.924, df 45, p =.006) and Sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (.800, df 52, p <.001) were not normally distributed.  As the 
distributions did not share similar distribution shapes and spreads, a Wilcoxon 
Ranked Sign Test was utilised. 
 
The results of this test indicate that Scepticism is not significantly different when 
compared between Auditors and Non-sophisticated Laypersons (T = 473, z = -.257, 
corrected for one tie, N = 45, p =.797, two tailed).  Although Auditors ranked higher 
(Sum of Ranks = 473), than Sophisticated Laypersons (Sum of Ranks = 517), 51% of 
the time (N = 45, n = 23) and only one participant ranked equally, Auditor scores 
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 between the 25th and 75th percentiles (.666667 - .880952 range) are clustered 
similarly to the Sophisticated Laypersons’ scores (.642857 - .928571 range). 
 
Table 5.14  H5 Alt2 Auditor/SL Scepticism Averages 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SL Scept 52 .5238 .9762 .778846 .1684470 
Auditor Scept 45 .4524 1.0000 .764550 .1537364 
 
Noting that the Y axis of the following figure is truncated at the lower end, the plots 
illustrate that the majority of Auditor Scepticism scores are accommodated within the 
same space as the majority of SL Scepticism scores. 
 
Figure 5.19  H5 Alt2 Auditor/SL Scepticism levels 
 
 
 
The results of this test do not provide enough evidence to support the alternate 
hypothesis that Auditor Scepticism is greater than that of Sophisticated Laypersons. 
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H5 Alternate 3: QFI/Auditor Scepticism Averages 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistics and visual inspection of the frequency histograms 
confirmed that QFI Scepticism (.963, df 41, p = .208) data were normally distributed, 
but Auditor Scepticism (.924, df 45, p = .006) data were not.  As the distributions did 
not share similar distribution shapes and spreads, a Wilcoxon Ranked Sign Test was 
utilised. 
 
The results of this test indicate that Scepticism is not significantly different when 
compared between QFIs and Auditors (T = 297.5, z = -1.059, corrected for 3 ties, N 
= 41, p = .289, two tailed).  Auditors ranked higher (Sum of Ranks = 443.5), than 
QFIs (Sum of Ranks = 297.5), 54% of the time (N = 41, n=  22), however Auditors’ 
scores between the 25th and 75th percentiles (.666667 - .880952 range) are clustered 
similarly to the QFIs’ scores (.619048 - .833333 range) and 3 participants ranked 
equally. 
 
This test revealed no significant differences between the average level of Auditor and 
QFI Scepticism (p = .289). 
 
Table 5.15  H5 Alt3 QFI/Auditor Scepticism Averages 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
QFI Scept 41 .3571 .9762 .716609 .1651122 
Auditor Scept 45 .4524 1.0000 .764550 .1537364 
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 Noting that the Y axis of the following figure is truncated at the lower end, the plots 
illustrate that, although the QFI scores accommodate a greater range, the majority of 
QFI Scepticism scores are accommodated within the same space as the majority of 
Auditor Scepticism scores. 
 
Figure 5.20  H5 Alt3 QFI/Auditor Scepticism Levels 
 
 
The results of this test do not provide enough evidence to support the alternate 
hypothesis that, on average, QFI Scepticism is greater than that of Auditors. 
 
 
Overall for Hypothesis 5, the mean Scepticism scores for the QFI, Auditor and SL 
groups are reasonably consistent, but NSLs’ Scepticism is lower, as illustrated in the 
following chart.   
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 Figure 5.21  H5 All groups’ average Scepticism 
 
From the available data, the difference between groups 2 and 3 (Auditors and SLs) 
and NSLs, is formal accounting education.  QFIs have a sophisticated understanding 
of accounting for the purposes of fraud investigation, but some may have entered the 
field via a professional pathway other than formal accounting education. 
 
5.6.4  Professional Scepticism Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 6  
This hypothesis tests whether Auditors’ scepticism meets or exceeds the minimum 
benchmark of professional scepticism, being 78.2% (.7820) on the Professional 
Scepticism scale. 
 
A one-sample t-test revealed a non-significant result (sig. = .463, two-tailed), even 
though the mean Auditor score (.764550) was close to the test value.  This means 
that the majority of scores were not close to the value. 
 
This test would not accommodate a range or cut-off point test value (> 0.7815), 
so .89 was used to enable exploration of scores within the range between the 
benchmark and the maximum possible score of 100%.  The .89 test value is the mid-
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 point between 78.2% and 100%.  As this value is less than one standard deviation 
(.1537364) from the minimum benchmark, it was expected that the results would 
capture the majority of Auditor scores within the relevant range. 
 
The results of this test were significant, as shown in the following table. 
 
Table 5.16  H6 Auditor Scepticism Benchmark 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = .89 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Auditor 
Scept 
-5.474 44 .000 -.1254497 -.171637 -.079262 
 
 
 
For a discrete count, the Excel COUNTIF function was utilised to identify the 
proportion of participant Auditors’ Scepticism scores which meet or exceed the 
lower boundary of professional scepticism. 
 
Of the forty five Auditor participants, twenty three had scores equal to, or greater 
than, 78.2%, being the lower boundary of Professional Scepticism, established in 
section 4.8.3  Testing of Hypotheses.  This means that 51.1% of Auditors’ scores 
were in the Professional Scepticism range.  Of the remaining Auditor group 
members’, 42.2% of scores (n = 19) were in the Sceptical range, and 6.7% (3) were 
in the Subjective range. 
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 To simplify comparison, the following table depicts the proportions of all four 
groups’ scores that sit within the three ranges of scepticism, as determined by the 
Professional Scepticism scale used in this study. 
 
Table 5.17  Scepticism Range Results 
 
Subjective 
Range 
Sceptical 
Range 
Professional 
Scepticism 
Range 
Group 1 – QFIs 
n = 41 
12.2%  (5) 48.8%  (20) 39.0%  (16) 
Group 2 – Auditors 
n = 45 
6.7%  (3) 42.2%  (19) 51.1%  (23) 
Group 3 – Sophisticated Laypersons 
n = 52 
0%  (0) 44.2%  (23) 55.8%  (29) 
Group 4 – Non-sophisticated 
Laypersons 
n = 153 
49%  (75) 15.0%  (23) 35.9%  (55) 
 
 
5.6.5  Correlations 
For completeness, the Scepticism, Skill, Trait and Bias scores of Auditors in each of 
the Subjective, Sceptical and Professionally Sceptical ranges were explored using 
Kendall’s tau-b to test for nonparametric correlations which may help explain the 
nature of differences in scores.  These tests revealed different results in each of the 
ranges.   
 
There were too few Auditors in the subjective range (N = 3) to enable meaningful 
comment. 
 
For Auditors in the sceptical range (N = 19), there were three significant correlations:  
Kendall’s tau-b indicated that the correlation between Scepticism and Trait was 
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 strong and positive, τ = .677, p < .00115, two-tailed.  Further, a negative correlation 
between Scepticism and Bias was quite strong and negative, τ = .598, p = .0011, two-
tailed, and there was also a weaker, but significant, negative correlation between 
Trait and Bias, τ = .416, p = .019. 
 
For Auditors in the professional scepticism range (N = 23), only one significant 
correlation was observed, being a relatively weak negative correlation between Trait 
and Skill: τ = .354, p = .033. 
 
The output of the correlation tests is included at Appendix 7. 
 
 
5.7  Summary 
The steps in this research involved definition of the data set and participant groups, 
presentation of demographic and descriptive statistics, exploration of the data 
distributions in preparation for statistical testing, and statistical testing of the 
hypotheses. 
 
Analyses were conducted by applying statistical tests using SPSS software and the 
Excel COUNTIF function.  The statistical analysis underlying the results is also 
reported in this chapter.  These results are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Testing of the data revealed that the primary goals of the study were achieved:  A fit 
for purpose inventory was derived from the composite survey instrument; a 
‘professional’ level of scepticism was determined; and responses from the auditor 
15 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 cluster were compared with the ‘professional’ benchmark, providing an answer to the 
primary research question. 
  
Chapter 6:  Discussion of Results   
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter extends the statement of hypotheses in Chapter 4, and the data analysis 
presented in Chapter 5, by interpreting the results and discussing the implications of 
the results in terms of the research questions.  To that end, this chapter is structured 
by addressing each of the research questions in turn, with discussion of the relevant 
hypotheses.   
 
Research Question 1, Do auditors and other groups exhibit different levels of 
scepticism?, includes discussion of Hypotheses 1 through 5, which explore the roles 
of Bias, Trait and Skill in professional scepticism, and contribute to the 
establishment of Scepticism Levels.  Research Question 2, Do auditors exhibit 
professional scepticism?, involves discussion of Hypothesis 6, which compares 
Auditors’ Scepticism scores with a quantified benchmark of professional scepticism.  
Within each of those sections, opportunity is taken to connect the findings with the 
proposed Research Model (Chapter 3), which was constructed from concepts 
identified in the literature (Chapter 2). 
 
Conclusions about these interpretations of findings are presented in the final chapter, 
indicating how this study fits within the body of professional scepticism research and 
showing significance of the research for knowledge in the discipline. 
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 6.2  RQ 1:  Do auditors and other groups exhibit different levels of 
scepticism? 
 
6.2.1  Trait Range 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 explored for expected diversity of attitudes across the horizontal 
Trait axis of the Scepticism Model, which is shown in section  
3.6  The Professional Scepticism Model.  The Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991) items 
were extracted from the main survey inventory, and used for this purpose, relying 
upon this established scale to explore the reasonableness of the Trait continuum 
foundation for the subsequent integration of scepticism constructs.  Specifically, the 
null expressions of the hypotheses proposed that Auditors and other participants 
would be equally biased, whether that be trust-oriented, distrust-oriented, or neutral 
(H1); and that any such biases are consistent within groups, rather than spread across 
different ranges (H2).   
 
Hypothesis 1 
Alternate 1:  Auditor/Layperson Bias 
The mean score for auditors is –0.844, indicating that Auditors are neutral on 
this scale.  In contrast, the mean Laypersons score is +7.33, which maps these 
participants as trusting.  This test result was significant (p = .001), indicating 
that there is enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that, on 
average, Auditors are less biased than Laypersons. 
 
The results of H1 testing indicate that the participants were not biased in the same 
ways.  Auditor participants were, on average, significantly less biased (µ = -.844) 
than all Layperson participants, even despite the off-setting of the moderately 
distrusting Sophisticated Layperson bias (µ = -1.212) and substantially trusting Non-
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 sophisticated Layperson bias (µ = 7.373).  This result confirms expectations that 
Laypersons would exhibit diverse (dis)trust biases across the continuum, and that 
Auditors would exhibit a more neutral position.  Indeed, the mean Auditor score 
diverges only 1.6% (µ = -.844/52, where 52 represents the possible Trust Scale 
scoring range of -26 to +26) from the point of greatest Neutrality, which is consistent 
with the ethical requirement for Auditors to be objective (APESB, 2013).  
 
Alternate 2:  Auditor/QFI Bias 
The mean score for auditors is –0.844, indicating that Auditors are neutral on 
this scale.  In contrast, the mean QFI score is +2.854, indicating a moderate 
trust bias (d = 0.465).  The results of this test were significant (p = .002), 
indicating that there is enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis 
that, on average, Auditors are less biased than QFIs.   
 
Auditors were also, on average, significantly less biased than QFIs.  This is 
consistent with the expectation of Auditor objectivity, as above, and it is consistent 
with the expectation that QFIs would exhibit a higher level of pre-emptive bias.  
However, it is noted that the QFI bias is in the opposite direction to expectations.  
Rather than indicating a small bias toward distrust, consistent with QFIs’ workplace 
predication that fraud has been committed, collating evidence to support prosecution, 
the mean QFI scores for this sample are in the low trust section of the continuum.  
This result was surprising, but it may be that such trust is off-set by skills which 
increase scepticism.  This possibility is addressed in Hypothesis 4, below. 
 
Recognising that the comparison of means does not address the breadth, or 
inconsistency, of scores within a possibly broad range, Hypothesis 2 compared the 
standard deviations of group bias scores to test whether the range of Auditor biases 
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 was relatively consistent.  Specifically, the null expression of the hypothesis 
proposed that Auditor Bias would be no different to that of other groups. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Alternate 1:  Auditor/NSL ranges 
This test provides evidence in support of H2 Alternate 1 that Auditor Bias (M 
= -.844, SD = 7.9600) is more consistent than Non-sophisticated Layperson 
Bias (M = 7.373, SD = 11.2272). 
 
The results of this test were significant (p < .001), providing evidence that 
Auditors have a narrower range of biases than NSLs, around significantly 
different means, and therefore these groups have very different Bias profiles 
underlying Traits across different ranges of the Trait continuum.   
 
The results of this test indicated that Auditor biases span a significantly narrower 
range than those of NSL.  Whilst the overall ranges of scores in each group are 
similar, the majority of Auditor participants’ scores cluster tightly around the 
objective mean.  In contrast, the NSL biases span a broad range of the belief-
cynicism continuum.   
 
The data indicated strong similarities between the ranges of Auditor and QFI biases 
though, with no significant difference observed. 
 
Alternate 2:  Auditor/QFI ranges 
This test does not provide evidence in support of H2 Alternate 2 that Auditor 
Bias (M = -.844, SD = 7.9600) is more consistent than QFI Bias (M = 2.854, 
SD = 5.9982). 
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 Although the shapes and ranges of scores are similar, the significantly 
different means (p = .018), suggest that the Bias profiles of these two groups 
occupy different ranges of the Trait continuum.   
 
The results for this Alternate mean that Auditors have Neutral Traits, whilst 
QFIs have trusting Traits, but there is not enough evidence to reject the Null 
hypothesis because both groups’ scores are equally consistent. 
 
The results of the Hypothesis 2 test are consistent with the expectations in the Model. 
Overall, the testing of biases, between groups, has contributed to the continuum 
aspect of the research Model, by confirming diversity of attitudes across the 
horizontal axis.   
 
With Bias testing complete, the Wrightsman Trust Scale items were reintegrated into 
the Scepticism Survey inventory, contributing to the main Skill and Trait factors for 
the remainder of the hypothesis testing. 
 
6.2.2  Skills  
Hypothesis 3 addresses skill, utilised by Auditors when exercising professional 
scepticism and “critically evaluating the evidence” (AUASB, 2013b) to decrease 
ambiguity and increase confidence in judgments.  This hypothesis explores for 
‘professional’ skill, distinguishable from that which may be exercised by Non-
sophisticated Laypersons in particular.  For this purpose, the null expression of the 
hypothesis proposed that Auditors and other participants would be equally skilled, 
and the Skill factor items were extracted from the data for analysis. 
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 Hypothesis 3 
Alternate 1:  Auditor/NSL Skill 
This test provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal Skill, but 
there is not enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that, on 
average, Auditors are more skilled than Non-sophisticated Laypersons 
because the difference was the other way around.  This test revealed 
significant difference between these groups, but the direction of difference 
was the opposite of expectations.  That is, that NSLs’ Skill was, on average, 
significantly (p = .018) higher than Auditor Skill. 
 
It was expected that Auditors would exhibit greater skill than Non-sophisticated 
Laypersons, who were assumed to include many participants with no specialist 
training or experience to provoke such skill development.  The results indicated a 
significant difference between the Skill of Auditors and NSLs, however that 
difference was the opposite to expected in that NSLs had greater Skill.  In fact, NSLs 
had the highest mean Skill score (.813259) of all participant groups.   
 
The reason for this is not clear from the data:  It is possible that the result is related to 
sampling, but it may also reflect that Laypersons, without access to the resources 
available to Auditors (regulations, Standards, methods) which support critical 
evaluation, may independently develop more overt Skill systems to compensate for 
perceived insufficiency of information.  Alternately, it may be that the types of Skill 
exhibited by Laypersons are more effectively captured by the research instrument 
than those exhibited by Auditors.  This may be a consequence of utilising a generic 
scale to measure both generic and specialist skill sets, which may be clarified by 
further research.  This apparently counter-intuitive finding is, however, reflective of 
a finding by Khan & Harding (2013, p.1) that:  
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 Rather than being positively associated with state skepticism, trait skepticism 
was negatively associated with the level of skepticism reflected in evidence 
evaluation and the judgments made in light of that evidence. That is, higher 
levels of trait skepticism were associated with lower levels of state skepticism. 
 
This result was also opposite to expectations, but the interactions between Trait 
scepticism and evidence evaluation may involve a trade-off adjustment wherein a 
misguided high trait factor inadvertently creates low-scepticism judgments (Khan & 
Harding, 2013).  In the case of this particular hypothesis, it is also possible that high 
level skills are necessary to offset the low Trait scores, which span across almost the 
entire continuum, with the minimum (7%) significantly lower than the next low 
group minimum (39%).   
 
Alternate 2:  Auditor/QFI Skill 
This test indicates there is not enough evidence to support the alternate 
hypothesis that, on average, Auditors are less skilled than QFIs. However, 
overall, the Null hypothesis is rejected by virtue of Non-sophisticated 
Laypersons being more skilled than Auditors in the first Alternate. 
 
The second alternate hypothesis predicted that Auditors would exhibit relatively 
lesser skill than QFIs, whose work involves a standard of court-admissible evidence 
which is higher than that to achieve reasonable assurance.  Therefore QFIs were 
expected to exhibit the highest level of skill.  However, the results of this test were 
not significant, and did not provide evidence that the skills of Auditors and QFIs are 
statistically different.  One possible reason for this could be that Auditors and QFIs 
share a similar skill set for the purpose of evaluating evidence. 
 
Overall, testing of the Skill hypotheses has contributed to the research Model by 
offering support for the notion of a variable Skill factor, however at this stage it is 
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 not clear how this factor is to be understood, because the results were different to 
expectations.   
 
6.2.3  Scepticism Levels 
Hypothesis 4 is the first step in addressing the notion of scepticism levels.  
Specifically, this hypothesis explores whether the Scepticism scores for each group 
cluster into distinguishable ranges, which are different between groups.  The null 
expression of the hypothesis is, therefore, that there are no significant differences. 
 
For this purpose, the Trait and Skill factor items were combined to derive an overall 
Scepticism score for each participant.  The standard deviations of each group’s 
scores were the focus of this analysis, with smaller standard deviations representing 
tighter clustering of scores.  It was expected that QFI and Auditor groups would have 
more distinct ranges than NSLs.  Comparisons were also made between the QFI and 
Auditor ranges, and between the SL and NSL ranges. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Alternate 1:  QFI Range Differentiation 
This test provides evidence in support of Alternate 1 that QFI Scepticism (M 
= .716609, SD = .1651122) is more consistent than Non-sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (M = .604420, SD =.2860812). 
 
The first alternate hypothesis predicted that the QFI Scepticism range would be 
smaller than that of NSLs.  The results were significant and provided evidence to 
support the alternate hypothesis.  This means that a QFI range was clearly 
distinguishable from the broader NSL range. 
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 Alternate 2:  Auditor Range Differentiation 
This test provides evidence in support of Alternate 2 that Auditor Scepticism 
(M = .764550, SD = .1537364) is more consistent than Non-sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (M = .604420, SD = .2860812). 
 
The second alternate hypothesis predicted that the Auditor Scepticism range would 
be smaller than that of NSLs.  Again, the results were significant and provided 
evidence to support the alternate hypothesis, meaning that an Auditor range was 
clearly distinguishable from the broader NSL range. 
 
Alternate 3:  Differentiated QFI & Auditor Ranges 
This test provides not provide enough evidence to support Alternate 3 that 
QFI Scepticism (M = .716609, SD = .1651122) is more consistent than 
Auditor Scepticism (M = .764550, SD = .1537364). 
 
The third alternate hypothesis predicted that the QFI Scepticism range would be 
smaller than that of Auditors.  These results were not significant and did not provide 
evidence to support the alternate hypothesis.  An Auditor range was not clearly 
distinguishable from the QFI range.  Given that the QFI group was studied for the 
purpose of representing a very high level of scepticism, and that professional 
scepticism is a requirement of Auditors, this result provides evidence that the 
majority of Auditors share the same range of scepticism as the majority of QFIs.  
Such a result is a positive indicator for this research. 
 
Alternate 4:  Differentiated SL & NSL Ranges 
This test provides evidence in support of Alternate 4 that Sophisticated 
Layperson Scepticism (M =  .778846, SD = .1684470) is more consistent 
than Non-sophisticated Layperson Scepticism (M = .604420, SD =.2860812). 
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The fourth alternate hypothesis predicted that the SL Scepticism range would be 
smaller than that of NSLs.  The results were significant and provided evidence to 
support the alternate hypothesis, meaning that an SL range was clearly 
distinguishable from the broader NSL range.   
 
Overall, the tests in this section provide evidence to reject the Null that there is no 
difference between the ranges of Scepticism, when compared between groups.  The 
alternative hypotheses were supported in three cases, wherein the scepticism scores 
of QFIs, Auditors, and SLs all clustered significantly better than those of NSLs.  The 
ranking of these ranges, and the observed similarity between QFIs and Auditors, 
were explored further in testing of the final two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 5 is the second step in addressing the notion of scepticism levels.  
Specifically, this hypothesis explores whether the Scepticism scores for each group 
centre on means which are different between groups, for the purpose of defining a 
professional level of scepticism.  The null expression of the hypothesis is, therefore, 
that there are no significant differences.  The alternate hypotheses propose that, in 
turn, SL Scepticism would be greater than NSL Scepticism; Auditor Scepticism will 
be greater than SL Scepticism; and QFI Scepticism would be greater than Auditor 
Scepticism.   
 
Hypothesis 5 
Alternate 1:  SL/NSL Scepticism Averages 
This test indicates there is enough evidence to support the alternate 
hypothesis that, on average, Sophisticated Laypersons are more sceptical than 
Non-Sophisticated Laypersons. 
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 Starting with the broadest range, the first alternative compared the mean SL 
Scepticism with mean NSL Scepticism.  The results were significant and provide 
enough evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that SLs have greater 
Scepticism.  In light of the results of testing Hypothesis 4, the evidence supports a 
level of SL Scepticism which is clearly distinct from, and higher than, NSL 
scepticism. 
 
Alternate 2:  Auditor/Sophisticated Layperson Scepticism Averages 
This test revealed no significant differences between the average level of 
Auditor and SL Scepticism (p =.797), and do not provide enough evidence to 
support the alternate hypothesis that Auditor Scepticism is greater than that of 
Sophisticated Laypersons. 
 
The second alternative compared the mean Auditor Scepticism with mean SL 
Scepticism.  The results of this test revealed no significant difference between 
Auditor and SL Scepticism. Therefore different levels are not identified between 
these two groups.  It may be that this result could be different for larger sample sizes, 
but given that the SL group includes trained accountants and other professionals, and 
that the Skill and Trait scores for distrusting SLs were both very high, it may be that 
the participants in these groups are, on average, equally Sceptical. 
 
Alternate 3:  QFI/Auditor Scepticism Averages 
The results of this test do not provide enough evidence to support the 
alternate hypothesis that, on average, QFI Scepticism is greater than that of 
Auditors. 
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 The third alternative compared the mean QFI Scepticism with mean Auditor 
Scepticism.  The results revealed no significant difference between these groups, and 
therefore separate levels are not identified.   
 
Overall, these tests establish that QFIs, Auditors and SLs are more sceptical than 
NSLs, and the Null hypothesis is rejected.  Further, the results of testing Hypothesis 
4 revealed that the scepticism scores of QFIs, Auditors, and SLs all clustered 
significantly better than those of NSLs.  This means that there are at least two 
distinct levels of scepticism identified by the statistical testing, and that the lower 
level pertains to the NSL group, as expected.   
 
It was possible that testing of larger QFI, Auditor and SL samples would reveal more 
substantial differences between these groups, and that alternative testing methods 
may be more informative.  Indeed, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test identified that 
the scores clustered similarly between the 25th and 75th percentiles, but did not 
address the extremities of the samples. 
 
This situation was explored further by deriving a benchmark of professional 
scepticism from the raw QFI Scepticism scores.   The method for that procedure was 
explained in Chapter 4: Method, in section 4.8.3  Testing of Hypotheses.   All 
participants scores can be compared with that benchmark to determine the 
proportions of each group that are equal to, or greater than, the benchmark, 
indicating scepticism within the professional range.  This is addressed in the 
following section.  
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 6.3  RQ2:  Do auditors exhibit professional scepticism? 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that Auditor Scepticism would be equal to, or greater than, 
78.2%, which is the lower boundary of professional scepticism as defined in section 
4.8.3.  The second range identified in testing of Hypothesis 5 was split at the fiftieth 
percentile, recognising that point at which judgments are balanced between evidence 
consideration and subjective bias.  This split resulted in a mid-range, spanning the 
difference between the fiftieth percentile and the professional scepticism benchmark, 
and encompassing judgments which are, on balance, more evidence based than 
subjective, but does not involve evidence to the extent of professional scepticism.  
The range below fifty percent was considered to be the subjective range, 
encompassing those judgments which are based more upon subjectivity than 
evidence evaluation. 
 
Auditor Scepticism scores which met the benchmark were counted, and it was found 
that 51.1% (N = 45, n = 23) fell within the professionally sceptical range.  A further 
40% were sceptical, and 6.7% exhibited indicators of subjectivity.  This means that a 
slim majority of Auditors do exhibit indicators of professional scepticism. 
 
To further understand the diversity of Auditors’ Scepticism scores, they were further 
analysed to search for correlations with the Trait and Skill sub-scores, and with the 
(dis)trust nature of their Trait biases.  Each of the results was quite different.   
 
For Auditors in the professional scepticism range, a weak negative correlation was 
observed, between Trait and Skill.  This is consistent with the findings from 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 which found that Trait was more influential than Skill in trusting 
Auditors, but there was no difference in distrusting Auditors.  In both cases though, 
the Trait and Skill scores were high, and it was suggested that the relative weightings 
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 of Trait and Skill may not be important when both are high. Two Auditors, however, 
achieved perfect Scepticism scores by achieving perfect Trait and Skill scores.  This 
suggests that 4% (2/45) of Auditor participants might present an inefficiency risk in 
the workplace, and that percentage may increase if other high-performing Auditors 
utilise greater scepticism than is warranted by the circumstances.  
 
For Auditors in the sceptical range, there were three correlations.  A strong positive 
correlation between Scepticism and Trait means that, for these Auditors, Scepticism 
is largely driven by their Trait positions.  In addition, a quite strong negative 
correlation between Scepticism and Bias means that the Auditors at the top of this 
range are less biased than those at the lower end of the range.  Finally, a weak but 
significant negative correlation between Trait and Bias corroborates that the 
dominant Trait factor is not compromised by bias at the top of the sceptical range.  
Auditor attitudes in this range may increase Audit Risk if they are not able to utilise 
sufficient scepticism to suit workplace circumstances.  This risk would increase 
toward the lower end of the scepticism range. 
 
For Auditors in the subjective range, there were two perfect negative correlations: 
Firstly, the relationship between Scepticism and Bias means that the least sceptical 
Auditors are also those who are the most biased.  However, only three Auditors 
scored in this range, and they were all above 45%.  Although the testing of 
Hypothesis 1 revealed that Auditors are, on average, the least biased of the 
participants in this study, the Auditors in this range exhibited low levels of Skill (> 
50%) and Traits influenced by strong trust biases, which is corroborated by a perfect 
negative correlation between Traits and Skills. Auditor attitudes in this range 
increase Audit Risk enormously due to judgments that are more subjective than 
evidence based.  Such judgments are also clearly inconsistent with the requirements 
in the Auditing Standards. 
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To complete testing, all the remaining participants’ Scepticism scores were then 
allocated to the ranges, and it was revealed that the challenge of attempting to 
distinguish an exemplary QFI level of scepticism during testing of Hypothesis 5 
arose because only 39% of QFIs exhibit indicators of professional scepticism.  This 
is a reflection of the method used to derive the benchmark, which was calculated 
using raw Scepticism scores before they were converted to percentages for analysis. 
This means that the benchmark was not compromised by where QFI Scepticism 
clustered on the scale, and therefore it appropriately accommodated the fact that no 
QFIs had perfect Scepticism scores.  
 
In the meantime, it was noted that approximately half of NSL participants are more 
subjective than sceptical, which is consistent with the expectations of this analysis 
and the research Model.  To simplify comparison between groups, the following 
table depicts the proportions of all four groups’ scores that sit within the three ranges 
of scepticism, as determined by the Professional Scepticism scale used in this study. 
 
Table 6.1    Overview of Scepticism Range Results 
 Subjective Range Sceptical Range 
Professional 
Scepticism 
Range 
Group 1 – QFIs 
n = 41 
12.2%  (5) 48.8%  (20) 39.0%  (16) 
Group 2 – Auditors 
n = 45 
6.7%  (3) 42.2%  (19) 51.1%  (23) 
Group 3 – SLs 
n = 52 
0%  (0) 44.2%  (23) 55.8%  (29) 
Group 4 – NSLs 
n = 153 
49%  (75) 15.0%  (23) 35.9%  (55) 
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6.4   Summary  
The findings of this research are generally consistent with expectations in that all 
Null hypotheses were rejected by at least one of the Alternate tests.  However, the 
results did not provide enough evidence to support the Alternates in all these cases.  
Specifically, both Alternate tests of Hypothesis 3 returned one-tailed results which 
were in the opposite direction to expectations.  This could be an implication arising 
from small sample sizes, or it is possibly a realistic result that could be clarified by 
further research into the roles of scepticism Traits and Skills. 
 
The results are promising in that, if the scale can be developed into a reliable means 
of measuring scepticism, auditors, audit firms and educators may be empowered to 
leverage the inherent Trait position with training which is targeted to individuals’ 
needs.  Further, such a development introduces scope for academic research into the 
potential of targeted training to improve scepticism states, as and when required, for 
the purpose of reducing audit risk, and potential auditor liability arising from audit 
failure. 
 
The findings also reveal that further research of the Trait and Skill roles may be of 
value to further the understanding of scepticism; its underlying Trait platform, and 
the potential influences of Skill development and utilisation to achieve a greater 
overall sceptical state.   
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions  
7.1  Introduction 
All auditors are specifically required by audit regulation to exercise ‘professional 
scepticism’ throughout the external audit process (AUASB, 2013b).  However, 
according to Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson (2001), lack of professional 
scepticism is one of the most common audit deficiencies, along with lack of due care 
and failure to collate sufficient evidence of sufficient quality.  These problems are 
arguably interrelated, as this research has attempted to demonstrate.    
 
Review of the literature revealed a growing body of professional and academic 
papers describe a need to improve professional scepticism.  This indicates that 
scepticism, as a concept, is a continuum. To understand the nature and extent of 
improvement required it is necessary to first understand what auditors’ professional 
scepticism currently looks like.  Scepticism involves “ongoing questioning” 
(AUASB, 2013a, para. A7), and provides additional guidance material that describes 
acts which constitute increased professional scepticism (AUASB, 2013a, para. A33).  
However, the guidance materials are consistently qualified by need to exercise 
judgement in determining what an appropriate level of scepticism is (AUASB, 
2013a, paras A7-A9), with terms such as “where relevant” (AUASB, 2013a, para. 
A7).  The standard implies that there are levels of scepticism which can be applied.    
There is also no currently available means of measuring professional scepticism for 
the purpose of identifying or quantifying any need for improvement.  The purpose of 
this research was to address that measurement gap.   
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 This chapter begins by reviewing the study’s aims and stating the conclusions 
derived from the research.  The contributions to knowledge are then outlined, and the 
implications for education and the profession are discussed. Limitations of this 
research are then acknowledged, and opportunities for further research are suggested. 
 
7.2  Review of the study 
7.2.1  Aims of the research 
My primary objective is to explore whether or not auditors exhibit indicators of 
professional scepticism.  Measuring this may be helpful in establishing how much 
improvement is necessary for the purposes of complying with the Auditing 
Standards.  Therefore, not only is measuring levels of scepticism important, there is a 
need to develop a suitable standard for the level of scepticism.  Therefore, the goals 
of this research were to address the following two overarching research questions: 
 
RQ 1:  Do auditors and other groups exhibit different levels of scepticism? 
and 
RQ 2:  Do auditors exhibit professional scepticism? 
 
In order to achieve these goals, it was first necessary to explore how professional 
scepticism might be differentiated from a non-professional, or lay, form of 
scepticism, and to then determine means of applying such differentiation in a way 
that would enable measurement of individuals’ scepticism attitudes.  The method 
most appropriate to this involved use of Attitude scales. 
 
It is possible to convert results from the Hurtt (2009, 2010) Scale to percentages, 
which would allow a benchmark standard (upper quartile or other measure) which 
could therefore be compared to a benchmark for this purpose.  However, that scale 
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 accommodates only the Trait factor (Hurtt, 2009).  It was therefore decided that an 
approach which extends the work of Hurtt (2010, 2013), which in turn draws upon 
Nelson’s (2009) concept of Neutrality, could involve measurement that also 
encompassed the continuum concept, following the work of  Glover & Prawitt 
(2014).   
 
Therefore, a new scale was explored, by combining three existing sub-scales, which 
potentially applied to the continuum by measuring attitudes related to the notions of 
trust (Wrightsman’s Trust Scale, 1991), ambiguity (Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale, 
Budman, 1962) and curiosity (The Curiosity and Exploration Inventory-II, Kashdan 
et al, 2009).  Wrightsman’s Trust scale was preferred to Hurtt’s scale because 
Wrightsman’s is a bilateral scale, encompassing trust and distrust, and matched the 
structure of Glover & Prawitt’s (2014) continuum.  The use of a bilateral scale would 
allow the mid-point to be neutral; a balance of distrust and trust.  It has also been 
used in prior audit studies (EG: Rose, Rose & Dibben, 2010).  It was proposed that 
the Intolerance of Ambiguity and Curiosity scales may capture the Skill factor as it 
pertains to questioning and critical analysis of audit evidence.   
 
Analysis of the data suggested that a combination of the Trust and Intolerance of 
Ambiguity scales would measure Trait and Skill, and a new 17-item inventory was 
derived, with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .910 and two confirmed factors which explain 
62.638% of the variances.   
 
Extending the existing notion of levels of scepticism (Harding & Trotman, 2015; 
Glover & Prawitt, 2014; Westermann et al, 2014; Hurtt, 2013), benchmarks were 
then determined.  The benchmark setting the lower boundary of professional 
scepticism was derived from data belonging to Qualified Fraud Investigators (QFIs).  
This group was chosen to set the benchmark because of the very high quality of 
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 evidence required for prosecution of fraud cases, and because fraud-related 
investigation necessitates high-level analytical skills due to the deceptive and hidden 
nature of the evidence, exemplifying evidence-based judgment.  The benchmark 
separating the lay scepticism range from the subjective range was set at the mid-
score of 50%, recognising a point of balance between subjective attitudes and those 
which begin to accommodate more evidence than subjectivity. 
 
Audit participants’ scores, derived from the new Scepticism Scale instrument, were 
then compared with the benchmarks to observe whether a professional level of 
scepticism was indicated. 
 
Overall, the aims of the research were achieved, in that a professional level of 
scepticism was derivable from the data for the purposes of this study; and it was 
therefore possible to answer the question of whether auditors in the study exhibited 
indicators of professional scepticism as measured by this research. 
 
7.2.2  Conclusions Derived from Hypothesis Testing 
The results of testing hypotheses in relation to Research Question 1 indicate that 
some groups of people do exhibit levels of scepticism which differ from other 
groups.  The data suggests that formal accounting education may be a driver of the 
differences observed in this research, because although Auditors do exhibit a 
different level of scepticism to Non-sophisticated Laypersons, the Auditors and other 
sophisticated users of accounting information share similar overall scepticism level 
characteristics.   
 
In terms of Research Question 2, the research found that 51.1% of the Auditors in 
this study did exhibit indicators of professional scepticism.  A further 40% were 
sceptical, and 6.7% appeared to have more subjective than evidence-based attitudes 
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 to judgment. However, whilst the proportion of professionally sceptical auditors 
appears lower than may be expected, it is important to recognise that this scale 
measures scepticism in terms of a default attitude, or a base-line, meaning that scores 
may increase substantially in response to perceived risk (Brown-Liburd, Cohen & 
Trompeter, 2013; Quadackers et al, 2009), and in response to prompts (Khan & 
Harding, 2013; Grenier, 2014).  In this sense, the Scepticism Scale utilised in this 
study measures only a minimum level of scepticism for each participant, and actual 
capacity may be far greater than the current data indicates.  This presents an 
opportunity for future experimental research in an audit-specific context, measuring 
the incremental changes achievable by introducing workplace-relevant cues to 
heighten scepticism.  
 
Exploration of the Trait and Skill sub-scale attributes of participants in each of these 
levels revealed clear differences.  Whilst Trait appeared to be very influential at all 
levels, the professionally sceptical auditors were not significantly biased, and Skills 
were consistently high for these participants.  Whilst it is possible that some Auditors 
who score in this range may be considered inefficient when risk is low, they are 
unlikely to need external prompts to increase scepticism when necessary, which is 
conducive to lowering Audit Risk.  As the risk of issuing an inappropriate opinion is 
of greater consequence than inefficiency, the extremely high scores achieved by 
some auditors may be valued in the workplace. 
 
In contrast, Auditors in the (mid) sceptical range were strongly influenced by their 
trait factor, and biases became very influential toward the lower end of the range.  
There was a negative correlation between Trait and Skill, but the relationship was not 
significant, indicating that skills may be able to counteract low-scepticism traits in 
this range.  This pattern is similar to non-sophisticated layperson who exhibited 
trusting characteristics.  This means that auditors who scored in this range may have 
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 difficulty utilising skills to increase scepticism in response to risk or external 
prompts in the workplace, which may increase audit risk.  A large proportion of this 
study’s auditor participants scored in this range, suggesting that skill development 
activities may be important; particularly for those with trust-related biases which 
need to be offset. 
 
The major themes to emerge from these findings are that scepticism-related Traits 
and Skills behave differently in individuals with different levels of overall 
Scepticism, and that biases do not appear to present a barrier to Skill development. 
 
7.3  Contributions to Knowledge 
Professional scepticism is one of the most important auditing constructs (Hurtt 2010; 
Hurtt et al. 2013; Cohen et al, 2014).  This study’s approach represents a 
development of expanding awareness of the issues involved.  It is expected to 
contribute knowledge to audit research in terms of initiating methodology debate, 
and enabling more specific future research of this elusive, but important, subject 
matter. 
 
In the following sub-sections, two main contributions are described.  
 
7.3.1  A Composite Model of Professional Scepticism 
This model draws together concepts in the extant literature to explore the interactions 
between core antecedents to professional scepticism.  Seminal influences include 
Hurtt’s (2010) measurement of the Trait factor, Grenier’s (2014) discussion of 
experiences and overconfidence that present barriers to scepticism, Nelson’s (2009) 
concept of Neutrality, and the Trait continuum presented by Glover & Prawitt 
(2014). 
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Prior research acknowledges that a professionally sceptical state is distinguishable 
from a default scepticism mindframe, as indicated by measurement of Auditors’ 
inherent scepticism trait (Castro, 2013) and acknowledgment that other factors may 
influence how scepticism manifests (Nelson, 2009) in varying circumstances.  This 
research combines the above concepts to describe the interaction of scepticism-
related Trait with Skills to measure a default state of scepticism, which may be 
incremented by developing or initiating use of skills for the purpose of achieving a 
heightened level of scepticism in response to assessed risk or prompts.  
 
The model prepared during this research extends the work of Hurtt (2010, 2013), 
draws upon Nelson’s (2009) concepts of Neutrality and trade-offs between 
scepticism antecedents.  It also develops the continuum concept, introduced to study 
of scepticism by Glover & Prawitt (2014), and extends the work of Hurtt (2010) by 
accommodating the Skill factor, as a means of explaining the difference between a 
scepticism Trait and an overall scepticism state.  This research proposes that whilst 
the Trait factor relates to the “enquiring mind” aspect of the International Auditing 
Standard definition of professional scepticism (PCAOB, 2012b; AUASB, 2013b), 
the Skill factor is an essential complement, relating to the “critical evaluation of the 
evidence” aspect in that same definition. 
 
During the course of this research, Cohen et al (2014) published a study with a 
similar approach in that they measured levels of scepticism, and combined their 
neutral measure of scepticism with a presumptive doubt measure of scepticism.  The 
approach is consistent with this study in that the authors categorise their auditor 
participants in to groups according to their scepticism scores before exploring for 
overall trait characteristics.  Cohen et al’s (2014) work also built upon Nelson’s 
(2009) model and the work of Hurtt et al (2013) categorize the antecedents to 
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 scepticism, and is consistent in that these antecedents were categorised as two 
internal characteristics (Trait and Skill) plus two categories of external factors which 
represented risk, or prompts.   
 
Interestingly, Cohen et al (2014) use both the Hurtt Scale (2010) to measure a neutral 
perspective of professional scepticism, and the Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991) to 
measure a presumptive doubt perspective.  A negative correlation between the two 
was anticipated, but there was no significant correlation.  My research model may 
complement Cohen’s (2014) results by explaining that when Wrightsman’s (1991) 
bilateral scoring method is adapted to accommodate a neutral mid-point, it is able to 
accommodate both presumptive doubt (low negative scores on the distrust side of the 
continuum) and neutrality (scores at or close to zero on either side of the continuum). 
 
7.3.2  Professional Scepticism Scale 
The Scepticism Scale devised during the course of this research is presented as a 
stand-alone instrument which may progress understanding of auditor scepticism and 
may provoke discussion by academics, regulators and the profession.  Whilst prior 
studies have measured auditor scepticism relative to other auditors, the literature 
does not reveal prior application of discrete scoring systems to auditor scepticism; or 
comparison of such a measure with a ‘professional’ level of scepticism. 
 
This scale potentially offers two contributions to knowledge of professional 
scepticism:  Firstly, quantification of the factor sub-scales and overall scepticism 
scores should facilitate research into the relationships between these factors, to 
further develop our understanding of the antecedents of professional scepticism.  
Secondly, quantification should facilitate comparison between research projects 
which use the composite scale and its scoring method.  This second contribution is 
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 my major contribution, and is offered as a platform to launch debate and 
development. 
 
7.4  Implications of the study 
7.4.1 Implications for Research 
The Scepticism Scale arising from this study may be a helpful tool for exploration of 
means by which scepticism can be improved.  Previous studies identify barriers to 
professional scepticism, and others identify prompts which facilitate it.  My scale 
may provide means of simplifying research which entails measuring the effects of 
barriers and facilitators.  For example, capacity to isolate and quantify changes in 
skill may enable ranking of facilitators to match those which are most appropriate to 
certain circumstances; such as when a participant’s results indicate a high scepticism 
Trait but low Skill, versus moderate scepticism Trait and moderate Skill.   
 
Examples of types of facilitators which might involve long-term effects, and thus 
influence the Trait factor, include Gilovich’s (1991) suggestion that instruction in, 
and experience with, scientific method increases scepticism skill, and Rose’s (2007) 
finding that fraud-related experiences are helpful for improving fraud detection 
capability.  In contrast, other facilitators might involve shorter-term effects, and thus 
influence the Skills factor.  These include external prompts which cue activation of 
scepticism skills and internal prompts to recognise context-specific risks.   
 
Further, the scale may provide a consistent means to measure the effects of differing 
remedies under experiment conditions, with the quantifiable results easing the 
problems associated with using different participant cohorts, or testing the different 
remedies at separate times.   
 
199 
 7.4.2  Implications for the Profession 
The Scepticism Scale includes capacity to indicate the nature of improvements which 
are best matched to the needs of specific individuals.  This capacity is not, of itself, 
an original contribution derived from this research.  However, this study applied the 
Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991) in a novel way, which contributes further to address 
the measurement gap between the Auditing Standards and calls for improved 
professional scepticism. 
 
That is, individuals’ results from the Wrightsman Trust Scale (1991) items, extracted 
from the Professional Scepticism Scale, have been used to indicate the nature of the 
underlying scepticism Traits, in terms of whether they are trusting, distrusting, or 
neutral, represented by the symbols +, - or 0 respectively.  A degree of bias (in the 
range 0 – 2616) is also available.  For the purposes of this study, this was referred to 
as the Bias indicator.  If an individual’s overall Scepticism is not in the 
professionally sceptical range, the Bias indicator may be useful to guide choices of 
training or professional development activity types which are most relevant to the 
nature and extent of the Bias.   
 
Hurtt et al (2013) note that some research has called for audit firms to screen 
(prospective) audit staff for scepticism qualities (for example, Farag and Elias 2012, 
in Hurtt et al 2013).  This research cautions against such testing because no 
measurement tool has, as yet, been established as a universally reliable mechanism 
for measuring auditors’ professional scepticism, with reiterative validity, and 
accommodating all factors of professional scepticism.  Therefore, it is potentially 
very problematic if scepticism measurement tools were used as a pre-employment 
evaluation of vocational fit. 
16 Scoring method adapted from a 7-point to a 5-point likert scale, with a neutral centre point, and a revised 
possible scoring range of +/- 26. 
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However, as there is potential for scepticism skills to be learned and counteract the 
effects of sub-optimal trait scepticism, as shown in this research, it may be possible 
for the Scale to be utilised by audit firms to assess the training needs of staff in terms 
of skill needs.  Where relevant, additional training could be offered to those with 
lower Trait and/or Skill scores; however it must be noted that ongoing professional 
development is still necessary for all staff, because all skills require maintenance 
(Bandura, 1993) lest they be gradually lost over time to counter-productive clean-
audit experiences and/or myriad other barriers.  It must also be remembered that firm 
culture, processes and supervision arrangements have been shown to influence the 
manifestation of scepticism (Hurtt et al, 2013; Svanström, 2015; Nelson 2009; 
PCAOB 2012a; Hurtt et al. 2013; Westermann et al, 2014; Vera-Muñoz, 2015), and 
therefore firms must remain cognisant of the impact that their workplaces may have 
on auditors’ professional scepticism in practice, and in differing circumstances. 
 
7.5  Limitations  
7.5.1  Scope – Purpose of the Scepticism Scale 
It is important to recognise that the purpose of the Scepticism Scale derived for the 
purpose of this research was to measure an indication of participants’ default 
scepticism mindframe.  That is, to obtain a picture of attitudes which are the default 
mindframe in the absence of any risk cues or external prompts which cause an 
individual auditor to utilise skills to achieve a heightened sceptical state (Castro, 
2013).   As no such cues or prompts were included in the survey instrument, the 
scores derived from this research reflect the minimum scepticism for each participant 
at the time of participating in the research.   Therefore the scores derived from the 
instrument must not be assumed to represent a participant’s maximum capacity.  It is 
possible that individuals who score in the (moderate) scepticism range may be able to 
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 respond to prompts in the workplace which increase their overall scepticism to high 
in the professional scepticism range.  Such a possibility provides scope for further 
research, as described below. 
 
Conversely, a high scepticism score could also be misinterpreted.  On the one hand, 
it may be seen as positive, meaning likely to be highly sceptical throughout every 
audit, thus complying with the regulatory requirement and lowering Audit Risk.   It 
may also be viewed as negative, meaning a tendency to inefficiently over-audit 
(Hurtt et al, 2013) at all times, rather than in response to assessed risk.   
 
From the opposite perspective, it is not expected that those who are highly sceptical 
in specific workplace contexts would transfer sceptical attitudes to social and other 
supportive contexts, such as participation in research projects, which involve lower 
risk and demand less rigorous reasoning.  Further, trust is a positive characteristic in 
supportive social engagement, and can even be beneficial in audit firms (Rose, Rose 
& Dibben, 2010) so it is possible that the trust biases exhibited in the context of data 
collection for this research may be reflective of the low-risk context.  It is possible 
that the trust effects in this study could be reduced in an audit context, and especially 
risky audit contexts, at least to the extent that the Trait position would allow. 
 
This means that the Scepticism Scale does not provide a measure of scepticism as it 
applies to any audit context, and therefore it is not appropriate for use as an indicator 
of vocational fit or potential.  Cohen et al (2014, p.5) further emphasise that auditors 
in their study with the greatest scepticism were not the best hires in terms of job fit, 
loyalty and retention, underlining that further research is necessary before such an 
application should be considered. 
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 7.5.2  Scope – Sampling 
The results of this research must be read with the caveat that the results are limited to 
the participants of this study and cannot be extrapolated to the broader population.  
Further research, involving a much larger sample, is warranted to improve the 
generalisability of the findings. 
 
7.5.3  Instrument Development 
Compilation of a psychometric tool was not an original goal of this research: Rather, 
need to do so arose from the specific requirements of the research question, which 
demanded not only that a ‘professional’ level of scepticism be specified, but that 
scepticism be measured.  As no appropriate tool was found to exist for that purpose, 
the tool was constructed.  Although the instrument is found to possess high internal 
validity and the two dimensions sought, further development of the scale, and a much 
larger sample size, is necessary to account for errors in projection. 
 
Whilst it was possible to identify item response models that would accommodate 
non-normally distributed data, it was more challenging to identify a model that 
would also accommodate data that is not unidimensional (Preston & Reise, 2013).  
Preston and Reise (2013) recommend use of procedures to reduce the error 
consequences of ignoring non-normality, exacerbated by skewed distributions and 
small sample sizes.  Such analysis requires a level of statistical and psychometric 
expertise that is beyond the scope of this particular study.  However, suggestions for 
future research to improve generalisability and simplified application are included in 
the Future Research Opportunities section of this chapter. 
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 7.6  Future Research Opportunities  
Several opportunities for future research arise from this study, mostly in the field of 
scale development.  Some of those ideas are listed below. 
 
7.6.1  Further scale development 
Further development of the scale would simplify future application for research or 
training purposes.  When the number of participants who complete the Professional 
Scepticism survey increase substantially, the database may eventually become more 
reflective of the average English speaking adult population, allowing for statistical 
refinement.  However, the distinct differences in shapes of the Skill distributions 
between the professional and non-sophisticated participant groups are not expected 
to converge or to normalise because professional participants’ are required to have 
high level skills.  Further, given the social favour afforded to trust-oriented Traits, 
the overall Trait distribution is not expected to normalise.   
 
Standardisation of variables may elucidate differences between sophisticated and 
non-sophisticated participant groups and provide for a more generalisable method of 
utilising the scale.  In particular, standardisation of the sub-test scores for each 
dimension may increase understanding of the two identified factors by facilitating 
comparison, per respondent, between sub-tests. 
 
In addition, it could be useful to apply Item Response Theory to the polytomous 
response data to achieve a greater understanding of latent traits underlying 
individuals’ scepticism scores (Templin, 2007).  By applying Samejima’s (1969) 
Graded Response Model to subjects’ scepticism and bias scores (Templin, 2007), we 
may further understand the relationship between the trait and skill aspects of 
professional scepticism. 
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Finally, Peytcheva (2014) and Quadackers et al (2014) suggest that it may be 
possible to determine whether an instrument reflects an optimal level of scepticism 
by comparing results of an experiment with a normative solution, and evaluating 
outcomes in light of participants’ scepticisms scores.  To that end, after further 
development, this scale might be tested, and the results compared with Peytcheva’s 
(2014) findings. 
 
These developments may facilitate scoring of individual subjects, by educators and 
trainers for example, who could compare subjects’ standardised total and sub-scores 
with representative base means and standard deviations, without need to administer 
the instrument to large numbers of subjects in future studies. 
 
7.6.2  Audit-Specific Trait & Skill Interactions 
Peytcheva (2014) highlighted that more must be understood about the relative 
importance of trait versus state scepticism when constructing an overall measure of 
scepticism.   
 
Future studies which explore the underlying constructs that underlie the trait and skill 
factors of scepticism may shed light on how skills work to achieve a heightened 
sceptical state.  Introduction of constructs such as conscientiousness (and other 
situational variables), and subsequent evaluation of the scale using Item Response 
Theory may reveal how the Scale may be useful in different audit scenarios.  If so, 
situational differences may be included in the instrument, and the measures must be 
evaluated independently, perhaps against prior studies, and in the context of each 
other. 
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 Appendix 1:  Fraud Schemes 
 
 
SOURCE:  ACFE, 2014a:11 
 
 
NB:  Theft might be recognised and reported in financial statements as shrinkage, for 
example.  Unrecognised schemes may result in unintentional misstatements or, 
where a perpetrator has covered up his/her crime by altering records, as 
fraudulent misstatements. 
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Author(s) Date Proposition(s) Method Data Source Results 
Backof, Thayer 
& Carpenter 
2014 Explore influences of textual 
v graph format client 
evidence on PS. 
A 2 x 3 between-
participants experiment, 
manipulating two 
variables in a 
hypothetical audit case. 
154 audit managers and 
partners from one Big 4 
firm. 
Prompts to consider client methods 
increases PS, particularly when 
evidence is in graph format. 
Brazel, 
Jackson, Rech 
& Stewart 
2013 Explores the potential effects 
of hindsight bias in audit 
supervisors evaluations of 
auditor scepticism. 
2 x 2 between-
participants experiment, 
involving a hypothetical 
audit case and a study-
specific survey. 
76 senior auditors from 
an international firm, 
averaging 45 months' 
experience. 
Results indicate that hindsight bias 
on the part of reviewers is known to 
auditors and creates a barrier to 
auditor scepticism.  Clients also 
under-rate PS if no misstatement is 
identified. 
Brown-Liburd, 
Cohen & 
Trompeter 
2013 Explores whether auditors 
are influenced by clients' 
forecast achievement and 
heightened PS in the post-
SOX environment. 
Experiment involving 
random assignment of 3 
hypothetical cases, 
manipulating earnings 
forecasts, and using 
study-specific proxies for 
PS and skeptical action. 
38 audit managers and 
partners from two Big 4 
firms, with experience in 
the hypothetical case 
activities. 
Auditors do not appear to be 
influenced by client forecast 
achievement ability.  Further, 
auditors with heightened PS are 
more ethical and conservative.  
Earnings forecast and PS were 
significantly related. 
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Carpenter & 
Reimers 
2009 Examines effects of partner 
attitude to PS, and the 
presence of fraud, on 
auditors’ identification of 
fraud risk factors, fraud risk 
assessments, and selection of 
audit procedures. 
Experiment, manipulating 
partner emphasis and 
fraud risk indicators in a 
hypothetical auditing 
task.  Measures involved 
a study-specific 
questionnaire and coder 
rating of audit 
procedures. 
80 audit managers from 
Big 4 firms, average 
experience 7.93 years, 
attending several 
sessions. 
Auditors’ fraud risk assessments are 
higher when fraud is present , and 
higher with a partner who 
emphasizes PS. Audit procedure 
choice is responsive to fraud risk 
when fraud is present, but only with 
a partner who emphasizes PS. 
Castro 2013 Explores effects of 
experience on PS. 
Utilised the Hurtt (2010) 
trait scale and the Fraud 
Indicator Symptoms 
Scale (Fullerton & 
Durtschi, 2004). 
Cluster sampling via 
social media, targeting 
professional network 
groups in USA and 
Canada (n=199). 
Auditors unable to influence 
judgment to detect fraud, and 
experience does not increase PS. 
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Cohen, Dalton 
& Harp 
2014 Examines the impact of the 
Neutral and Presumptive 
Doubt perspectives of PS on 
auditors' job attitudes and 
turnover intentions. 
Scales used include 
Neutral PS (Hurtt scale, 
2010);  PD PS (inverse 
Wrightsman Trust scale, 
1991); Job fit (Lauver & 
Kristof-Brown scale, 
2001);  Professional ID 
(an existing 5-item scale); 
and Organisational Trust 
(adapted from 
Kirkpatrick & Locke, 
1996). 
287 USA auditors from 
a cross section of firms. 
Average age 47.3 years. 
The Neutral perspective is positively 
associated with low turnover, in 
contrast with the Presumptive Doubt 
perspective, which correlates with 
high turnover. 
Cuccia & 
McGill 
2000 Examines whether 
accountants' ability to 
structure a judgment task 
affects belief-adjustment 
given that evaluation order is 
a contextual factor incidental 
to the judgment task. 
Two experiments, 
involving familiar and 
unfamiliar accounting 
contexts. 
E1: 94 tax professionals 
from several offices of 
one Big 5 firm. Average 
30 years of age with 5 
years of tax experience. 
E2: 96 tax professionals 
from the same firm.  
Average 28 years of age 
with 4.2 years of 
experience. 
Recency was dependent on 
interactions between control over the 
judgment task and the decision 
context, but only when subjects had 
no context-relevant knowledge or 
experience, or were precluded from 
structuring the task. 
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Grenier 2014 Explores whether specialist 
auditors have more PS in the 
presence of prompts 
regarding evidence, or 
prompts to be self-critical. 
2 x 3 between-
participants experiment 
involving a hypothetical 
audit task with prompts. 
Uses a study-specific 
scale. Supplemental 
analyses of non-
misstatements, process 
measures, and specificity 
of fraud explanations. 
171 auditors: Specialists 
(insurance audit) and 
non-specialists (other 
auditors). 
Specialization impedes some areas 
of PS due to increased confidence 
in, and reliance upon, prior 
knowledge and ability. Non-
specialist accountants were more 
likely to consider fraud, but assigned 
it low probability. Findings offer a 
potential explanation for insufficient 
auditor scepticism. 
Harding & 
Trotman 
2015 Investigated PS in auditor 
judgments and actions 
pertaining to fraud 
brainstorming: Sceptical 
orientation and likelihood of 
fraud. 
Two studies: a 2 x 2 x 3 
design experiment 
involving a hypothetical 
audit case and 
manipulated variables. 
Measures: manipulation 
reinforcement questions, 
check questions, and the 
Hurtt (2010) Trait scale. 
E1: 88 subjects from 
USA Big 4 firms.  E2: 
34 subjects from one 
Australian Big 4 firm. 
Auditors are likely to be more 
sceptical when an assessment of low 
likelihood of fraud is attributed to 
management, rather than to the 
partner.  This supports a ‘reviewer 
perspective’ incentive rather than a 
‘partner alignment’ incentive.  An 
outward sceptical orientation 
increases PS in actions only. 
Hurtt  2010 Proposes that PS is a multi-
dimensional individual 
characteristic, which can be a 
state as well as a trait. 
Developed a 30-item 
scale to measure Trait PS. 
Final scale iteration: 200 
professional 
accountants, plus 88 for 
the re-test. 
Findings provide preliminary 
evidence about the validity of the 
scale and appropriate inter-item and 
temporal stability.   
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Khan & 
Harding 
2013 Proposed that a belief system 
determines an individual’s 
level of trait skepticism, 
which then determines state 
scepticism. 
Using covariance based 
structural equation, 
modelled the antecedents 
and consequences of trait 
scepticism.   
140 Postgraduate 
auditing students from 
an Australian university. 
Average age 24.52 
years. 
A belief system emphasising self 
direction and spirituality was 
positively associated with trait 
scepticism.  A belief system 
emphasising tradition and 
universalism negatively associated. 
Elevated trait skepticism was 
negatively associated with evidence 
evaluation and judgments in light of 
that evidence. That is, higher levels 
of trait skepticism were associated 
with lower levels of state skepticism. 
Kim & 
Trotman 
2014 Investigates the effects of 
process and outcome 
accountability in enhancing 
the level of auditors’ PS, and 
differences across experience 
levels. 
Experiment, manipulating 
outcome and process 
accountability variables. 
9 pre-experiment 
interviewees from Big 4 
accounting firms.  63 
experiment subjects: 
students (n=32) and 
assistant/senior auditors 
from Big 4 accounting 
firms (n=31). 
Auditors show greater levels of PS 
when they are required to justify 
their judgment process, rather than 
their final judgments.  Using process 
accountability, the PS of less 
experienced auditors increases 
further than that of more 
experienced auditors. 
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Luippold, Kida, 
Piercey & 
Smith 
2014 Examines whether client 
diversion of auditors’ 
attention to either fairly 
stated accounts, or accounts 
containing other errors, 
affect auditors’ ability to 
discover earnings 
management. 
2 x 2 experiment 
involving a hypothetical 
case and manipulated 
variables. 
Seventy-six auditors, 
averaging four years of 
audit experience.  
Neither experience nor 
rank significantly 
influenced results. 
Auditors’ earnings management 
detection is least effective when they 
are diverted to fairly stated accounts, 
and most effective when diverted to 
accounts containing other errors.  
Martinov-
Bennie & 
Pflugrath 
2009 Examines whether an 
accounting firm’s ethical 
environment affects auditor 
judgment, and whether the 
impacts are different at 
varying levels of audit 
expertise. 
2 x 2 between-subjects 
experiment, examining 
audit experience and 
ethical environment, 
measured via a study-
specific scale. 
Audit seniors (n=44) and 
managers (n=42) from a 
Big 4 Australian 
accounting firm. 
Results suggest that a difference in 
ethical environment will have 
greater impact for more experienced 
auditors; and greater accountability 
pressures lead to more conservative 
auditor judgments. 
McMillan & 
White 
1993 
Test influence of contextual 
frame, confirmation bias and 
professional scepticism on 
auditors' belief revisions and 
evidence searches. 
2-stage experiment, 
testing auditor 
confirmation bias and  
belief revision, using 
audit tasks. 
Auditors:  50 staff, 50 
seniors, and 66 partners 
and managers in full-
time auditing positions 
When belief revision was [self] 
measured with an absolute scale, 
auditors were more responsive to 
disconfirming evidence than to 
confirming evidence.  This was not 
true when a proportional scale was 
used. 
Peytcheva 2014 Explores effects of Trait in 
the presence of two types of 
State prompts, using a 
hypothetical Auditing task 
2x2 Experiment:  Trait 
measured by Hurtt's 
(2010) Trait Scale.   
Auditing students (n=78) 
and practising auditors 
(n=85). 
Prompts achieve no incremental 
effects on experienced auditors, but 
they are likely to assist novices. 
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Popova 2013 Examines how levels of Trait 
skepticism and hypothetical 
client experiences affect 
audit judgments. 
2 x 3 between-subjects 
experiment measuring 
trait skepticism (more vs 
less skeptical) and 
previous experiences of a 
hypothetical client 
(positive vs negative vs 
none).  Measures are 
Hurtt’s (2010) trait scale 
and a study-specific task 
scale. 
79 Auditing students, at 
undergraduate (n=53) 
and postgraduate levels 
(n=26); some with 
auditing experience 
(n=25). 
Initial auditor expectations are 
driven primarily by client 
experience, particularly for low-
Trait participants.  Expectations are 
driven by trait only when no client 
experience exists.  High-Trait 
participants are more sensitive to 
fraud evidence at the evaluation 
stage. 
Quadackers, 
Groot & 
Wright 
2009 An experiment explores 
relationships between 
interpersonal trust, 
suspension of judgment, and 
locus of control. A new scale 
to measure auditor PS was 
also introduced, and 
influence of client control 
environment on the 
relationship between 
skepticism characteristics 
and auditors’ judgments and 
decisions is also examined. 
Experiment, using a 
hypothetical audit case 
and manipulated control 
environment.  using Four 
scales: Rotter’s 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 
(1967), the Need for 
Cognitive Closure Scale 
(Webster and Kruglanski, 
1994), Rotter’s Locus of 
Control scale (1966) and 
the Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale (2007). 
376 auditors from 
offices of the Big 4 
auditing firms in the 
Netherlands.  
Participants ranged in  
experience from staff to 
partner level. 
Overall, interpersonal trust is most 
significant in predicting skeptical 
judgments and decisions, but the 
relationship between auditors’ 
characteristics, judgments and 
decisions appears to be dependent 
on the strength of the audit client’s 
control environment. 
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Quadackers, 
Groot & 
Wright 
2014 Examine the relationship 
between PS perspectives: 
Neutrality and presumptive 
doubt. 
A hypothetical audit task 
with manipulated control 
risk. Neutral PS measure: 
Hurtt (2010) Trait scale. 
Presumptive Doubt PS 
measure: Rotter 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 
(1967) inverse. 
25 partners, 41 
managers, 27 seniors, 
and 3 unclassified 
auditors from a single 
Big 4 firm, averaging 
14.75 years’ experience 
with the hypothetical 
scenario procedures.  
In the low-risk setting, the inverse 
RIT and HPSS scales equally predict 
PS.  In the high-risk setting, the 
inverse RIT is more predictive, 
indicating that presumptive doubt is 
antecedent to higher PS. 
Rasso 2015 Investigates whether use of 
instructions about audit 
evidence documentation 
promote the collection and 
high-level analysis of 
evidence. 
1 x 3 between-
participants experiment 
involving a hypothetical 
audit task and prompts to 
heighten PS. 
58 experienced auditors, 
from 6 accounting firms. 
Average experience 5.4 
years. Positions range 
from staff auditor to 
partner. 
Auditors think and act with more PS 
when using the instructions that 
promote higher-level analysis, and 
better process the collected 
evidence. However, task complexity 
could impede PS. 
Robinson, 
Curtis & 
Robertson 
2013 Measures and examines the 
trait and state components of 
PS, and their effects on 
auditors' behaviour.  Also 
assesses the effects of two 
situational factors (prompts) 
on State Skepticism. 
3-part experiment, using 
the Hurtt (2010) trait 
scale, a hypothetical 
auditing task, and an 
adaptation of the Hurtt 
scale to measure State 
PS. 
126 senior-level auditors 
from a single Big-4 firm 
(mean age  26.85 years 
and mean experience 
3.71 years) 
Positive relationships between time 
pressure and State PS, and between 
higher levels of state PS and 
skeptical behaviors, but weaker 
results for trait PS.  Results suggest 
a trait-state interaction such that 
auditors with low trait PS respond to 
high state PS with a greater increase 
in skeptical behaviors than auditors 
with high trait PS. 
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Rose, Rose & 
Dibben 
2010 Investigates the potential for 
dispositional trust to 
influence auditors' career 
advancement. 
Correlates dispositional 
trust scores with career 
positions, using the 
Wrightsman Trust Scale 
(1991). 
216 practicing auditors 
from Big 4 firms (staff, 
seniors, managers, and 
partners). 
Promotion was associated with 
higher levels of dispositional trust. 
Results indicate that trusting 
auditors are more likely to be 
promoted, but less trusting auditors 
are less likely, and may even leave 
the profession. 
Shaub & 
Lawrence 
1996 Defines and tests a model of 
PS as a function of ethics, 
experience and situation. 
Structual equation 
modellingg evaluates 
relationships. PS is 
measured via 9 high(low) 
risk situations 
156 auditors from a 
single Big 6 firm. 
Professional ethics is associated with 
higher PS than situational ethics; 
and certified accountants are more 
sceptical than uncertified.  
Independence threats reduce PS. 
Westermann, 
Cohen & 
Trompeter 
2014 Examine auditors' 
perceptions of PS and 
perceived effects of 
accountability on PS. 
Survey using both 
quantitative and 
qualitative questions   
77 auditors of varying 
experience 
Auditors believe PS is necessary but 
not enough of itself.  Quality 
accountabilities promote scepticism, 
but pressure accountabilities weaken 
it. 
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 Appendix 3:  Research Invitations 
Examples of the short-form invitations sent via social media is shown below.  It was 
necessary to keep these very brief to fit the format of social media communications, 
so readers were redirected to a website with the formal Invitation (included on the 
next page), Participant Information Sheet and a hyperlink to the survey instrument. 
 
 
Targeting Laypersons via Facebook: 
 
We make decisions and form opinions about facts, money and risk every day; but 
beliefs of all sorts can make similar situations very different.  I am studying 
differences in how people find and use information, experience and knowledge that 
influence those decisions. 
 
Please take 15 minutes to contribute your views to my world-wide survey? It is 
anonymous, and asks you to select answers to simple multiple choice or rating type 
questions. There are no right or wrong answers.  
 
Also, please share this so we can build a global picture involving people in diverse 
industries and roles, and with diverse education, culture and experiences. 
 
Visit www.kerriodonnell.wordpress.com  
 
 
 
Targeting Auditors and Fraud Investigators via Facebook and LinkedIn professional 
groups: 
 
Please include your views in this international research 
 
I would like to learn from members of this group about the effects of different 
experiences. 
 
I am an accounting lecturer at the University of Tasmania, Australia, currently 
researching differences between laypeople and professionals (in 40 countries so far!) 
in how they find and use information, experience and knowledge to form opinions.   
 
The views of accountants, auditors, fraud specialists and corporate executives are 
especially important to my research because the input of high-level information 
analysts is vital for a quality data set. 
 
Will you please contribute 15 minutes to my PhD by taking my online survey?  
 
This survey is anonymous, and takes approximately 15 minutes to complete.   
 
Please visit www.kerriodonnell.wordpress.com for an overview of the project, an 
Information Sheet with participant FAQs, ethical clearance details, contact 
information – and of course, the survey. 
 
236 
  
[school letterhead]   
 
Subject:  Research Invitation 
 
I am undertaking my doctoral studies under the supervision of Associate Professor 
Trevor Wilmshurst and Dr William Maguire [retired] at the University of Tasmania, 
Australia.  Your answers will help me develop a method to measure attitudes to 
information, past experience and knowledge that influence decision making.  
Attached is a Participant Information Sheet, which further explains the project.   
 
The questionnaire asks simple questions about your views, and will take between 10 
and 20 minutes to complete, depending on your answers. 
 
The questionnaire is completely anonymous.  No identifiable personal information 
will be collected, and participation presents no risks to you.  Your consent to 
participate is implied by completion and submission of the survey. 
 
Participation is voluntary, but as I need as many responses as possible to satisfy the 
requirements of my research, so your participation will be very much appreciated.   
 
If you have any questions I can be contacted on (03) 6226 2755 or at 
Kerri.ODonnell@utas.edu.au.   My supervisors can be contacted at 
Trevor.Wilmshurst@utas.edu.au  or William.Maguire@utas.edu.au.  
 
Click HERE [hyperlink] to start the survey. 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
(03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. Please quote ethics reference 
number H0013643. 
 
Many thanks for your help, 
 
Kerri O’Donnell 
Doctoral Candidate 
 
Kerri.ODonnell@utas.edu.au  
University of Tasmania 
School of Accounting & Corporate Governance 
Private Bag 86 
Hobart, Tasmania, 7109 
AUSTRALIA 
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 Appendix 4:  Participant Information Sheet 
You are invited to participate in a research study investigating inputs to, and 
processes of, decision making.  This study is being conducted by Kerri O’Donnell in 
fulfilment of a PhD degree, under the supervision of Associate Professor Trevor 
Wilmshurst and Dr William Maguire [retired], at the University of Tasmania 
(Australia). 
 
Chief Investigator:   
Associate Professor Trevor Wilmshurst, University of Tasmania, School of 
Accounting & Corporate Governance, Locked Bag 1317, Launceston Tasmania 
7250, Australia.  Ph: +61 3 6324 3570.  Email: 
 Trevor.Wilmshurst@utas.edu.au  
 
Student Researcher: 
Kerri O’Donnell, University of Tasmania, School of Accounting & Corporate 
Governance, Private Bag 86, Hobart Tasmania 7001, Australia.  Ph: +61 3 6226 
2755.  Email: Kerri.ODonnell@utas.edu.au  
 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
We are particularly interested in exploring any differences in how people in different 
occupation groups balance the mix of information, prior knowledge and experience 
they draw on as inputs for judgments and decision making. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited because your views are relevant to the research.  The study is 
being conducted within the joint fields of Accounting and Corporate Governance, so 
groups of particular interest include those studying in either discipline, those 
employed in professional accounting or allied fields, and those involved in all types 
of businesses. 
 
You are eligible to participate in this study if you are aged 18 or over.  Participation 
in this study is entirely voluntary.  There will be no consequences for those 
individuals who do not wish to participate.   
 
What will I be asked to do? 
You are asked to answer an online questionnaire, which should take you no longer 
than 10-12 minutes to complete. 
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 You are asked to rate your personal views, so there are no correct or incorrect 
answers, just your views.  (The questions are all multiple choice.)   
 
Please answer the questions as honestly as possible, rather than choosing what you 
think the researchers might want you to. 
 
 
Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
The information gathered from this study may assist researchers in further 
understanding the ways in which people use information, prior knowledge and 
experience to make decisions.  Any significant differences that are identified 
between groups may help us to clarify expectations and improve communication 
between businesses and support organisations. 
 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks anticipated with participation in this study. 
 
Participation is anonymous.  As no personal identifying information will be 
collected, all answers will be treated confidentially. 
 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
You are free to withdraw from this study without providing an explanation if you do 
so before completing the questionnaire.  All incomplete responses will be removed 
from the research data.   
 
If you withdraw after completing the questionnaire, it will not be possible to remove 
your data from the study because responses are collected anonymously and are 
therefore unidentifiable. 
 
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
The research data will be securely stored in electronic (spreadsheet) format for 5 
years from the date of first publication, after which time the data will be destroyed.  
 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of this study will be published in a doctoral thesis in the first instance.  It 
is also intended that the results will be submitted for publication in at least one 
academic journal, in the form of an article. 
 
As the questionnaire is anonymous, you will not be identifiable in the publication of 
results. 
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 If you wish to access a report of the results, you are welcome to join a mailing list by 
emailing Kerri.ODonnell@utas.edu.au, with the phrase “doctoral study results 
mailing list” in the subject line.   The mailing list is open to interested people other 
than research participants, but in any case, your inclusion on the mailing list will not 
enable identification of any questionnaire responses as yours.   
 
The publication process can take considerable time, but you will certainly be notified 
when the first publication is available. 
 
What if I have questions about this study? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, please contact Associate 
Professor Trevor Wilmshurst on +61 3 6324 3570.  Also, please feel free to browse 
the School website to find out more about its research and about the people involved 
in this particular study. 
 
“This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
(03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote 
ethics reference number H0013643.” 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study.  Please understand that by 
completing and submitting the anonymous survey, consent to participate in this study 
will be implied.  This information sheet is yours to keep. 
 
The questionnaire is now available HERE (hyperlink). 
 
With thanks, 
 
Kerri O’Donnell 
Associate Lecturer & Doctoral Candidate 
University of Tasmania 
School of Accounting & Corporate Governance 
Private Bag 86 
Hobart, Tasmania, 7001 
Australia 
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 Appendix 5:  Initial Long-form Survey Instrument 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
1. Are you female or male? 
o Male 
o Female 
 
2. Which group includes your age? 
o 17 or younger 
o 18-20 
o 21-25 
o 26-35 
o 36-45 
o 46-55 
o 56-65 
o 66 or older 
 
3. What education have you completed, or substantially completed? 
o Did not complete high school 
o High school certificate or equivalent (e.g., GED, year 12) 
o Some college/university 
o Trade qualification 
o Bachelor degree 
o Professional certification 
o Graduate degree 
 
 
4. Are you currently enrolled as a student? 
o Yes, in a trade program / apprenticeship 
o Yes, at a college/university 
o Yes, in a professional program 
o Yes, in graduate school 
o Yes, in an informal program / other 
o No, I am not currently enrolled as a student 
 
 
5. Which of the following best describes your employment status? 
o Employed, working 1-39 hours per week 
o Employed, working 40 or more hours per week 
o Not employed, looking for work 
o Not employed, NOT looking for work 
o Full-time unpaid work (carer, etc) 
o Retired 
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 6. Most of your training and/or experience is within which industry group? 
 
 
 
7. Please indicate your main role(s). 
o Board member (not for profit) 
o Company director 
o CEO / CFO 
o Accountant or auditor 
o Law enforcement/Investigator 
o Small business owner / Self employed 
o Manager 
o Employee 
o Other (please specify) 
 
 
7a.  [CONDITIONAL] Your main directorship(s) have been in a(n): 
o Listed company 
o Unlisted public company 
o Private company 
 
 
8. Have you also worked or trained as an accountant? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
9. [CONDITIONAL] Your most senior accounting/audit role is: 
o Assistant 
o Graduate 
o Professionally qualified 
o Senior / Manager 
o Partner 
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 10. [CONDITIONAL] Your main accounting role involves: 
o Corporate / Management accounting 
o Public accounting (including tax and business advisory) 
o Internal audit 
o External audit (financial) 
o Other (please specify) 
 
 
11. In which country have you lived most? 
o Australia 
o China 
o United States of America 
o Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
TRAITS 
[This section is adapted from Wrightsman’s (1991) Trust Scale.  Respondents are 
required to select a point along a 5-point Likert scale for each of the fourteen items.] 
 
 
 
12. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
- Most students will tell the instructor when he has made a mistake in adding 
up their scores, even if he has given them more points than they deserve. 
- If you give the average person a job to do, and leave them to do it, he will 
finish it successfully. 
- People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, 
but few people stick to them when the chips are down. 
- People usually tell the truth, even when they know that they would be better 
off lying. 
- Nowadays people commit a lot of crimes and do bad deeds that go unnoticed. 
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 - If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure that they 
were not seen, they would do it. 
- Most students do not cheat when taking an exam. 
- Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. 
- Most people are basically honest. 
- If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will reciprocate with 
fairness towards you. 
- Most people lead clean, decent lives. 
- If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things to them in 
great detail and supervise them closely. 
- Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they’re afraid of 
getting caught. 
- Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had a chance. 
 
 
SKILLS  
[This section is adapted from Budner’s (1962) Intolerance of Ambiguity instrument.  
Respondents are required to select a point along a 5-point Likert scale for each of the 
sixteen items.] 
 
 
 
13. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
- An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t 
know much. 
- I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. 
- There is really no such thing as a problem that can’t be solved. 
- People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of 
living. 
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 - A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are 
always clear. 
- It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. 
- In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple 
problems rather than large and complicated ones. 
- Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don’t mind 
being different and original. 
- What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar. 
- People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how complicated 
things really are. 
- A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or 
unexpected happenings arise really has a lot to be grateful for. 
- Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient 
information. 
- I like parties where I know most of the people more than situations where all 
or most of the people are complete strangers. 
- Teachers and supervisors who hand out vague assignments give students a 
chance to show initiative and originality. 
- The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 
- A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at 
things. 
 
 
 [The next section is adapted from the Kashdan et al (2009) Curiosity and 
Exploration Inventory-II instrument.  Respondents are required to select a point 
along a 5-point Likert scale for each of the ten items.] 
 
 
 
14. Please rate the following ten statements for how accurately they reflect the way 
you generally feel and behave at this point in your life. 
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 - I actively seek as much information as I can in new situations. 
- I am the type of person who really enjoys the uncertainty of everyday life. 
- I am at my best when doing something that is complex or challenging. 
- Everywhere I go, I am out looking for new things or experiences. 
- I view challenging situations as an opportunity to grow and learn. 
- I like to do things that are a little frightening. 
- I am always looking for experiences that challenge how I think about myself 
and the world. 
- I prefer jobs that are excitingly unpredictable. 
- I frequently seek out opportunities to challenge myself and grow as a person. 
- I am the kind of person who embraces unfamiliar people, events and places. 
 
 
Have you ever undertaken training about any aspect of fraud? 
o No 
o Yes, informal 
o Yes, formal (part of a qualification) 
o Yes, formal (specialist qualification) 
 
 
 
Survey Terminology Disclosure Statement 
As explained in the Invitation and Information Sheet, the purpose of the research is 
to measure how people use information, experience and knowledge to make 
decisions.  Given that, it is very important that the research terminology does not 
lead participants toward answer choices that don’t genuinely reflect their views.   
One term, used throughout the research project, has been omitted from the 
questionnaire and preliminary information.  The term ‘scepticism’ represents how a 
particular balance of experience and knowledge are used to gather and assess 
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 information, which is what I hope to observe in the mix of responses.  That is – I am 
hoping to collect a range of definitions as determined by the collective responses.  
The purpose of omission is to elicit more authentic responses.  It would be 
counterproductive for me to provide definitions or alternate terminology because I’m 
trying to elicit a very wide variety of participants’ views of the issues from the 
ground up rather than top-down. 
The term “professional scepticism” is known to auditors, defined according to 
Auditing Standard ASA102 as “an attitude that includes a questioning mind, being 
alert to conditions which may indicate possible misstatement due to error fraud, and 
a critical assessment of audit evidence”.  The audit definition is highlighted in both 
undergraduate and professional education, is emphasised in the Auditing Standards, 
professional papers and regulatory recommendations, and is also prominent in legal 
cases against auditors.  Therefore use of the term would likely influence 
accountant/auditor respondents to select what they perceive to be a ‘most correct’ 
answer rather than that which most reflects their true perspective.  This would unduly 
bias the research data. 
The term is not understood in the same way by those outside the audit and related 
fields.  However, this is equally as problematic as the problem above, because 
colloquial usage is usually to mean ‘disbelief’, ‘doubt’ or ‘cynicism’.  Such 
misinterpretation of the research purpose and questions would influence respondents 
in to answer in ways that are not intended by the research.   
This research is interested in both these, and other, definitions of scepticism, as 
revealed in the responses of participants in this survey.   It is about your methods of 
evaluation and decision making, and the particular balance of information, 
experience and knowledge that you use to make decisions. 
If, after reading this disclosure statement, you wish to withdraw your data from the 
study, please close your browser without clicking the ‘submit’ link. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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 Appendix 6:  Per-Group Scale Item Descriptives 
 
Group 1 (QFI) Questionnaire Responses 
Qn # Theoretical Score Range Actual Range Mean Mode Standard Deviation 
1 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +1 3 1 1 0.54 
2 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 -1 1.10 
3 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 0.89 
4 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 1 1.07 
5 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 1 0.87 
6 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 -1 1.00 
7 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 1 0.73 
8 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 1 0.87 
9 -2 : +2 5 0 : +2 3 1 1 0.42 
10 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 1.06 
11 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 1 1.09 
12 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 1 1.13 
13 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 1.09 
14 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 0 0.91 
15 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 -1 1.09 
16 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 3 3 1.18 
17 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 3 1.12 
 
From this table, we observe that the range of responses to questions 1, 4, 5, 7 and 9 
was narrower than the aggregated results. 
 
Group 2 (Auditor) Questionnaire Responses 
Qn # Theoretical Score Range Actual Range Mean Mode Standard Deviation 
1 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 0.87 
2 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 -1 -1 1.13 
3 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 0 0.97 
4 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 -1 1.03 
5 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 0.92 
6 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 -1 0.92 
7 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 1.04 
8 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 1 0.8 
9 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 1 0.94 
10 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 -1 1.03 
11 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 1 1.04 
12 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 1 1 1.04 
13 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 0 1.11 
14 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 0 1.15 
15 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 -1 -1 1.1 
16 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 3 1.08 
17 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 2 1.11 
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 From this table, we observe that the range of responses to questions 3, 6 and 10 was 
narrower than the aggregated results.  This increase in consistency is across questions 
which are different to the questions which were answered more consistently by QFIs. 
 
Group 3 (SL) Questionnaire Responses 
Qn # Theoretical Score Range Actual Range Mean Mode Standard Deviation 
1 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +1 3 0 0 0.71 
2 (R) -2 : +2 5 -1 : +1 3 0 -1 0.99 
3 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +1 3 -1 -1 0.83 
4 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 1 0.82 
5 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +1 3 0 -1 0.95 
6 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 -1 1 1.42 
7 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 1 0.41 
8 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 1 0.87 
9 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 0 0 0.74 
10 (R) -2 : +2 5 -1 : +1 3 0 -1 0.98 
11 0 : 4 5 1 : 3 3 2 1 0.84 
12 0 : 4 5 0 : 3 4 2 1 0.98 
13 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 -1 -2 1.35 
14 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 1 1.04 
15 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 -1 -2 1.16 
16 0 : 4 5 1 : 3 3 2 2 0.54 
17 0 : 4 5 1 : 4 4 2 1 1.05 
 
From this table, we observe that the range of responses to all questions, with the 
exception only of question 13, was narrower than the aggregated results.  The most 
consistently answered item was question 7, which differs to the aggregated results as 
well as the QFI and Auditor results. 
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 Group 4 (NSL) Questionnaire Responses 
Qn # Theoretical Score Range Actual Range Mean Mode Standard Deviation 
1 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 2 1.01 
2 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 2 1.44 
3 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 2 1.35 
4 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 2 1.39 
5 -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 2 0.60 
6 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 1 1.34 
7 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 2 0.96 
8 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 2 1.02 
9 -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 1 2 0.99 
10 (R) -2 : +2 5 -1 : +2 4 1 2 1.04 
11 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 3 0.87 
12 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 3 4 1.18 
13 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 0 0 0.70 
14 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +2 5 0 0 0.68 
15 (R) -2 : +2 5 -2 : +1 4 -1 -1 0.60 
16 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 2 0.67 
17 0 : 4 5 0 : 4 5 2 1 0.84 
 
From this table, we observe that the range of responses to questions 1, 5, 10, 13 and 
15 was slightly narrower than the aggregated results.  Questions 1 and 5 were also 
answered more consistently by QFIs and SLs than is indicated for the Auditor group 
and the aggregated results as a whole, and question 10 reflects similarity with the 
Auditor and SL results.  However, the smaller range of responses to questions 13 and 
15 is unique to the NSL group. 
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Appendix 7:  Auditor Sub-scale Correlations 
Auditors in the Subjective Range SCEPT TRAIT SKILL BIAS 
K
en
da
ll'
s t
au
_b
 
SCEPT 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 .816 -.816 -1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .221 .221 . 
N 3 3 3 3 
TRAIT 
Correlation 
Coefficient .816 1.000 -1.000 -.816 
Sig. (2-tailed) .221 . . .221 
N 3 3 3 3 
SKILL 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.816 -1.000
** 1.000 .816 
Sig. (2-tailed) .221 . . .221 
N 3 3 3 3 
BIAS 
Correlation 
Coefficient -1.000
** -.816 .816 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .221 .221 . 
N 3 3 3 3 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Auditors in the Sceptical Range SCEPT TRAIT SKILL BIAS 
K
en
da
ll'
s t
au
_b
 
SCEPT 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 .677
** .229 -.598** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .207 .001 
N 19 19 19 19 
TRAIT 
Correlation 
Coefficient .677
** 1.000 -.184 -.416* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .312 .019 
N 19 19 19 19 
SKILL 
Correlation 
Coefficient .229 -.184 1.000 -.297 
Sig. (2-tailed) .207 .312 . .098 
N 19 19 19 19 
BIAS 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.598
** -.416* -.297 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .019 .098 . 
N 19 19 19 19 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Auditors in the Professional 
Scepticism Range SCEPT TRAIT SKILL BIAS 
K
en
da
ll'
s t
au
_b
 
SCEPT 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 .243 .208 -.114 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .140 .214 .480 
N 23 23 23 23 
TRAIT 
Correlation 
Coefficient .243 1.000 -.354
* .232 
Sig. (2-tailed) .140 . .033 .146 
N 23 23 23 23 
SKILL 
Correlation 
Coefficient .208 -.354
* 1.000 -.119 
Sig. (2-tailed) .214 .033 . .463 
N 23 23 23 23 
BIAS 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.114 .232 -.119 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .480 .146 .463 . 
N 23 23 23 23 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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